From ‘merchants and ministers’ to ‘neutral brokers’? Water diplomacy aspirations by the Netherlands – a discourse analysis of the 2011 commissioned advisory report

ABSTRACT

Water diplomacy agents typically manage tensions between promoting peace and securing self-interest. This paper conducts a discourse analysis of a commissioned policy report by a leading Netherlands think-tank that helped inform Dutch policy on water diplomacy. We first establish the importance of the report. We then identify its focus on the theme of ‘neutral broker’ and apply vocabulary analysis, argumentation analysis and metaphor analysis, together leading up to frame analysis. From this report and the larger water diplomacy literature, we propose that water diplomacy must be viewed in connection with discursive politics and trade promotion. We illustrate relevant methods for future enquiry.

KEYWORDS:

• Water diplomacy
• discourse analysis
• metaphor analysis
• frame analysis
• The Netherlands

Introduction: ‘water diplomacy: a niche for the Netherlands?’

An old cliché about who the Dutch really are – a mix of merchants and [religious] ministers – applies to foreign policy as well. (Lechner, 2008, p. 247).

One key area within the water sector is conflict resolution and peace in transboundary water basins (e.g. Conca, 2006; Wolf, 1997). Efforts to build an international legal regime around transboundary waters have not been successful, leaving the field to a multitude of institutional initiatives and approaches that govern through norm-building and soft law (Biermann & Pattberg, 2012; Conca, 2006). An important field within this transnational activity is ‘water diplomacy’ – a multi- and bilateral engagement of nation-states and non-state actors in building institutions, channelling investment, promoting regional development and preventing, mediating and transforming water conflicts (Pohl et al., 2014; Pohl & Swain, 2017; Zeitoun et al., 2020a). In the absence of a strong multilateral regulatory framework, third parties such as individual states have more space for water diplomacy activities (e.g. Zeitoun et al., 2020b).

The Netherlands has explicitly aspired to an international profile of excellence in water resources management (e.g. Government of The Netherlands (GoN), 2013, 2016, 2019; Minkman & Van Buuren, 2019; Büscher, 2019). Its exports of water-related infrastructure and services have grown steadily since the early 2000s onwards; from €4.1 billion in 2004 to €8.1 billion in 2015 (MacAusland, 2017). Exports include delta technology, such as flood protection works and integrated coastal development infrastructure, as well as planning and governance expertise around groundwater, surface water, water quality, coastal development, port construction and dredging (Büscher, 2019; Hasan et al., 2019; Kuijpers & Muntz, 2016; Minkman & Van Buuren, 2019). The Netherlands is also home to several relevant international organizations, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), and important research and training institutes, such as the IHE Delft Institute for Water Education and the Global Center on Adaptation (GoN, 2013; Knapen, 2012).

This paper focuses on the Netherlands’ orientation in international water diplomacy. The then Minister of Development Cooperation Ben Knapen referred to ‘water diplomacy’ as a strength of the Netherlands in the global arena (Knapen, 2011, 2012). He called for active engagement in such diplomacy in at least seven cross-border watershed areas: the Brahmaputra, Incomati, Nile, Mekong, Senegal, West Bank Aquifer and Zambezi (Knapen, 2011, 2012). During the period 2006–16, the Ministry's budget for aid projects in the water sector was €871 million, from which €107 million went to fund technical and institutional assistance projects in transboundary water basins (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (MFA-IOB), 2017).

We focus on the report commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 2011 to help determine its course of action on water diplomacy. Co-funding was provided by the Water Governance Centre (WGC), created in 2011 by the Dutch regional water authorities.¹ The government-linked think-tank on international affairs, the Clingendael Institute, wrote the report Water Diplomacy: A Niche for the Netherlands?, published in the same year, in English, under the authorship of Van Genderen and Rood (2011). This provided in 46 closely printed pages an overview of transboundary water governance and an analysis of the potential for the Netherlands to exercise influence and leadership. The report concluded that ‘water diplomacy or water conflict prevention, which has a strong political dimension, is a distinct opportunity for the MFA within this broader niche’ of water expertise (p. 29).

The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, we are interested in the tensions between portraying the Netherlands as neutral and yet exploring opportunities for the country to benefit from the increasing demand for water diplomacy and water governance expertise more generally and in how the 2011 report navigates them. Neutrality features prominently in the Clingendael report as well as in various speeches of Minister Knapen and government strategies on development cooperation and water diplomacy. Related to this first objective, we examine the choice to focus on conflict prevention and not conflict mediation as a strategy for the Netherlands; and we pay special attention to the ‘neutral broker’ theme, but within a larger understanding of the report and the broader context of Dutch water diplomacy and water governance.

Second, we illustrate the relevance in examining water governance of multi-method analysis of influential policy texts in their context, giving systematic attention to language and argumentation. The methods presented in this study can be used for critical interrogation of draft policies and debate on already published policy and strategic documents. The World Bank’s experiences in interrogating explicit and implicit assumptions in the reasoning of its experts is a sister example, of how more formal argumentation analysis can be employed in policymaking (World Bank, 2014); more such tools are desirable and we here present some. We hope to encourage other researchers to apply such methods to illuminate water policy and governance. They become especially relevant given the increasing importance of branding and other semiotic modes of seeking influence in water governance (e.g. Büscher, 2019; Gerlak & Mukhtarov, 2016; Joo & Heng, 2017; Minkman et al., 2018).

Any in-depth discourse analysis of a major document requires a paper in itself (see explanation in e.g. Van Dijk, 1996, 2016). Focusing though on one report only, however strategic is its status and timing, has limitations when seeking to characterize and diagnose a policy shift. Further analysis for our case should look into other key policy documents, such as International Water Ambition (GoN, 2016) and Netherlands International Water Ambition (GoN, 2019), and complement discourse analysis with interviews and focus group discussions.

Our choices of this report and the type of analysis we perform are justified as follows. First, the Clingendael report was commissioned and written at a time when the Netherlands government was seeking to reorient its foreign and international development policies. The report was based on interviews and questionnaires involving scores of Dutch and international experts and officials. It attracted significant attention; various government documents, think-tank and academic publications have referred to it.² We can see how it helped to shape the Netherlands’ policy on water diplomacy. Minister Knapen (Knapen, 2012, p. 12), in his letter to Parliament titled ‘Water in Development’, drew on Clingendael’s research on ‘opportunities for water diplomacy’; the emphasis of the report on framing of water diplomacy as conflict prevention (as opposed to a narrower involvement in conflict mediation) has been reflected in the later policy of the government, as expressed in International Water Ambition (GoN, 2016); and so was its explicit balancing of conflicting goals of water diplomacy (GoN, 2016, 2019).

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the background of the report, its structure and key characteristics, and applies word-choice analysis to explore its main themes through identifying key vocabulary and recurrent phrases. The third to fifth sections then apply in turn further discourse analysis methods, to shed light on the orientation to ‘niche diplomacy’ and on the declared stance of neutrality of the Netherlands as a potential preventer or mediator of transboundary water conflicts. Argumentation analysis (third section) and metaphor analysis (fourth section) lead up to an overall frame analysis in the fifth section that synthesizes a picture of the new Netherlands self-positioning within water diplomacy. The sixth section discusses the status and importance of our findings in relation to wider literatures. The seventh section concludes.

Background, structure and key themes of the report: content analysis

We approach a discourse as a set of connected utterances that advances a line of argument, makes readers focus on some issues while occluding or obscuring others, and has implications for how social reality comes to be seen and experienced (Hajer, 1995). We are influenced by the critical discourse analysis perspectives of, for example, Teun van Dijk (e.g. Van Dijk, 1996, 2016) and Ruth Wodak (e.g. Wodak, 2015). Through analyses of texts in relation to the contexts in which they have been written and are propagated, one can explore relationships of power, including by attention to problem- and solution-framing, the choices of metaphors (e.g. Kövecses, 2002), and the use of linguistic devices like the passive voice, naturalization and nominalization (e.g. Alexander, 2009). A large body of literature applies discourse analysis techniques to policy documents and reports, such as publications of governments and major international organizations (e.g. Moretti & Pestre, 2015), statements by political leaders, and media representations (e.g. Montessori et al., 2019). Some covers the fields of climate change (e.g. Fløttum et al., 2016; Gasper et al., 2013) and water diplomacy (e.g. Rigi & Warner, 2021).

After discussion of the policy context, the toolset we employ for the analysis has four further components. First, content analysis to identify the vocabulary chosen, including recurrent phrases; this helps to show relative emphases and occlusions, and to identify themes and questions for further exploration. Second, argumentation analysis based on close textual examination of strategic sections that present the main conclusions and advice; this helps to surface and test assumptions and logic, including especially the general warrants that are employed, often inexplicitly. It supports reflection on the habitual discourses that authors treat as authoritative (Gold et al., 2002). Third, metaphor analysis, for surfacing generative recurrently used premises and thought patterns. Policy players rely on metaphors to suggest complex relationships. Fourth, bringing together the insights obtained through the other methods, frame analysis specifies and assesses an overall system of ideas and its possible blind spots.

Beginning in the late 1990s, a coordinated effort of Dutch policy actors has essayed a unified and coherent strategy of engagement in global water affairs (Büscher, 2019; Gast, 2008). In 2010 the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR, 2010) published a report titled Less Pretention, More Ambition: Development Policy in the Times of Globalization in which it recommended the reorientation of development cooperation spending, to centre on a few themes that matched well to national economic, political and scientific priorities, including water. The MFA, informed by the WRR publication, then released a government strategy titled ‘The World to Gain’, which tightly linked development aid to the Netherlands’ trade and investment agenda (GoN, 2013). Furthermore, water and maritime activities were designated as one of the ‘top-sectors’ of the economy – a strategic export-oriented cluster supervised by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management and involving officials from the MFA and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate (Büscher, 2019). The private sector is broadly represented in the top-sector network and is supported by ministry officials at home and embassies’ personnel abroad (Büscher, 2019; RVO, 2019).

In February 2011, the Minister of Development Cooperation, Ben Knapen, outlined an ambitious vision for the government to support the Dutch water sector in international activities. In a special meeting with the sector representatives, Knapen (2011, p. 4) said:

Involvement of the (water) sector is meant, in simple and straightforward terms, to advance the trade positions of the Dutch private companies in developing countries. [However,] The most important goal of development aid, the money for which I, as a minister, am responsible in front of the Parliament, is and will remain the achievement of developmental outcomes. (authors’ own translation from Dutch)

He added (p. 5) that ‘this cabinet wants to move from aid to trade’ (authors’ own translation from Dutch). This vision was formalized in January 2012 when Knapen outlined his views on global water strategy in a letter to the Second Chamber of Parliament titled ‘Water for Development’ (Knapen, 2012). This policy paper placed the private sector at the centre of development cooperation and mentioned collaboration with other policy stakeholders such as universities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations’ (UN) organizations. Following various deliberations, the Netherlands government produced the global water strategy titled ‘International Water Ambition’ (GoN, 2016). All these documents stated the ambition of the Netherlands to become a global ‘centre of excellence’ in water affairs with the triple goals of promoting global public goods, achieving geopolitical and reputational gains, and advancing economic profits (e.g. Büscher, 2019; GoN, 2016, 2019; Minkman & Van Buuren, 2019; Mukhtarov, 2020). Development cooperation projects, including those funded by Dutch embassies worldwide on water conflict mediation and prevention, must be viewed in light of these triple goals (e.g. Hoebink, 2007, 2017).

These developments show the context in which the report of the Clingendael institute emerged and was received. Water Diplomacy: A Niche for The Netherlands? (Van Genderen & Rood, 2011) begins with an executive summary and an introduction. Chapter 1 then presents the sources of transboundary water conflicts and the types of responses. Chapter 2 discusses how ‘water diplomacy’ can be conceptualized, and the various types of possible objectives here for a middle-size power such as the Netherlands. It lists six sets of possible benefits, three of which are for the international community and three for the Netherlands itself (more status, influence and fulfilment of its values; more security; and more wealth; p. 15). Chapter 3 maps the key actors and networks of water diplomacy players, both internationally and in the Netherlands, and advocates the special suitability of the Dutch water sector to play leadership roles in water diplomacy. Chapter 4 puts forward policy recommendations and suggested conclusions for the MFA and relevant Dutch water institutions to consider.

The report was produced from ‘Clingendael’, the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, a research and training institute situated in The Hague. Clingendael describes itself as ‘an independent think tank and academy on international affairs which aims to contribute to a secure, sustainable and just world’ (Clingendael, 2021). It largely works for the Dutch government; 75% of its funding for 2017 was from ‘Dutch ministries’, and the MFA has been the traditional largest contributor (Clingendael, 2019). The authors of the report were Ruben van Genderen and Jan Rood. Van Genderen was a visiting fellow. Rood was and is senior research fellow at the Clingendael Institute and was responsible at that time for Clingendael’s strategic research programme.

The genre of the report is that of a prescriptive consultancy report giving options, recommendations and general guidance. It makes considerable use of economic jargon terms such as ‘supply and demand’ in an ‘international political market’ (13), ‘niches’ in such markets, investment in ‘global public goods’ (e.g. 2, 15, 17), ‘basic rationalist assumption’ (6) and others. It was based on a literature study, interviews with 48 experts on water policy and/or MFA officials, and a questionnaire sent to relevant Dutch embassies. Approaching 90% of the interviewees were Dutch. Specific mentions of the interviews and questionnaire responses are scarce throughout the document.

We turn now to identifying themes and keywords in the report, first through content (vocabulary) analysis. While ‘water diplomacy’ appears in the title and is the general framework of the report, the central focus is on transboundary conflicts and various means to prevent, mediate and resolve them. We ran a word frequency count³ for the whole document in the software AntConc (version 3.5.8) (Anthony, 2019). As seen from Table 1, the report focused on states, diplomacy, conflict and the place of the Netherlands. ‘Netherlands’ is the fourth most frequent word (excluding so-called stopwords such as ‘the’, ‘a’, ‘an’, ‘and’). In contrast, for example, the UN appears in ninth place. ‘Netherlands’ is considerably more frequent than even ‘conflict’ and twice as frequent as ‘governance’. ‘MFA’ and ‘niche’ are both more frequent than ‘cooperation’. ‘Conflict’ does open the report – it is the first word in the executive summary and the first topic that the document attempts to clarify in chapters 1 and 2. So, ‘conflict’ may constitute the initial problem-statement. However, its absence from the title and the fact that it is considerably less frequent than ‘diplomacy’ suggest that the report is more concerned with water diplomacy as a special niche, an opportunity, than directly with solutions to the problem of conflict.

Table 1. Word frequency count, analysis performed in AntConc 3.5.8 (excluding stopwords such as ‘the’, ‘a’, ‘an’, ‘and’).

Rank	Frequency	Word	Rank	Frequency	Word
1	537	Water	10	85	Development
2	210	International	11	84	Basin
3	152	Diplomacy	12	83	MFA
4	138	Netherlands	13	76	Niche
5	117	States	14	74	UNESCO
6	111	Conflict	15	72	Cooperation
7	106	Transboundary	16	71	Such
8	100	River	17	69	Governance
9	91	UN (70) + United Nations (21)

Analysis of collocates of the term ‘conflict’ helps to identify the concepts linked to it and the type of conflicts the report is concerned with (Table 2). Collocation analysis is a method within content analysis to explore the most frequent direct companions of a term in which the analyst is interested; it checks for ‘significant regularities in the use of word combinations’ (IDS, n.d.).⁴ Concordancing, the listing of all uses of a term, helps us to identify these recurrent combinations (Alexander, 2009), as well as to further explore the usages in context.

Table 2. Collocates of ‘conflict’, analysis performed in AntConc 3.5.8 (excluding stopwords; also for words with the stem ‘conflict’).

Rank	Frequency	Frequency (L)	Frequency (R)	Collocates
1	82	66	16	Water
2	52	3	49	Prevention
3	23	2	21	Resolution
4	21	17	4	Transboundary
5	18	3	15	Mediation
6	18	8	10	International
7	12	10	2	Role
8	11	1	10	Management
9	11	8	3	Diplomacy
10	10	4	6	Technical

Note: The table includes counts of 5 right and 5 left collocates of the word ‘conflict’.

‘Water’ and ‘transboundary’ are the most frequent left-collocates (i.e. words that immediately precede) of the term ‘conflict’, indicating the types of conflict being described. The right collocates are dominated by ‘prevention’, and to a significantly lesser degree, ‘resolution’ and ‘mediation’. ‘Conflict prevention’ is a concept in conflict/peace studies that emerged in Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s report for the United Nations titled An Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). This report marked a shift in the UN’s approach, by emphasizing preventive diplomacy. The term, along with peacebuilding, has remarkably expanded the field, which was hitherto focused on peacekeeping, to include measures to transform the socio-economic conditions of pre- or post-conflict societies. In the Clingendael report, ‘conflict prevention’ (49 occurrences) is used to justify the inclusion of instruments such as international water law, technical and development assistance, and training activities – areas where the Netherlands has a competitive advantage over most countries. The Netherlands can further benefit from its links with international organizations and training programme opportunities (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2014). Meanwhile, concepts such as ‘conflict resolution’ (21 occurrences) and ‘conflict mediation’ (15 occurrences) are less prominent in the report.

By emphasizing ‘conflict prevention’ over ‘resolution’ or ‘mediation’, the report appears to centre its representation of the issue on preventive diplomacy. Conflict resolution takes more of a backseat; it is often evoked in the report through other terms such as ‘mediation’, ‘negotiation’ and ‘fact-finding’, terms that do not suggest as great a scope for involvements as ‘conflict prevention’ allows. One plausible hypothesis is that ‘conflict prevention’ is emphasized partly because it offers a larger space for the Netherlands to be involved in transboundary river basins globally; prevention can encompass economic, social and political activities of various kinds. It matches the economic incentives that drive Dutch global water activities (as argued by, e.g., Büscher, 2019; Hasan et al., 2019; Minkman & Van Buuren, 2019; Zegwaard et al., 2019).

In the next two sections we explore the focus on ‘conflict prevention’ and the notion of ‘neutral broker’. The first of these sections provides an argumentation analysis of a key passage in which several of the report’s conclusions are presented. Looking at that passage next, with reference also to the executive summary, gives a fuller feel for the content of the report, and a helpful basis for the subsequent sections.

Argumentation analysis

Gasper and Apthorpe (1996) describe various ways in which discourse analysis may be attempted in public policy and development studies, including by argumentation analysis. Argumentation analysis has a venerable tradition in rhetoric studies, in logic and in formal linguistics studies. The version articulated by Gasper (1996) explores the logic of a text through a combination of: (1) Toulmin’s format for looking at a particular proposition or well-knit set of propositions, which has been widely applied to policy arguments (Toulmin, 1958); (2) the more open-ended exploratory methods of Scriven (1976) and others for specifying and then assessing the components and structure of extended sets of propositions that make up broad arguments; and (3) (use of) compilations of possible fallacies in argument (Gasper & Apthorpe, 1996, p. 11).

Scriven requires attention to textual detail, always in relation to the textual and extra-textual contexts. Such close and slow reading of a text allows for detailed commenting on word choices and connotations, implications, assumptions, tropes and other rhetorical choices.

We apply the format of text analysis tables, developed by Gasper (2000) for underpinning argumentation analysis, to the following extract. It occurs at a key stage in the conclusions chapter at the point where the report turns to advise the ministry on its future role. The first subsection of that advice is titled ‘The MFA as a Neutral Broker Through IOs’ and opens as follows:

The Minister for Development Cooperation recently argued that the Netherlands could function as mediator in national and transboundary water conflicts due to its technical expertise of water governance and its neutrality (Knapen, 2011).⁵ Regarding national water conflicts, this is certainly the case since Dutch water governance experts and hydrologists are advising states such as China, Syria, Egypt, Bangladesh, and many others. The qualitative research gathered through interviews with and questionnaires from water experts and policy advisors indicates a more complex answer regarding transboundary water conflict mediation. Water hegemons, such as India, China and Turkey, are often not keen on third-party involvement. The Netherlands is generally perceived as neutral, but riparian states still favour UN parties or the World Bank as a facilitator or a mediator. The MFA is, therefore, in general advised to focus on conflict prevention, although two options remain for the MFA if it wants to play a part in water conflict resolution. (p. 29)⁶

This extract illustrates two central features of the report: the assertion that the Netherlands is better off pursuing conflict prevention rather than resolution, partly contrary to the direction argued earlier by the minister, and the theme of neutrality. Dissecting the extract, which opens the part of the conclusions that proposes the role of ‘neutral broker’ (p. 29), will also give the reader some more intimate feel of the report. Table 3 comments in detail on this paragraph.

Table 3. Stepwise analysis of arguments for adoption of focus on prevention and of an indirect ‘neutral broker’ role.

The text, divided into components	Consider meanings	Identify possible conclusions and assumptions
The MFA as a Neutral Broker Through IOs	Section title	Semi-stated conclusion: NL^a can play a neutral broker role
The Minister for Development Cooperation recently argued that the Netherlands could function as mediator in national and transboundary water conflicts due to its technical expertise of water governance and its neutrality (Knapen, 2011)	Praise terms: ‘mediator’, ‘expertise’ and ‘neutrality’ The technical prowess of the Netherlands is seen as a ground to be a ‘mediator’ in conflicts; this is not self-evident ‘Argued’ signifies merits to the statement but also makes it open to criticism (other terms could convey stronger authoritative judgement: ‘conclude’, ‘determine’, etc.)	[1] Unstated assumption: the Minister's argument deserves attention [2] Unstated assumption (of the Minister): technical prowess and perceived neutrality are sufficient for the Dutch to act as an effective mediator in national and transboundary water conflicts
Regarding national water conflicts, this is certainly the case since Dutch water governance experts and hydrologists are advising states such as China, Syria, Egypt, Bangladesh and many others	‘Certainly’ is a praise term expressing firm agreement. The praise is the polite prelude to subsequently disagreeing with the Minister ‘Experts’ is more favourable than ‘consultants’	[3] Half-stated conclusion: part of the Minister's argument is true, regarding mediation in intra-national water conflicts. The present involvements, regardless of their efficacy, imply potential for further involvement
The qualitative research gathered through interviews with and questionnaires from water experts and policy advisors indicates a more complex answer regarding transboundary water conflict mediation	‘Complex’ leaves obscure the extent of something and partly veils the subsequent disagreement with the Minister. The piling up of the terms ‘research’, ‘interviews’, ‘questionnaires’, ‘experts’ and ‘advisors’ (rather than just saying ‘research’) similarly prepares for that disagreement	[4] Unstated assumption: the complex answer found in the authors’ research provides better grounds to argue about transboundary water conflicts [5] Unstated conclusion or suggestion: since the researchers have conducted in-depth research and consulted water experts and policy advisors, they know better
Water-hegemons, such as India, China and Turkey, are often not keen on third-party involvement	‘Hegemon’ may overstate these large and/or upriver countries’ dominance. Choice of the term contributes to opposing the MInister's argument	[6] Unstated assumption: opposition by a hegemon prevents third-party involvement, even if that party is technically superior [7] Unstated assumption: ‘third-party’ applies to all states outside the riparian states, and puts those countries on at best the same footing as IOs such as the UN
The Netherlands is generally perceived as neutral, but riparian states still favour UN parties or the World Bank as a facilitator or a mediator		[8] Unstated assumption: neutrality is required for an effective mediator (because otherwise no reason to mention it) [9] Unstated assumption: third party involvement follows riparian states’ preference [10] Unstated conclusion: so, even if NL is not seen as partisan, there is no niche here
The MFA is, therefore, in general advised to focus on conflict prevention, although two options remain for the MFA if it wants to play a part in water conflict resolution^b	‘if it wants’ gives the ministry space to drop the minister’s stated view	[11] Stated conclusion: NL should focus on conflict prevention [12] Unstated assumption: a role in conflict prevention is unrelated to a mediator role [13] Unstated assumption: the Minister's argument, despite being not fully true, should be respected by identifying options to pursue it (which are subsequently explained)

Notes: ^aNL, the Netherlands.

^bPages 29–30 of the report then immediately specify these two options: (1) a neutral broker upon request (which should be from all parties); and (2) action through other organizations, including the EU and the PCA (whose Secretary-General ‘is traditionally Dutch’, p. 30).

Table 4 then presents each argumentation step, using the Toulmin format: claim, data provided, warrant for linking the data and claim, and possible rebuttals (Toulmin, 1958; Toulmin et al., 1984). It forms an argumentation synthesis table where the relations between the identified conclusions/outputs (‘claims’) and assumptions/inputs (labelled as ‘data’ for the more empirical and as ‘warrants’ for the more theoretical and normative ones) are presented. Space is provided also for possible objections (‘rebuttals’) and qualifications, whether presented by the report itself or added as commentary here (in italics) as part of assessing the strength of the position.

Table 4. Argument structure for the advocacy of involvement in conflict prevention and a qualified ‘neutral broker’ role.

The report proposes that (Claim),	given that (Data)	and the principle(s) that (Warrant),	unless (Rebuttal(s) and Qualifications)
NL should focus its water diplomacy on conflict prevention. [11]	NL is well qualified for involvement in foreign and inter-national water matters. [See next row] [A possible tacit belief that: Prevention activities offer far more profitable opportunities]	There is no major direct niche for NL in inter-national water conflict mediation [see below]. [10] [External comment: Nor, perhaps, is there any niche in intra-national mediation]	[Possible external criticisms: Role in conflict prevention may require acceptance as a mediator; NL's expertise is not sufficiently relevant]
NL is well qualified for involvement in foreign and inter-national water matters. [0]	The Minister says so, …	… on the grounds that NL has great water expertise and is neutral. [2], [8]	[Report’s own rebuttal/qualifier:] NL will not be welcome in inter-national water conflicts. [10] [And possible external criticism: NL is not always considered neutral]
There is no major direct niche for NL in inter-national water conflict mediation. [10]	Riparian states determine whether involvements of third parties are accepted. [9]	Opposition by local hegemon state-parties vetoes involvement of 3rd parties; [6]; especially of third-party states, for their position is less favourable than IOs. [7]	[Possible external criticism: neutrality is perhaps not essential to be an effective mediator]
The Minister’s proposal for inter-national conflict mediation by NL is not strongly founded but we identify some more effective ways to pursue this ambition. [3], [4] [and next row]	Our advice is based on complex relevant research. [5]	The Minister is the Minister and must be respected. [cf. 1]	[Possible counter-arguments: The Minister's view is also based on careful research; and/or based on other foreign/domestic policy considerations. And: (If) the report’s research is thin and flawed]
Within inter-national water conflict resolution, the MFA should focus on promoting the roles of the two relevant International Courts	These two Courts are located in The Hague and have contributed in such cases (Report p. 2: Permanent Court for Arbitration, in arbitration; International Court of Justice, in adjudication)	The Courts have a treaty-based potential for jurisdiction, a stronger grounding than NL has. Their location in The Hague enables MFA influence	Qualification. MFA can also: work with other parties; respond to any direct requests; and encourage ratifications of the UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE Water Convention (though this is possibly more relevant for conflict prevention)

The two tables are partners (Gasper & George, 1998). The text analysis table provides materials for the argumentation synthesis table: ideas regarding the text’s premises (proposed data and assumptions) and conclusions (stated, half-stated, or implied). These items are enumerated [within square brackets] to show the links between the tables. We use the term ‘identify’ in the sense economists do when speaking of ‘the identification problem’, meaning how to estimate underlying structures from partial data. The ‘identifications’ are thus often hypotheses, and are sometimes qualified because language, especially political language, is often inevitably or deliberately somewhat ambiguous. Like any hypothesis, they are not generated by formula but by substantive thinking about content. They are then partly tested and revised by the work done in the synthesis table, where we are led to look for patterns, linkages, and further unstated assumptions and implications. Often some hypotheses in early drafts of the analysis table have to be amended or dropped when we look more holistically via a synthesis table. Together the tables produce what is still an interpretation, subject to further discussion and checking and influenced by theories and other ideas; but it is an interpretation that is systematic, probing, disciplined and explicit, precisely oriented to such discussion and examination, unlike what we are likely to achieve through ordinary reading and talking.

The dissection in the tables reveals the authors’ care in expressing disagreement with the Minister. The raison d’être of the ‘neutral broker’ sections of the report may be to extend the recommended main focus on conflict prevention, thus respecting Minister Knapen’s advocacy of conflict mediation, given a presumption that some relevant grounds inform the minister’s argument and/or given the minister’s status. The MFA and the Netherlands Ministry of Defence are the largest sources of the institute’s income (Clingendael, 2019). While the report is more emphatic in advocating a focus on conflict prevention, rather than for a direct ‘neutral broker’ role, it does leave space for such a role ‘upon request’ or in collaboration with international organizations and after careful analysis (pp. 23, 29).

The question that we formulated above remains: the tension between stated neutrality and the economic and geopolitical incentives of the Netherlands. We therefore analyse the ‘neutral broker’ theme further, within a metaphor analysis.

Metaphor analysis: ‘games’, ‘orchestra’ and ‘neutral broker’

We have applied Steger’s (2007) methodology for metaphor analysis, in four stages; we draw ideas also from Schmitt (2005). First, we looked through the document for major metaphors; second, we selected three metaphors or groups of metaphors because of their connection to the issue of neutrality. One group concerns ‘games’, one concerns ‘orchestrating’, with the Netherlands as conductor of an international orchestra of players, and the last and most frequent is the ‘neutral broker’ trope. Third, we discuss these metaphors in general terms; and fourth, we discuss them in relation to the particular context and usages of the report. We found that we need to interweave the third and fourth stages, for the type of general discussion that is relevant depends first on interpreting the meanings of the metaphors in context.

The game-related metaphors include ‘player’ (four uses), ‘zero-sum games’ (one use) and ‘win–win’ (four uses). ‘Game’ is used in the game-theory sense of competitive interaction rather than in the sense of recreation and entertainment (Table 5). Originally ‘win–win’ is used to refer to conflict management through finding arrangements relevant to all conflicting parties (p. 7) and connects to the concept of ‘benefit-sharing’ that is prominent in transboundary water governance studies (e.g. Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008). But the usage evolves to refer to the potential for reducing others’ conflicts while at the same time making money from giving advice and from conflict prevention activities that could also lead to further business. For example, the report states: ‘The MFA, in close cooperation with EL&I, should enable win–win situations of conflict prevention via technical advice and economic spin-offs’ (p. 24).⁷ A caveat follows immediately: ‘However, there can be a tension between the two activities, which asks for inter-ministerial harmonization’ (p. 24) between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs. Conflicts of interest may arise between money-making and conflict prevention. In some parts of the report these two are mentioned next to each other implying the ‘win–win’ scenario (e.g. Figure 1 on p. 15), whereas at other points the report calls attention to ‘tensions’ between them (pp. 23, 24, 32) and requests specific Dutch governmental actors to mitigate these. The repetitive use, relative elaboration and central role in the overall story of the report makes attention to this family of metaphors important.

Table 5. ‘Game’ metaphors in the report.

Identification of the metaphor group	‘The benefit-sharing model is essentially based on issue-linkage, since it tries to turn zero-sum games into win–win situations by combining various benefits’ (p. 7). This early usage refers to win–win among the conflicting parties, as common in transboundary water studies (e.g. Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008). ‘The MFA, in close cooperation with EL&I, should enable win–win situations of conflict prevention via technical advice and economic spin-offs. However, there can be a tension between the two activities, which asks for inter-ministerial harmonization’ (p. 24). Now win–win refers instead to the conflicting parties on the one hand but also the Netherlands on the other hand as a potential economic beneficiary ‘With all these actors present, the Netherlands will not be able to be internationally acknowledged as the main player in the entire water diplomacy niche’ (p. 28, emphasis in the original)
Identify intuitively felt associations	Competitive interactions, especially in the zero-sum case, but with potential for mutually beneficial outcomes/cooperation (‘win–win’). It fits the current Dutch approach to foreign aid: ‘good for the world, good for the Netherlands’
Identify dimensions/aspects of the metaphor	(1) Players who interact; (2) differential pay-offs for the players, depending on how they interact; (3) competitive dimension, as reflected in the possibility of ‘zero-sum games’ (one player’s gain is another player’s loss); and (4) also, possible cooperative potentials – some games contain ‘win–win’ possibilities for some or all players via choice of interaction patterns
Identify specific features/roles in the given context	Large number of organizations and states involved in water conflicts and/or the water sector. While the Netherlands cannot become ‘main player in the entire water diplomacy niche’ (p. 28), it can make itself central in roles drawing on strengths in capacity-building, technical consultancy and international water law (p. 29)
Compare with other available metaphors and other situations where this metaphor occurs	In contrast to the metaphor of orchestra-and-conductor, here a player does not synchronize all other players, but instead plays with/against them. However, in the case of ‘issue-linkage’ and ‘benefit-sharing’, which are forms of ‘win–win’ that are discussed in the report concerning the interactions of two (or more) competing actors, external actors may be involved to ensure coordination
Does the metaphor fit in an overall story?	The report is clear that NL as a state (represented by the MFA) and as an economy (again represented by the MFA) is a player, and as such is partly in competition with the rest of the players, such as the US and UN (p. 28); not simply neutral. At the same time, the report presents NL/MFA as neutral. This ambiguity is better handled by the ‘neutral broker’ language, which more readily accommodates the proposed complementarity of water diplomacy and economic diplomacy (p. 3)

Games often have referees, required to be neutral, but that metaphor is not used; it would convey neutrality but also control and power. Instead, in its conclusions the document switches to an orchestra-and-conductor metaphor (two uses, in the executive summary and the conclusions; pp. 2, 33), to suggest both the win–win character and the centrality of the Netherlands in the envisaged system of relationships (Table 6).

Table 6. The ‘orchestra’ metaphor.

Identification of the metaphor/group	‘The MFA should aim to orchestrate the European and domestic activities in a way that adds [to] more than the sum of its parts’ (p. 2) ‘If the Netherlands wants to fulfil a role as a neutral broker, a central hub, an enabler, and a norm entrepreneur, the challenge for the MFA is to conduct the orchestra’ (p. 33)
Identify intuitively felt associations	To orchestrate implies to coordinate the actions of many different people at once. It requires skill and authority
Identify dimensions/aspects of the metaphor	Actors: conductor, various instrument players, audience To orchestrate/conduct: action leads to complex synchronized complementary activities Productive outcome: music is performed
Identify specific features/roles in the given context	‘To orchestrate’: implies the role of the MFA is that of leader and expert, well-versed in the issues at hand; a highly prestigious role
Compare with other available metaphors and other cases where this metaphor occurs	Compared with metaphors about games: whereas NL cannot be the ‘main player’ amongst many other competing players, the orchestra-and-conductor metaphor reflects similar ambitions – wanting to be central, the most prominent – but in a more plausible frame for their fulfilment. The final page of the main text concludes with this metaphor (p. 33) and is now explicit about the MFA as the conductor, and this time for all four roles (international hub, enabler, norm entrepreneur, mediator), not just one. The referee metaphor has a clearer neutrality meaning but is weaker in putting NL in control of activities. The ‘hub’ metaphor links well with the orchestra metaphor
Does the metaphor fit in an overall story?	It is only used twice. It does not easily fit the genre of the paper; the musical metaphor jars against the economic jargon and metaphors of competitive games or building^a

Note: ^a‘Build’ and ‘building’ (of trust, capacity, peace, consortia, community, confidence) occur 38 times. We give them less attention here since they are less connected to the neutrality theme.

The report relies considerably more though on the ‘neutral broker’ metaphor (11 users), see Table 7. This links from a source domain of business deals to a target domain of promoting peace (Kövecses, 2002). ‘Broker’ originally means not just an intermediary but a business dealer. ‘A broker is a person or firm who arranges transactions between a buyer and a seller for a commission when the deal is executed. […] The word “broker” derives from Old French broceur “small trader”’ (Wikipedia, 19 December 2020); and emerged as a term in ‘Middle English (denoting a retailer or pedlar)’ (www.lexico.com, 12 March 2020). The report uses ‘broker’ unaccompanied by ‘neutral’ only once, on p. 32, with regard to the MFA’s intermediary role between international fora and Dutch agents who can benefit from opportunities arising in those fora.⁸ Elsewhere the water diplomacy context requires addition of the adjective ‘neutral’. The phrase ‘neutral broker’ aptly hints at a desired combination of minister/preacher and merchant: a state that can fulfil roles as an international hub, enabler, norm entrepreneur and mediator, promoting peace while at the same time actively promoting its own country’s businesses. It operates in the spirit of the bourgeois world order in whose birth the Netherlands was a central arena and ‘player’: the world order constructed after Europe’s 17th-century wars of religion. In it ‘the passions’ that underlie violent conflict are supposed to be tamed by and redirected into ‘the interests’ that drive the wheels of commercial market society (Hirschman, 1977, 1986).

Table 7. The ‘neutral broker’ metaphor.

Identification of the metaphor/group	Eleven uses, e.g. ‘A neutral broker plays a role in conflict resolution, by itself or via IOs’ (p. 22)
Identify intuitively felt associations	(1) An intermediary between parties, (2) who is neutral in relation to the parties, and (3) yet may have own (perhaps economic) interests^a
Identify dimensions/aspects of the metaphor	Business is the source domain (‘broker’) and promotion of peace is here the target domain (thus ‘neutral broker’)
Identify specific features/roles in the given context	In a business-dominated society, brokering is respected; earning well while intermediating between others. Here, the metaphor usefully combines peace-orientation with business language that suggests a business-like professional approach but also gives room for pursuit of own (economic) interests
Comparison with other available metaphors and other cases where this metaphor occurs	Game metaphors may be more open, perhaps too open, about pursuit of own interests The simpler metaphor of the pure broker is used when referring only to open facilitation of NL’s economic activity Orchestra metaphor indicates a facilitator role; it gives an uplifting public image but is only used for a parting final phrase in the report and in the summary. ‘Neutral broker’ term is more functional
Does the metaphor fit in an overall story?	Yes, for it combines both ‘minister’ and ‘merchant’

Note: ^aFor example, Burke (2005).

The report mostly uses the term ‘neutral broker’ for the role of influence via IOs. But sometimes it talks about direct mediation ‘on request’ and suggests that as the Netherlands’ water sector contributions grow and become recognized then more such requests will arise (p. 29; also pp. 22, 23).

Annex 5 of the report, titled ‘The role and required qualities of water diplomats’, summarizes ideas found in the existing literature. Being perceived as neutral is mentioned first in the list of 10 relevant features. While the list is not explicitly in order of importance, mentioning perceived neutrality first, before technical water knowledge in general and ‘technical, economic and political expertise of the basin’, is suggestive. This stress on neutrality, combined with the self-perception of neutrality of the Netherlands, make the report’s advancement of a ‘neutral broker’ conception further understandable. It permeates beyond the limited niche of ‘on request’ mediation and influence via the international courts, to convey the idea of a state responsibly busy both in water diplomacy and in doing water business.

Frame analysis: what is the problem represented to be?

We can now attempt to characterize the report’s overall intellectual structure and framing, using results from the previous sections and also going further. There are many ways of studying frames and framing. One widely used method developed for public policy studies is ‘What is the Problem Represented to Be?’ (or WPR for short) (Bacchi 2009).⁹ This asks six (sets of) questions to help specify the framings used in a policy stance. In Table 8 we apply these questions to the water diplomacy report. Not all can readily be answered; the table opens an agenda for further work. But some things are evident. We comment here in the text on the first, second and fifth questions.

Table 8. Applying Bacchi’s ‘What is the Problem Represented to Be?’ (WPR) format to the Netherlands water diplomacy report.

1. What’s the problem represented to be?	The human problem is international/basin-wide conflicts over (intra-continental) waters; but the problem/question addressed in the report is: How can NL fruitfully invest in water diplomacy? More specifically, the policy problem is how to use the opportunities implied by NL’s situation (its knowledge, history, contacts, reputation, etc.). One sub-problem/constraint identified is the difficult nature of conflict resolution work;^a to which the proposed response is a focus instead on prevention. So, this proximate problem too is formulated in relation to Dutch involvement, rather than in relation to the lack of human security
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the problem?	(a) Using MFA resources for NL’s own advantage is appropriate. Likewise, water conflict resolution is not something the MFA should get involved in if it is not beneficial for the MFA/NL, and then only upon request, subject to careful consideration and usually in collaboration with/through IOs (b) NL can be effective in water conflict prevention due to its deep knowledge, high reputation and wide network in the water sector (c) For conflict mediation/resolution, NL can ‘promote the role of the PCA in facilitating water conflict arbitration and similarly for the ICJ concerning adjudication’ (p. 2), two organizations that are based in NL. Underlying presumptions include: these IOs have the capacity and interest for taking these roles; the MFA has the capacity to influence them to play the roles; and because these IOs reside in the NL a larger role for them would mean a larger role for NL
3. How has the representation of the problem come about?	(a) Evolution of views in mainstream Dutch polity and society regarding expenditures on international cooperation (b) Specific experiences where selfless activity backfired for the mediator/peace-keeper’s reputation (as implied on p. 29), for example, the Srebrenica genocide in 1995 in which the Dutch state was later found legally culpable (BBC, 2017) (c) Although both the UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE water convention eventually formally came into force later (2016), the recognized failure by 2011 of both to be widely adopted and ratified had left room for individual actors on this policy stage
4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the problem be ‘thought’ differently?	Silences: (a) No explicit mention of the roles of non-European powers in resolution/mediation (b) Water-hegemons are presented only as problematic; but ‘Hegemons are not necessarily impediments to cooperation; they can also facilitate it’ (Pohl et al., 2014, p. 27) (c) All the riparian states mentioned as needing conflict resolution/mediation are non-Western (China, Syria, Egypt, Bangladesh, India, China and Turkey) (d) The only IOs that are mentioned to help resolve/prevent conflict are those based in the North Can be thought differently: Often bilateral agreements may not need a third party, or have brought in a third party in a well-defined role as prescribed by a treaty. For example, India and Bangladesh managed to institute benefit-sharing through the 1996 agreement over the Ganges River (Pohl et al., 2014, p. 28); and India and Pakistan settled their 2011 conflict through the PCA following a provision of the Indus agreement from 1960 (Sarfraz, 2013)
5. What effects are produced by this representation of the problem?	(a) The representation of attempted water conflict resolution as risky brings a focus on conflict prevention. This steers NL’s external involvements towards a larger field with more economic opportunities (b) A perception that there are many developing countries in the world without technical knowledge and expertise in water governance and diplomacy, hence requiring external, specifically Dutch, assistance – with ‘economic spin-offs’ for NL (c) The presentation of the Netherlands as having a reputation for neutrality, which is conducive to use of the ‘neutral broker’ concept
6. How/where is this representation of the problem produced, disseminated and defended? How could it be questioned, disputed, disrupted?	The literature on water conflicts has tended to treat the field as volatile and high-risk: Wolf indicated the common ‘playing up … [of the] warning of future “water wars”’ (Wolf, 1997, p. 361); ‘much of the initial scholarly work on water conflicts focused on the potential for so called “water wars”’ (Blank, 2012) In parallel to that, discourses of priority to national self-interest and of private sector-led development have valorized foreign policy activity that centres on promotion of national corporate sales Questions that could be raised might include: To what extent can the actions taken by NL be perceived as ‘neutral’? Which indicators of neutrality should be used? Who should make such an assessment? When does history show pursuit of short-term self-interest as short-sighted?

Note: ^aFor example, ‘The goodwill to facilitate negotiations can backfire if one of the parties does not want to alter the status quo and blames the mediator for the failure of the negotiations’ (p. 29).

First, on what is presented as the policy problem. Strikingly, the report only uses the word ‘problem’ twice, and then not in terms of ‘what is the problem addressed in this report?’. For as we saw, the focus was already given: How can the Netherlands increase its profile in transboundary water governance? Transboundary water conflicts, which in other contexts could appear as the central problem, appear in this context instead as opportunities.

Second, on underlying presuppositions. The Netherlands is considered to have high potential in this (designated ‘top’) sector, from being neutral, expert and well connected, including via the IOs it hosts. Further, foreign policy is understood as an instrument for national advantage. It is notable, for example, that neither the ICJ nor the PCA are presented in the document simply as multilateral organisms to settle conflicts in a neutral and legal way, but are seen as agencies through which the Netherlands can exercise significant influence. The positions too of the then Prince Willem-Alexander of Orange in the international water world and of the secretary-general of the PCA are not presented simply as posts to serve the international community, but as positions of influence that benefit the agendas of the Netherlands.¹⁰

The report says that the Netherlands ‘can’ adopt a neutral broker role in conflict resolution (p. 29), and then goes on to restrict that recommended role to action through other organizations and/or upon request. Pervasive through the report though is the theme that the Netherlands has a role due to the existence of transboundary water conflicts, its neutral nature and its exceptional capacities. We acknowledge the special capacities; but from the assumptions and silences identified above we suggest that neither is the situation diagnosis very strong (concerning the intensity of conflict, or the presumed inadequacies of the conflicting parties) nor is the Netherlands a ‘neutral’ player devoid of economic, geopolitical and reputational interests. However, we suggest too that the ‘neutral broker’ language illustrates a fundamental characteristic of the report – how a country is able to brand itself as both neutral and as the country to do business within this field.

Relating the ‘niche diplomacy’ report to the water diplomacy literature

This section relates our findings to the recent scholarly work in the field of water diplomacy. We have had two objectives in this paper: first we aspired to explore how the 2011 report navigated tensions between portraying the Netherlands as neutral and yet exploring opportunities for the country to benefit from the increasing demand for water diplomacy and water governance expertise more generally. As part of this objective, we investigated the choice to focus on conflict prevention and not conflict resolution. The second objective was to show how discourse-analytical methodology provides valuable tools for studying such water diplomacy efforts.

Three suggested findings have emerged from pursuing these objectives. First, we noted how the language of neutrality is used in order to legitimize the Netherlands’ efforts to merchandise its water sector next to building peace. Second, we noted that the focus on conflict prevention and not resolution may indicate the desire of the Netherlands to broaden the playing field for its water sector actors. This is in line with the strategy of the government of the Netherlands to promote the aid-and-trade agenda and may reflect the growing competition among water diplomacy agents over potential markets. We added that further research is needed to ascertain these initial findings. Third, we suggest that the methodology applied in this paper is helpful in studying soft power in water diplomacy.

With regard to our first finding, the efforts of the Netherlands to position itself as a global hydro-hub and to benefit from water diplomacy are not unique to this country. Zeitoun et al. (2020a, p. 109) write that ‘[w]ater diplomacy is increasingly seen as a way for countries to advance national and often military interests rather than simply reach agreement about a transboundary resource’. The United States of America (2017, pp. 6, 11) openly states that along with the goals of poverty reduction and building peace and security, it aims to ‘open up international markets to U.S. technologies and approaches’. Pohl & Swain (2017, pp. 22–23) pointed to the problematic nature of such endeavours; they claimed that geopolitical, military and economic interests of third-party agents have contributed to focusing on tangible but fragile agreements in the Nile and the Mekong river basins instead of pursuing longer term transformative outcomes. Water diplomacy is thus an inherently political endeavour in which all the parties have their own, multiple and at times conflicting rationales for getting involved (e.g. Büscher, 2019; Pohl et al., 2014; Pohl & Swain, 2017; Zeitoun et al., 2020a, 2020b). In this light, the Netherlands’ strategy, and the use of a self-image as ‘neutral broker’, should be viewed with caution. Further research could investigate how far other water diplomacy agents use the language of neutrality to legitimize their multiple and conflicting objectives.

The Clingendael report acknowledged a tension between water diplomacy and self-interest, but argued that ‘private sector technical advice that aids in conflict prevention can be a win–win situation’ (van Genderen & Rood, 2011, p. 32), that is, both profitable and meritorious. However, the recent governmental review of the Netherlands’ development cooperation in the water domain during the period 2006–16 (MFA-IOB, 2017) advised that the Netherlands was not sufficiently sensitive to local political realities in its water diplomacy and was focused too much on technical and infrastructure projects instead. One may read the assessment as criticism of overzealous focus on engaging private companies to provide technical and material assistance at the expense of attention to other aspects:

In most of the transboundary water management work supported during the review period, effective delivery of technical outputs – such as shared monitoring and early warning systems – proved relatively straightforward, at least for the duration of the projects that delivered them. Building intergovernmental institutions with the resources, competence and political backing to control and allocate rivers’ resources fairly and effectively was a much greater challenge. (MFA-IOB, 2017, p. 16)

Our second finding, that the focus on conflict prevention instead of conflict resolution matches the aid-and-trade agenda of the government, is supported by the broader strategic documents of the Netherlands. International Water Ambition (GoN, 2016) and the ‘Blue Deal’, a programme set up by the Dutch Water Authorities and two ministries (DWA, MIWM and MFA, 2019), subsequently articulated ways for the Netherlands to get involved in water governance projects globally, partly in order to prevent water conflicts. Further research is needed to understand how far such coordination and integration in the Netherlands is indeed driven by the goals of self-interest and global competition in the water markets and how far other third-party agents also pursued such integration.

Finally, on our third finding, Büscher (2019) has pointed to the shift in the Netherlands’ development cooperation policy from ‘harder’ means of ensuring self-interest such as tied aid, towards ‘softer’ means, including branding domestic water sectors as ‘centres of excellence’. The latter strategy relies on discursive techniques (Joo & Heng, 2017; Minkman & Van Buuren, 2019; Mukhtarov, 2020). To enhance branding and global visibility of the Dutch water sector, a position of a national envoy for water resources was established, who has subsequently been very active in diverse policy venues and news outlets around the world (e.g. New York Times, 2014, 2017; CNN, 2020; Financial Times, 2020; The Guardian, 2019). These thrusts of public relations and branding call for suitable methodologies and methods to understand their rhetorical strategies. The discourse analysis techniques and methodology applied in this paper offer a linked and manageable set of such tools. There is other emerging work on applying metaphor analysis and discourse analysis broadly to water governance and diplomacy (Ison et al., 2015; Rigi & Warner, 2021). Application to branding and aid-and-trade agendas would be a next step.

Conclusions

This paper has pursued two aims. First, we considered how the Netherlands has reoriented itself with regard to international water diplomacy, through an analysis of the influential 2011 report on water diplomacy commissioned by the Dutch government from a leading think-tank and used in forming its global water strategy (Knapen, 2012). Through a structured examination of this report, and by placing discussion of it within the larger literature on water diplomacy and governance in the Netherlands and worldwide, we investigated how the report navigated the reorientation, portraying the Netherlands as neutral and at the same time exploring opportunities for the country to benefit economically and politically from water diplomacy efforts.

Second, we have sought to illustrate the utility of an accessible set of discourse analysis tools that can be applied to water diplomacy and water governance in order to illuminate such positioning. The use of such tools is of special relevance given the growing trend of branding and merchandizing water governance expertise in a competitive world. Exploration of single documents, however key, has limitations, and sister methods plus examination of related documents are needed in addressing wider questions. This paper has pointed towards such work as a worthwhile agenda, for other papers.

The Netherlands has invested heavily in promoting its world-class water-sector reputation. An emphasis on its own neutrality allows the government to claim to combine the potentially conflicting goals of advancing national interest and securing global public goods. The win–win language of the report presented water diplomacy as a strategic game (van Genderen & Rood, 2011, p. 24) in which the Netherlands was an active participant that too could ‘win’, and served to justify using development cooperation and peace-related funding to centrally also promote economic benefits for the Netherlands. Revealingly, the Clingendael Institute report was classified under ‘Trade and Globalisation’ in Clingendael’s own library, rather than under ‘Conflict and Fragility’ or ‘Sustainability’. The old adage of the Dutch as both ‘merchants and ministers’ seems to continue well-grounded. All the actors involved and affected need awareness that water diplomacy agents have complex motivations – an awareness that calls for skills to investigate discourses of ‘neutrality’ and multiple ‘wins’.

The case study report that we have analysed advised the Dutch government to focus on conflict prevention rather than conflict mediation. Engagement in conflict mediation or resolution was seen as largely impractical because of the lack of demand for such services from the conflicting parties and perhaps also the potential reputational and other dangers of getting involved in complicated conflictual situations (van Genderen & Rood , 2011, p. 30). Through positioning the arguments in the context of the efforts to brand and merchandise the Dutch water sector as a ‘global hydro-hub’, we argued that the assertion of a niche in conflict prevention opened a broad playing field for the Netherlands, with large potential economic spin-offs and in line with the new policy for aid, trade and foreign investment (GoN, 2016, 2019). Further research on this theme in the Netherlands and abroad is necessary to ascertain how far the focus on prevention is driven by self-interest and is traceable also with other water diplomacy agents. Comparative investigation of other documents and policy statements will be valuable in further work, including on Dutch policies in other domains of water governance and on uses of the notion of ‘neutrality’. Attention to water diplomacy discourses of other countries such as the United States, the UK, France and China will also provide interesting comparisons.

We hope that our study has introduced and illustrated a set of methods in policy discourse analysis that can be helpful in such investigations, for exploration of stated and unstated goals, strategies and tactics in water diplomacy and water governance. Word frequency analysis helps to show emphases and de-emphases, more strikingly and thoroughly than can general reading; in this case it showed emphases on positioning the Netherlands and on conflict prevention more than resolution and mediation. Argumentation analysis of key sections and claims helps us to confront the complexity of texts and to explore unstated assumptions and possible tensions and contradictions. Metaphor analysis then often helps to show how such tensions are coped with. For the report that we examined it proved particularly helpful. We found three recurrent metaphors related to the Netherlands’ policy reorientation: the international water sector as a competitive game; the Netherlands as director of an orchestra of other players; and, clearly predominant, the Netherlands as a ‘neutral broker’, the formulation that most effectively combined the new set of policy goals, connoting both diplomatic prominence and economic gains. Frame analysis integrates and extends the findings from the sister methods. We were explicit that discourse analysis complements rather than replaces other research methods, and that it produces what is still an interpretation, but one that is more probing, disciplined, and open for checking and further discussion than what we may achieve through ordinary reading and talking.

Notes

1. The WGC was created in 2011 by the regional water authorities and supported by the ministries for (1) Foreign Affairs, (2) Infrastructure and the Environment, and (3) Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation, in order to promote Dutch water governance expertise internationally. It has since become defunct, but been succeeded by the umbrella organization called ‘Dutch Water Authorities’ which has a mandate to provide a unified voice of regional water authorities (waterschappen in Dutch) in international affairs. The co-funding of the Clingendael report by the WGC illustrates the links between various domains of Dutch water policy and branding, such as regional and local water management and transboundary water governance.

2. The report is cited 22 times in the academic literature (as of 20 December 2020, Google Scholar). It seems significant in policy literature, cited, for example, in the major consultancy report on hydro-diplomacy by Pohl et al. (2014) and the 2017 UNESCO and Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI) report by Molnar et al. (2017).

3. We adopt word frequency analysis because it shows the word choices made, whether made consciously or unconsciously, generates insights that ordinary reading would not, and helps to identify areas where further language analysis may be productive (Franzosi, 2008). Word frequency counts are increasingly used in studying environmental politics, for they often show surprisingly sharp contrasts between texts. The method is of course not sufficient in isolation and should be combined with context analysis and other methods such as frame and metaphor analyses, as well as standard social science tools such as interviews and focus group discussions.

4. ‘In corpus linguistics, a collocation is a series of words or terms that co-occur more often than would be expected by chance’ (Wikipedia, 2020).

5. Knapen (2011, p. 4) had said the following: ‘Our knowhow in transboundary water management, in combination with our politically neutral position, makes The Netherlands suitable to act as a mediator in the framework of water diplomacy in national and international water conflicts’ (authors’ own translation from Dutch).

6. In the Netherlands the Minister for Development Cooperation’s position is as a second-level minister within the MFA. Since 2012 the position has been renamed as Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation.

7. EL&I is the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation.

8. Page 32 calls for the MFA to assign many staff to communicate contract opportunities to private Dutch actors.

9. See, for example, an international symposium on the WPR approach, Karlstad University, scheduled for June 2022.

10. ‘The Netherlands could benefit from lobbying for the PCA as an international forum of water arbitration, since it is already situated in The Hague and the Secretary-General (SG) of the PCA is traditionally Dutch. […] The Netherlands can thus fulfil the role of a neutral broker and central hub via the PCA […]’ (pp. 24–25). On Willem-Alexander’s position, see pp. 14–15.