Abstract
Following ongoing debates on rural transformation, developing countries give priority to district capitals for their market viability and geographical centrality to empowering peripheral populations. Critics point out inherent electoral largesse in redistricting projects all the while ignoring hidden incentives from these exercises. Drawing on empirical data and local debates on decision dilemmas over a district capital in rural Ghana, the article raises two key points of interest. Rural district capitals undergird neither economic performance nor political participation of districts. A focus on their mundane governance processes, however, reveals hidden political incentives for local party buildout and individual political advancement. The insights enrich our understanding of in-built preferences in redistricting decisions beyond the widely perceived politico-economic attributes.
Acknowledgements
I am particularly grateful to Ebenezer Boateng, University of Cape Coast, for the painstaking cartographic support. Dieter Neubert, University of Bayreuth, and the anonymous reviewers provided helpful comments and suggestions.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Ghana’s districts dramatically increased from 45 in the 1980s to a recent tally of 260. Similar trends are observed elsewhere in Africa, including Uganda, Burkina Faso, and Kenya (Billing, Citation2019; Green, Citation2010; Grossman et al., Citation2017; Hassan, Citation2016).
2 All district types – large metropolitan, mid-sized municipal, and ordinary districts –implement council decisions through an executive body.
3 The Ghanaian government redirects donor support for agricultural into general administration priorities Mogues and Owusu-Baah (Citation2020, p. 14) point out.
4 Wa East population: 71,120 with 10,768 households; Wa West population: 80,382 with 11,486 households (GSS, Citation2014a; Citation2014b).
5 Just like splits elsewhere in the region (see Bob-Milliar, Citation2011), the Funsi Area Council essentially votes for the NPP while the NDC is popular in the Bulenga Area Council.
6 The dominant ethnic categories were 45% Wala, 21% Sissala, and 19% Chakali (GSS, Citation2014a, p. 2).
7 As rough verification of ethno-political leanings, the councillors openly used their ethnic grouping and political party persuasions to emphasize their arguments.
8 These efforts obviously helped them reclaim the constituency seat in the 2020 general elections.
9 Sometimes involving family lineage and social backgrounds, the asymmetrical but reciprocal exchange effectively sustains this relationship.
10 Ironically, this political clout in awarding road contracts could not translate into resolving the district’s road infrastructure problems.
11 Notably, the Presiding Officer of the council (Dr. Ewurah K. Mahama, public administrator), the NPP’s candidate (Ing. Yakubu Salifu, engineer and ex-councillor); and the NDC’s candidate and now MP (Dr. Godfred Seidu Jasaw, university teacher).
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Matthew Sabbi
Matthew Sabbi is a postdoctoral researcher, African Politics and Development Policy, University of Bayreuth, Germany. He is interested in political sociology and development politics with a particular focus on actors and their strategies in local political reforms in Africa. He has held fellowships at the Merian Institute for Advanced Studies in Africa (MIASA) at the University of Ghana, Accra, and the Bayreuth Academy of Advanced African Studies, University of Bayreuth, Germany. His most recent research is published in Studies in Comparative International Development, Third World Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, and International Journal of African Renaissance Studies.