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Abstract
This article explores how Frank Aiken's (1898–1983) later political career was shaped by his experiences during the Irish revolutionary period (1916–1923). One of the central arguments is that it was Aiken's experience of the internecine violence of the civil war which led him to exercise more caution (relative to the new generation of Fianna Fáil ministers) in dealing with the outbreak of the ‘new’ Troubles in Northern Ireland in 1969. Aiken's experience of UN diplomacy is compared with that of his successor Patrick Hillery, and his role both inside and outside the cabinet, in shaping official government policy towards Northern Ireland at the start of the Troubles, is examined against that of the new post-revolutionary generation, many of whom broke from Aiken's stance on armed struggle, failing to appreciate the consequences of a new civil war erupting north of the border.
Notes
1 For more on the Altnaveigh incident, (see Lynch, Citation2010: 184–210).
2 One notable exception is the recently published edited collection by Evans & Kelly (Citation2014).
3 One example of Aiken's romantic view that he was fighting for Ireland is in the letter he wrote on 6 July 1923:
there are several thousand men and women and boys in Ireland yet who believe it their duty to free our country … The national position is rapidly becoming very like that after 1916. If we work hard enough I believe we will, with the help of God, firmly establish the Republic within 5 or ten years. (Frank Aiken Papers, University College Dublin Archives (hereinafter UCDA), P104/1301)
4 In an interview with the author in 2009, Mici McGleenan, the son of Charles McGleenan, the former adjutant and comrade of Aiken's in the Fourth Northern Division of the IRA, explained how despite their latter political differences, Aiken still continued to visit their father ‘anytime he was in the area … and they would sit and talk for hours'.
5 Paul Bew is also of the opinion that ‘the management of the problem of enmity' is at the heart of the Irish conflict. Indeed, Bew further argues that ‘Home Rule, partition and independence, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, and the Belfast Good Friday Agreement of 1998 – have been conceived as attempts to divert the full flood of rage into a place of relative calmness’ (see Citation2007: viii–ix).
6 As Lynch explains,
… the Altnaveigh attacks have been personalised as being the responsibility of the local I.R.A commander Frank Aiken. Indeed it is the alleged involvement of Aiken in organising and carrying out the attacks which remains for many the most significant aspect of the Altnaveigh massacre. (See Robert Lynch, ‘Explaining the Altnaveigh Massacre,’ p. 187)
7 For instance, in a letter written 20 August 1923, three months after the civil war had ended, Aiken urged his local electorate in Co. Louth to ‘Look to the future and forget the past. The history of our nation and the lives of its heroes should be studied in order to learn how its citizens should act.’ Eamon de Valera Papers, UCDA, P150/175.
8 When the riots broke out in Derry, the Taoiseach was in the middle of a referendum campaign in which Fianna Fáil was seeking and subsequently failed to replace proportional representation with the ‘first past the post’ system, as used in Britain.
9 In the aftermath of the riots on 5 October 1968, the Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Jack Lynch held an important summit to discuss the affairs of Northern Ireland. While both leaders agreed to keep private the discussions from their meeting, Lynch was to break this agreement later that day at a separate engagement. Consequently, the Irish state lost its official channel with the British State, as Lynch was denied personal access to his British counterpart for the remainder of 1968 and throughout 1969.
10 Aiken notably stated to awaiting journalists on his return journey from the UN that in relation to the British government's involvement in Northern Irish affairs, he felt that ‘a lot of them are sorry they're there. I hope they are anyway'. Irish Times, 24 April 1969. Similarly Aiken's wife, appealed to the British Ambassador to Dublin Sir Andrew Gilchrist at a dinner reception that ‘you have given back all of your empire except Northern Ireland. Why don't you give that back to us now and finish the job?’ In what became a heated discussion, Mrs Aiken later instructed Gilchrist to ‘take out your troops, take away your arms, and those people will see at once which side their bread is buttered on, and they will be loyal Irish men again from that time forward.’ See memorandum from Gilchrist to the FCO entitled ‘The IRA and the Republic’ 5 July 1968, NAUK, FCO23/169.
11 As noted for example, by John Walsh on page 169 of his biography on Patrick Hillery.
12 As O'Halpin explains, the quality of Irish State intelligence was so poor that ‘Northern Ireland in 1969 might as well have been North Korea, so sparse was the reliable information available’ (see Citation2000: 306).
13 The boarding-house where Hillery was staying had a fixed rule that painters could not be disturbed.
14 The RTÉ broadcaster Desmond Fisher, for example, supports the view that Lynch was well aware of the dangers of an Irish military intervention in the North. Present during Lynch's speech, Fisher claims that the Taoiseach tuned to him beforehand, asking the journalist what would happen if he were to order the Army into the North. When Fisher answered that they ‘would get 20 miles into Down or Derry before they would be Massacred', the Taoiseach ‘smiled wanly’ adding that he had ‘come to the same conclusion himself'. See Fishers column entitled ‘An Irishman's Diary’ in Irish Times, 25 October 1999.
15 Meeting of Fianna Fáil Parliamentary Party, 5 September 1969, University College Dublin Archives, Fianna Fáil Party Papers, P176/448.
16 Interestingly, one month earlier, an intelligence officer of the Irish Special Branch caught Haughey himself having a meeting to discuss the facilitation of provision of arms to the IRA and in return they would call off the burning and destruction of the property of foreign wealthy residents. On this particular occasion, however, the meeting was with a member of the Official IRA, Mick Ryan, the O/C of the Dublin Brigade. See manuscript letter 8th June 1970 with attached memorandum by Peter Berry, Secretary of Department of Justice, to the Taoiseach, outlining the actions and attitudes in relation to Charles J. Haughey as Minister for Justice. National Archives Ireland, Jack Lynch Papers, 2001/8/7.
17 For a more elaborate analysis of the Bailieborough meeting of 4–5 October 1969 (see O'Brien, Citation2000: 69–72).
18 I read ‘dissensions’ for ‘discussions’ in this quote – the original source has ‘discussions’ which I presume to be a lapsus calami.
19 While not disputing that Aiken ‘was a leader in his own right', Lewis makes a compelling argument that Aiken ‘had a history’ of preferring the mould of obedient foot soldier, ‘falling behind charismatic superiors’ such as Patrick Rankin, the original commandant of the IRA Newry Brigade in 1918–1919 and the only local man to fight in the Easter rising; also Michael Collins, whose patronage of Aiken led to his displacement of Rankin in 1921 as the top ranking divisional commandant of what was now reformed as the Fourth Northern Division, and to his selection as a running mate for Collins in Armagh for the elections to the new northern parliament in April 1921 (Citation2014: 214) and finally the ‘Chief’ De Valera who chose Aiken ‘as the leading member of his old guard', and in whose shadow Aiken was happy to remain ever since their first encounter in July 1917, when the 19-year-old Aiken got his first taste of electioneering in East Clare as he helped with de Valera's campaign (Skinner, Citation1946: 84; McMahon, Citation1984: 21).