ABSTRACT
The connections between Irish politicians and the private sector are the subject of constant speculation, particularly in the post Celtic Tiger period. However, there is little systematic evidence whether publicised cases of such ties represent the exception to the rule, or if they are symptomatic of a larger problem. In this paper we focus on one aspect of the public–private nexus and investigate whether a revolving door – the movement of individuals between public and private sectors – exists in Ireland. Using evidence from originally collected data on former TDs from 1989 to 2016, we find that almost one third of ex-politicians are in the private sector; however, many merely return to their previous occupations as solicitors or small business owners. Still, 11 per cent turn to consulting, lobbying or corporate board membership. We find that former cabinet ministers, the representatives of FF, PD and FG parties, as well as TDs who do not run and lose are more likely to join the corporate sector. We additionally compare former TDs with ex-officials in the civil service. Finally, placing Ireland in a comparative context, we find that the extent of the revolving door problem here is lower than in other democracies.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. See http://www.europasp.com/our-team/john-bruton/, accessed 1 May 2017.
2. Based on the register on www.lobbying.ie, CIF has 119 returns filed from September 2015 to end of 2016, including 25 with Tom Parlon, who in turn has five returns with the Department of Finance (accessed 31 July 2017).
3. While the subject of this article is not concerned with nominations to quangos or the bench, such appointments, driven by patronage considerations, may represent a different phenomenon of, albeit not public–private but rather public–public, nexus (see Elgie et al., Citation2017 on judicial appointments).
4. Similarly, many firms that audited Irish banks before the crash were later recruited to consult the government on restructuring the very banks they arguably had failed to audit earlier (Phelan, Citation2015). On the contract amounts, see Parliamentary Question No. 194 of 4 October 2011, Dáil Éireann Debate, Vol. 755 No. 1, p. 198.
5. http://www.hanovercomms.com/our-people/senior-advisers/mary-harney/ (accessed 3 May 2017).
6. We were unable to categorize 25 per cent of the former Labour TDs, mainly due to the lack of data on those who exited in 2016.
7. Because in the 27th Dáil the first FF-Labour coalition preceded the second, ‘Rainbow’ coalition, we account for FF and Labour for ex-TDs who exited in 1992.
8. Historical TDs, http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/tdssenators/tds/ (accessed 31 July 2016).
9. It is possible that necessary connections are acquired prior to the university, in elite private schools. See Lynch (Citation2014) on the dominance of privately educated men and women in Irish public life. Future studies may investigate the value of private education and networks.
10. The pay and pension benefits for senior secretaries are comparable to that of ministers, with the gross pay from €122,313 to 190,233 annually as of April 2017 (IMPACT, Citation2017).
11. The data were supplied through each department’s HR office. Unsuccessful requests resulted from low staffing levels within HR or, as in the case of the Department of Arts, frequent structural/name changes resulting in poor access to archived information and a lack of institutional memory within the newly created department. The data cover the Departments of Public Expenditure and Reform (from 2011), Health (1990), Finance (1987), Transport (including Transport and Tourism, Tourism and Sport) (1990), Public Enterprise (2009), Defence (1987), Taoiseach (1993), Justice (1987), Education (1989), Social Protection (2016), Office of the Attorney General (2006), Office of President (1990). The data are not complete as Departments of Arts, Gaeltacht and Hertitage, Department of Children and Youth Affairs, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, Revenue and Communications did not provide the information.
12. Their reported percentages are apparently to those in the private sector (59 per cent of all), making into 11 and 14 per cent in the corporate sector to total, much closer to the Irish figures herein.
13. Still, while percentage estimates may suggest that the Irish political system is less connected to the corporate sector than in larger countries, it is possible that the Irish corporate sector is more connected to politics than in bigger countries. To see this, the back-of-the-envelope calculation produces the ratio of 1.2 ex-TD in corporate sector per election per million of population in contrast to only 0.2 ex-politicians per election per million in Germany, based on figures from Claessen and Bailer (Citation2016).
14. We would like to thank Iain McMenamin for this argument.
15. We would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for this argument.