Rebels and Aid in the Context of Peacebuilding and Humanitarian Disaster: A Comparison of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Tamil Tigers (LTTE)

Abstract

Development aid and humanitarian assistance are increasingly subject to conditionalities aimed to secure progress in peace talks and curb rebel predatory behaviour. Comparing how Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Aceh and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka strategised on the basis of aid before and after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, this article shows that rebel leaderships use peace negotiations to push for control over the administration of aid as a means to expand their governance capacities as de facto state actors. I argue that while peace conditionalities may encourage peace talks and ceasefires that provide space for humanitarian assistance to reach those in need, it is a poor tool to curb rebel predatory behaviour and encourage peace settlements. Yet, as is illustrated by the GAM case, conditionalities may have positive effects on long-term peace in the immediate post-settlement phase. The findings suggest that at this stage of the peacebuilding process, inclusion of rebels into the formal aid bureaucracy may work to encourage the transformation of militarist structures to secure political stability.

Keywords:

• rebel groups
• aid conditionalities
• peacebuilding
• Aceh
• Sri Lanka

Notes on contributor

Gyda Marås Sindre (PhD) is a research fellow at the Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen. Sindre's research is broadly focused on the political behavior of rebel groups and rebel groups turned political parties, post-conflict development, participatory development, and democratisation. Her research is primarily focused on Indonesia, East Timor and Sri Lanka but draws on other examples as well.

Notes

¹Statement of the Royal Norwegian Embassy, Colombo, 3 November 2002.

²ADB Media Statement 7 March 2003, http://www.adb.org/Documents/Speeches/2003/ms2003011.asp (accessed 23 February 2010).

³John Cooney of the ADB and the LTTE's John Balasingham, Sunday Times, cited in TamilNet http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=9109 (accessed 23 February 2010).

⁴Personal communication, member of the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission.

⁵Open letter to Norwegian facilitator Vidar Helgesen, 23 May 2003, Interim administration proposal letter.

⁶Text available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3232913.stm

⁷Interviews GAM commanders Aceh in August 2006 and February 2007.

⁸Anonymous interviews with NGO representatives and analysts involved.

⁹PRDU internal report, commissioned by the HDC: What role can an independent humanitarian organisation play in defusing conflict? (2001 and 2002), can be obtained from the author upon request.

¹⁰Personal interviews with GAM commanders confirmed that they perceived of international NGOs to be primarily loyal to the Indonesian government.

¹¹S Ranjan, the General Secretary of the LTTE Peace Secretariat to Bistandsaktuelt 2, September 2005; President Kumaratunge's response to JVP General Secretary Tilvyn Silva's letter on June 6, 2005, available at www.dailynews.lk/2005/06/16/pol05.htm

¹²Personal communication with LTTE affiliates, 2008 and 2009.

¹³The content of JVP General Secretary M Tilvyn Silva's letter on June 6, 2005, referred www.dailynews.lk/2005/06/16/pol05.htm

¹⁴Personal interviews, General Leonard (TNI), AMM representative, Aceh, August 2006.

¹⁵Personal interview, AMM representatives, IOM representatives and UNDP representatives, Aceh and Jakarta, August and September 2006.

¹⁶Personal interview Bachtiar Abdullah, GAM leadership, Aceh, June 2008.

¹⁷Personal interview, Shadiah Marhaban, SIRA, Aceh, May 2008.

¹⁸Personal interviews with GAM representatives, AMM representatives and international observers, Aceh August 2006.

¹⁹Personal interview, Muchsal Mina, GAM-commander, Aceh, February 2007.

²⁰Personal interview, Nur Djuli, Aceh, May 2008.