Power, Politics, and the Supernatural: Exploring the Role of Witchcraft Beliefs in Governance for Development

Abstract

Belief in evil and hidden supernatural forces, generally referred to as witchcraft, is widespread in many parts of the African continent. In addition to affecting individual health, perceived security, and social relations, witchcraft allegations may be used as covert political instruments, resulting in governance challenges such as lack of trust, transparency, administrative delegation, and political accountability. Since witchcraft is commonly associated with physiological and psychological violence, some citizens may be less willing to participate in political activities, including seeking elected office or criticizing political elites for fear of falling victim to witchcraft. The focus of our study is Malawi where large groups in the population believe in the power of witchcraft. We aim to unpack how local witchcraft beliefs have a bearing on governance – whether, and the extent to which, witchcraft influences how citizens understand and practice transparency and accountability in everyday life. Particularly, the belief in witchcraft among Malawian elites’ warrants closer scrutiny, especially since existing literature and local discourse on the impact of witchcraft tend to largely focus on rural and less educated groups in the population. As the highly secret and complex dimensions of witchcraft resist clear-cut definitions, representations, and analysis, it is not our intention to describe witchcraft in everyday life. Rather, we explore the potential political implications of not addressing elite discourses of and belief in witchcraft. We find that belief in witchcraft can influence citizens’ perceptions of power and authority and can potentially undermine the legitimacy of democratic institutions and processes.

Keywords:

• witchcraft
• power
• elite politics
• democratic governance
• Malawi
• Sub-Saharan Africa

Introduction

In many societies across the globe, misfortunes such as illness, infertility, accidents, and death may be considered by local inhabitants to be the result of exposure to invisible supernatural powers, including the malicious phenomenon typically labelled as ‘witchcraft’. Indeed, a full range of illnesses, including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, dementia, schizophrenia, Ebola, and COVID-19, may be potentially viewed as caused by acts of witchcraft. While articulations of witchcraft are widespread and ‘is a critical dimension of social reality’ in many parts of the African continent (Lwanda, 2005; Mbiti, 1990; Smith, 2019, p. 65), scholars have argued that the phenomenon should be understood as local idioms for tackling issues of inequality, economic hardship, social unrest, alienation, and oppression (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1993; Geschiere, 1997; West, 2005). While several scholars describe witchcraft as a form of secretive violence that is distinguished from other types of physical and psychological violence, it is not regarded as being less harmful by those who believe in the power of witchcraft (Ashforth, 2005).

In much of the literature, witchcraft discourses are viewed to co-exist with modern understandings of state-society interactions and capitalism (Englund, 1996; Ferguson, 2006; Mabefam, 2022). For example, Ashforth (2002, p. 128) notes that the ‘witchcraft paradigm’ offers causality and responds to the key questions related to suffering and distress – ‘Why me? Why now? Who is to blame?’. In addition to affecting individual health, perceived security, and social relations, the belief in the power of the supernatural plays a crucial role in determining the level of trust citizens have in their leaders (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, 1998). Such beliefs and practices, we argue, may have important implications for the perceived legitimacy of the state. Our aim is thus to unpack how the belief in witchcraft among the population, and particularly among elites, may have a bearing on governance – whether, and the extent to which, witchcraft influences their understanding and practice of transparency and accountability in everyday life. The empirical focus of our study is Malawi, where large groups in the population believe in the power of hidden supernatural spirits, particularly the evil interactions of ufiti, which commonly – and many would argue, wrongly and condescendingly (Lwanda, 2005) – is translated as witchcraft. Colonial administrators and European missionaries created the broad category of ‘witchcraft, defining it as any supernatural phenomena not aligned with Christian practices (Redding, 2019). They also disapproved of African consulting healers/diviners, linking their practices to beliefs in witchcraft, although many healers/diviners did not blame misfortune and illness on witchcraft (Redding, 2019). While some argue witchcraft is a pejorative term, it is frequently utilized by the public (Geschiere, 2013; Nichols-Belo, 2018).

Everyday life in Malawi is permeated with anxiety and fear of misfortunes. This ‘spiritual insecurity’ reflects the sense of danger that many experience when they perceive suffering and hardships as caused by spirits, witches, or ordinary people who possess evil forces to hurt them (Ashforth, 2010).

The general perception in the country is that witchcraft is used to secretly harm, destroy, or kill humans, cattle, crops, and property (Malawi Law Commission, 2021). Traditionally, colonial authorities, international scholars and development agencies have associated witchcraft on the African continent with superstitions resulting from low levels of education and rural lifestyles (Kroesbergen-Kamps, 2020; Leistner, 2014). The conventional understanding has for long been that such beliefs would decrease and disappear with increased modernity (Chabal, 2009; Englund, 1996). However, despite the colonial ‘civilizing’ mission followed by decades of post-colonial involvement of the international community in promoting economic and political development, accusations and assaults related to witchcraft beliefs appear to have intensified in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa (Kroesbergen-Kamps, 2020; Smith, 2019). Scholars link this escalation to increased levels of socio-economic inequality caused by accelerated foreign capitalist engagement that has fuelled local, national, and regional power asymmetries and increased corruption in the region (Ferguson, 2006; Murrey, 2015).

Although the practice of witchcraft in Malawi was abolished by the Witchcraft Act enacted during colonial rule (and witchcraft remains illegal to this day), reports of persecutions of alleged witches appear frequently in Malawian media. Individuals accused of being a witch risk intimidation and social exclusion, which sometimes result in violence and murder (Ashforth, 2014, 2015; Chilimampunga and Thindwa, 2012; Englund, 2007). According to the Malawian Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation, 75 people suspected of practising witchcraft have been murdered since 2019, and violence against those suspected of indulging in witchcraft ‘is one of the most serious human rights violations’ in the country (Mweninguwe, 2022: para. 9). A recent Afrobarometer survey found that 74 per cent of the Malawian population believe that witchcraft is an integral part of daily life, and that a majority supports criminalization of the practice (Afrobarometer, 2022). While the survey did not find any significant difference between rural and urban citizens, educated residents were surprisingly found to be more inclined to believe in witchcraft than the less educated.

Our goal in this article is to explore how the belief in the supernatural among Malawian elites potentially affects social trust, as well as political and administrative transparency, accountability, communication, and delegative responsibility. The topic warrants closer scrutiny since the literature on the practice and impact of witchcraft, including the local discourse in Malawi, tends to largely focus on rural and less educated groups in the population. As the highly secret and complex dimensions of witchcraft resist clear-cut definitions, representations, and analysis, it is not our intention to describe witchcraft. Rather, we explore the potential political implications of not addressing elite belief in witchcraft. Although there are several ongoing debates on what it signifies, most scholars agree that witchcraft entails manipulating and summoning evil supernatural forces to cause harm (Redding, 2019). We adapt Geschiere’s (2013, p. 10) approach in using witchcraft as a ‘loose terminology that can do … justice to the constant shifts and ambiguities of the central notions.’ Such notions, we argue, include the political sphere.

The constricted scope of academic publications makes writing about the supernatural often problematic, as it risks exoticizing and/or reducing the phenomena into un-nuanced and derogatory concepts and images (Murrey, 2017). However, we claim that ignoring the phenomenon of witchcraft in academic scholarship may be even more harmful as it may further a colonial tradition of silencing and marginalizing people’s ways of experiencing everyday social and political life. In addition, and notwithstanding its oversimplification and potentially misleading connotations, critics of the term ‘witchcraft’ still use it; acknowledging that it is so broadly adopted ‘that it has become impossible to avoid its use’ (Stoop and Verpoorten, 2020, p. 1200). Avoiding the discourse by attributing other terminology than those used by local media, academics, and research participants, would be to re-conceptualize witchcraft based on our own cultural references. Thus, we treat our respondent’s understandings of witchcraft as contextual, plural, fluid, and subjective knowledge, yet not less true or real.

Although we have been following the witchcraft discourse in Malawi for several years and engaging in numerous informal discussions on the topic with a range of actors, the data for this study is primarily based on fieldwork conducted in 2022 in the cities of Lilongwe, Zomba and Blantyre. The press release of the findings from an Afrobarometer survey on Malawian perceptions of witchcraft in April 2022 generated considerable media attention and sparked numerous public debates on the topic in the country. This created a conducive environment for public discourse, and we used this momentum to conduct semi-structured in-depth interviews with a range of elite stakeholders, including politicians, civil servants, civil society leaders, judges, diplomats, researchers, students, and media persons. These were selected based on their diverse strategic institutional and organizational positions (e.g. economic, political, governmental, commercial, and social- and cultural organizations and movements), and control over political and symbolical resources in the country. 20 such elite informants were interviewed in 2022, each lasting between 45 and 75 min. We did not find it challenging to find individuals to speak with as many of our informants wanted to demystify the relationship between witchcraft and politics. In addition, we examined key policy documents (including those related to the review of the Witchcraft Act) and reports in Malawian dailies, while engaging in informal discussions with elites. Beyond elites, our study incorporates the views of ordinary Malawians on the topic of witchcraft by drawing on the data from the AB survey. This survey used a nationally representative, random, stratified probability sample of 1200 adult Malawians and had a margin of error of +/- 3% at the 95% confidence interval. The results are thus generalizable on the entire Malawi adult population, a large proportion of whom are non-elites. Among many questions, the Malawi survey respondents were asked whether they believe in the existence of witchcraft; what types of people are associated with witchcraft in their communities and whether the laws of Malawi, which currently do not recognize the existence of witchcraft, should be changed to recognize, and criminalize witchcraft. Apart from the elite interviews and the AB survey, we also conducted 20 interviews with 20 traditional healers practising in Lilongwe and Zomba, as well as in Machinga district in southern Malawi (interviews lasting between 45 and 75 min). The objective to interview this sample was based on the common assumptions that these practitioners typically deal with the grey zone between good spiritual healing and evil witchcraft (Beneduce, 2017), and a public belief that they often are consulted by power-seeking politicians (Geiselhart, 2018). Thus, we anticipated the experiences of traditional healers would add further nuance to the complex dynamics. All interviews were conducted in English and/or Chichewa. Upon request, we have anonymized the names of traditional healers and our elite informants, although we refer to the institutional affiliations of our informants (for which we received approval). The dataset from the Afrobarometer (2022) survey provided further nuance to the qualitative data.

We begin with a brief overview of the literature on witchcraft in Sub-Saharan Africa, including definitions and approaches. Thereafter, we discuss the evolution of the discourse on witchcraft in Malawi. Our empirical findings are then presented in the discussion section before concluding remarks.

Global politics, western development, and local witchcraft

Defining witchcraft and related phenomena or beliefs such as magic is challenging. Some of the difficulty is due to the backgrounds of the persons studying these phenomena. Mbiti (1990, pp. 190–191) claims that Western scholars, administrators, and missionaries have for long distorted and misrepresented what local African communities experience daily – the ‘mystical power which often is experienced, or manifests itself, in form of magic, divination, witchcraft and mysterious phenomena that seem to defy even immediate scientific explanations.’ Thus, it may be tempting for outsiders to categorize everything that appears unscientific, viewed from a western lens, under a general witchcraft category. However, the kaleidoscope of epistemologies and practices of witchcraft are typically ‘plural, fluid, multiform and ambiguous’ (Murrey, 2017, p. 158), making it virtually impossible to accurately pin down and quantify (Ranger, 2007).

Indulging in witchcraft and accusing an individual of being a witch is commonly motivated by greed, jealousy, hatred, and vengeance (Ashforth, 2005; Redding, 2019). It may also be the result of several types of socio-economic inequalities entrenched in society. However, it is not just the well-off that are exposed to witchcraft accusations. People living in poverty may also be labelled as witches by those in society who believe that the poor are envious and resentful of those that are better off (Cohan, 2011; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, 1998). Accusations of witchcraft directed at kin often involve the violation of trust. For example, family members might be accused of using witchcraft to advance their own interests to the detriment of the group (Geschiere, 2003, 2013; Kohnert, 1996). Witchcraft may thus be understood as the darker and more destructive side of kinship and closely linked to tensions and conflicts in social relations, particularly due to struggles over resources and power (Geschiere, 2003, 2013). The anxiety and fear of arousing envy and thereby attracting the wrath of witchcraft makes individuals consciously try hard to hide their success or to consult healers for protection against harmful acts directed at them (Lwanda, 2005; van Breugel, 2001). Thus, individuals who fear that others are using witchcraft to cast an evil spell on them may resort to using protective charms and amulets. Ashforth (2005, p. 17) thus argues that ‘witchcraft is the illegitimate use of occult force: healing is its legitimate purpose’.

Academic interest in African witchcraft beliefs has, since the 1990s, mainly focused on the relationship between witchcraft and modernity. As witchcraft beliefs flourished in parallel with democratic consolidation and national and international efforts to stimulate economic development, anthropologists began analyzing contemporary articulations of witchcraft ‘less as evidence of traditional thought and more as a creative recasting of established beliefs to respond to new circumstances and challenges’ (Kroesbergen-Kamps, 2020; Redding, 2019, p. 12). The conventional understanding that emerged from these studies is that witchcraft is a product of the complex political, social, and economic conditions of modernity and postcolonial life. Still others claim that witchcraft may be understood as ‘modern’ when it exists and reacts – as it always has – to the tensions and uncertainties in the African society (Ranger, 2007). Scholars also find that in recent decades witchcraft is no longer considered to be taboo and is often the subject of legal, political, and personal discussions (Geschiere, 1998; Roxburgh, 2019). This is in line with what we find in Malawi, where witchcraft is frequently featured in newspaper reports, television- and radio shows, and on social media.

Global development actors and agencies have typically characterized belief in supernatural powers in sub-Saharan Africa as superstition rooted in primitive ontologies due to lack of education and poor development levels (Englund, 1996; Geschiere, 1997; Kohnert, 1996; McNamara, 2015). Despite several decades of Western-led efforts to promote economic growth and reduce poverty on the African continent, the belief in the power and influence of evil forces to achieve an outcome has only grown stronger and assaults related to witchcraft have intensified in some countries. Scholars associate the escalation in witchcraft-related activity with increased levels of social and economic inequality because of accelerated capitalism and involvement of international actors – in particular, the roles played in African economies by the IMF and the World Bank (Hickel, 2014; Moore and Sanders, 2001). Increased competition, corruption, social instability, and unequal power relations in many societies have weakened or destroyed informal security nets and the very social fabric of communal societies (see Ashforth, 2005; Ferguson, 2006; Murrey, 2015; Smith, 2008). Thus, the role of witchcraft in sub-Saharan African societies requires an analysis of the broader social, economic, and political contexts in which accusations and beliefs emerge.

Beliefs and articulations of witchcraft and understandings of development are often intertwined, as many Africans perceive ideologically driven practices and concepts that characterize Western development, such as privatization, expropriation, and individualism, to be forms or catalysts of witchcraft (Smith, 2019). Thus, development interventions undertaken by Western actors and agencies – that promote ideological notions of material individualism and personal independence – may clash with local communal norms of egalitarianism, equality, hospitality, reciprocity, and redistribution (Kohnert, 1996). When viewed as such, Western-led development projects may be understood by local populations to be promoting selfishness, greed, and individual accumulation of wealth through acts of witchcraft (Smith, 2008).

The extensive inequalities between rural and urban populations in many sub-Saharan African societies also fuel witchcraft beliefs. The rural poor may watch with envy the growing wealth and improved lifestyles of urban relatives and local and national political and business elites and accuse these groups of not redistributing their wealth (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, 1998; Mabefam, 2022). As Redding (2019, p. 9) asserts, public ‘postcolonial narratives of witchcraft’ have served as ‘critiques of the power of political leaders and of self-enrichment’. Several African leaders including Idi Amin of Uganda, Paul Biya of Cameroon, Mbouto Sese Seko of Zaire, and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe have been accused of using supernatural power to gain or retain political power (Redding, 2019). Similarly, President Jacob Zuma of South Africa claimed in 2016 that the election successes of his political opponents in the Western Cape could be attributed to witchcraft (Eaton, 2019).

Many studies have found a strong and complex relationship between supernatural forces and politics in Africa and elsewhere (see Ashforth, 2005; West and Sanders, 2003). As Kohnert (1996) notes, since the decline of colonial rule, the supernatural and witchcraft have been instrumentalized and strategically utilized for political incentives. To cultivate spiritual power has become ‘a vital component of a political career’ (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2007: 391). In other words, like much of their constituency, politicians hold the belief that real power originates from supernatural dimensions. Consequently, cultivating spiritual power is understood as essential for maintaining political dominance (Ellis and Ter Haar, 1998). Unlike political power – as understood for example in much of the Western world – spiritual influence like magic and witchcraft is not rooted within institutions or the collective will of the constituency, but in the invisible realm (Ellis and Ter Haar, 1998).

When supernatural forces dominate the political landscape, several questions arise concerning the everyday practice of democracy and its pledge to secure accountability, trust, and transparency (Grossi, 2016). Graeber (2007, p. 140) argues that when political initiatives as actions are understood to affect individuals not physically present then ‘magical action [such as casting spells] might seem one of the purest forms of political action’. Thus, articulations of witchcraft and anti-witchcraft actions may be viewed in relation to political processes and the practice of state power (Moore and Sanders, 2001). However, because of its malleability, articulations of witchcraft require contextualization rather than being described in relation to grand theories. As noted earlier, the global political economy and the development ideals of the West cannot be separated from local discourses on witchcraft.

Despite the demonstrated connection between foreign political involvement – through ideologically driven development interventions and conditionalities imposed by western donor agencies – the links between witchcraft, politics, and development is surprisingly under-appreciated and understudied (Chabal, 2009; Ellis and Ter Haar, 2007; Smith et al., 2017). For example, Leistner (2014, p. 70) notes that ‘Considering the severe impact of witchcraft on development, it is remarkable that the subject is totally ignored in the abundant literature on African development – particularly in the host of World Bank studies.’ This ignorance is perhaps linked to the fear by organizations of promoting ‘colonial stereotypes of Africans as a population mired in backwardness and irrationality’ (Federici, 2018, p. 64). Moreover, due to lack of global awareness of how articulations witchcraft may affect people in everyday life, Western-informed development interventions may further fuel and strengthen expressions of witchcraft. While in this article we understand witchcraft as a latent threat that is all encompassing in certain social settings in Malawi, including the political arena, such acts are not restricted to specific contexts. For example, expanding the scope beyond Malawi and sub-Saharan Africa, scholars note that, individuals in all societies may – to varying degree – hold a combination of religious, spiritual, supernatural, or scientific worldviews (Holmes et al., 2018). This is demonstrated by the enduring presence of ‘the fantastic (including magical animals) in popular culture (Rountree, 2002) and in major and minor religious, cults and witchcraft’ (Holmes et al., 2018, p. 232). Accordingly, we believe our findings from Malawi may well have relevance for such beliefs worldwide.

Witchcraft and governance for development

Upon gaining independence from Great Britain in 1964, Malawi witnessed three decades of dictatorship under Hastings Kamuzu Banda (Banik and Chinsinga, 2016), who limited the country’s contact with the outside world (Thornton et al., 2014). Banda was ruthless and his regime imprisoned, tortured, and murdered political rivals, many of whom were forced into exile (Mapanje, 2002). Coinciding with the dominant changes in global politics and the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the political diaspora and clandestine oppositional forces were able to pressure Banda out of office. Following a referendum in 1993, Malawi adopted a multiparty system and after multiparty elections were held in 1994, development agencies and organizations became highly active. Much of this was initially linked to containing the rampant HIV/AIDS epidemic (Morfit, 2011). After almost three decades of democratic rule, however, a large majority of Malawian citizens continue to live in extreme poverty. More than 80 per cent of the country’s’ around 20 million population lives in rural areas with limited access to electricity, roads, schools, and hospitals (World Bank, 2024). Subsistence agriculture remains the main source of income, and the country has struggled to achieve fast economic growth and compete in the global neo-capitalist economy (Mathur and Mulwafu, 2018).

The social distance between the elite and the masses is vast, and the political, economic, and legal marginalization of the poor majority is based on class, gender, ethnicity, and geographical location (Gloppen and Kanyongolo, 2007). This divide is also prominent in belief in the supernatural. As McNamara (2015, p. 74) puts it, ‘Among the myriad witchcraft narratives that operate in rural Malawi is the understanding of the supernatural as empowering the nation’s elite’. Witchcraft accusations and rumours are thus commonly aimed at public servants and social elites, stories often covered by the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) (Lwanda, 2005; McNamara, 2015). Yet, while the power asymmetry between rural dwellers and the country’s elite is well established, the elite’s engagement and understanding of the role of witchcraft in Malawian politics received less attention until the recent Afrobarometer (2022) survey, which, contrary to previous assumptions, found that educated Malawians, to a larger extent than their uneducated counterparts, believe in witchcraft. Thus, such beliefs appear not just bound to traditional ways of life, but very much entrenched in Malawi’s urban and modern life.

Political analysts generally overlook the linkage between vernacular healing practices and politics in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, besides holding a key position in the health, systems of sub-Saharan African societies, including Malawi (Simwaka et al., 2007), traditional healers (health practitioners working in the physical and spiritual/supernatural realm) also play a key role in politics (Geiselhart, 2018). As Offiong (1999, p. 124) notes, ‘Traditional healers also assist in politics’ as the political realm is characterized by uncertainty and ‘Enemies are everywhere … in politics there are many foes working hard to make one fail.’ Traditional healers are thought to possess the ability to access the hidden mysterious dimensions of life and to offer help with identifying the supernatural causes of misfortune, illness, and death (Lwanda, 2005; Mbiti, 1990).

Geiselhart (2018, pp. 181–181) observes that ‘whether something is to be judged as healing or witchcraft is usually decided along a moral dividing line between good and evil’ while Morris (2011, p. 248) argues that ‘there is a close association between [traditional] medicines and witchcraft’ in Malawi. Accordingly, whether treating people who suffer from witchcraft attacks (Chilimampunga and Thindwa, 2012) or using spiritual powers to promote someone’s wishes that might simultaneously hurt someone else (Geiselhart, 2018), traditional healers are often understood as dealing with witchcraft (Morris, 2011). As mentioned earlier, spiritual practices and beliefs should not be conflated with witchcraft. Indeed, some sections of the population typically consult traditional healers for medical problems (Nichols-Belo, 2018). Others seek their services for illnesses that are believed to be witchcraft-induced, which they believe cannot otherwise be cured with conventional hospital treatment (see Masina, 2016). Distinguishing the roles played by ‘witch doctors’ and traditional healers is also a challenge (Drury, 2020). The conflation of traditional healers with witchcraft arises from the fact that people seeking to assume witchcraft powers often seek the services of certain traditional healers.

This access to the invisible supernatural realm places traditional healers in an ambiguous, yet powerful societal position. As magic can be used for both good and evil purposes, healers are often viewed as important spiritual redeemers in addition to actors that possess the ability to use magic in harmful ways. The traditional healers in our study expressed this ambivalence. While most of their customers consult them for magic that can help ward off witchcraft, to dispel potential bewitchment, or to seek prosperity, many respondents also recounted stories about clients wishing to cause suffering to others. As one healer¹ put it, ‘a lot of people come looking for revenge, to kill someone.’ While most healers told us that either they did not possess the knowledge of evil magic or they would never use their powers to harm others, some admitted to having used evil magic to cause destruction. For example, when a customer who wished another dead for having stolen an item, the consulting healer² ‘used my charms to make his stomach swollen and die slowly but painful’. Another healer³ told us:

Many people come to ask me to bewitch someone. Sometimes they want me to make the person who is bewitching them disappear. I help them. What I do is, I take my charms … and I ask the person to confirm if they really want the person to disappear. When the person comes home, he does not find that witch. I charge a lot of money, because at that point I become a witch as well, to fulfil what they want. Because witches deal with other witches.

The monetary aspect is also highlighted by Labhardt et al. (2009) who ‘found Traditional healers’ prices to be higher for treating witchcraft, because of the risks associated with it, e.g. becoming bewitched themselves’ (cited in Drury, 2020, p. 182). Beneduce (2017, p. 203) finds that ‘There are many reasons for the ambivalence that unites witchcraft, illness and the action of healers in a shared field of experience.’ The borderline between what counts as healing therapeutic-powers and the magic evil force of witchcraft is thin; as the healer ‘functions as an antiwitchdoctor, he will be constantly suspected of becoming his opposite, as he perceives violence and plays with it’ (Rosny, 1981, pp. 393–394).

The clientele of the traditional healers in our study varied greatly, including a wide range of professions and social status – from pastors and civil servants to businesspeople, farmers, and housewives. However, when asked explicitly about politicians, many respondents stated that this group was not among their main customers. A healer⁴ from Lilongwe lamented, ‘Politicians don’t come here because those people like to meet very strong witch doctors from Mozambique. So, they travel to Zomba, Makanjira, and Balaka [districts close to the Mozambique border] to look for that kind of doctors.’ Yet, it should be noted that most of our respondents stated that in line with their work ethics, they do not ask their customers about their professions or social position.

Discussion

We propose that how, to what extent, and why Malawian elites navigate and negotiate the precariousness of witchcraft – given their power and influence over the economy and politics – has important impacts on governance for development. The challenges are on the one hand intrinsically tied to issues of transparency, accountability, and openness; and on the other, conspiracy, corruption, and competition. As Sanders (2009, p. 91) observes, ‘only when political doings (and naturally, their undoings) are revealed in full can people be held accountable for their actions.’ Given the invisibility and elusiveness that characterizes witchcraft practices, political processes tainted by the supernatural become difficult, if not impossible, to monitor, as there are no established mechanisms to reveal and prove a supernatural conspiracy. Writing on South Africa, Ashforth (2002, p. 138) claims that among the challenges democratic governance faces is the public belief that ‘the government is in league with the witches against the interests of the people.’ Such views not only weaken state legitimacy but also reduce trust in political institutions. In the ensuing sections, we discuss three interrelated sets of explanations that together shed light on the relationship between witchcraft and governance. We focus on rural identities of political elites, the role of envy in society, and the strategies employed by individuals to navigate political witchcraft.

‘Everybody comes from a village’

There is widespread agreement that despite residing in urban centres, Malawian elites remain deeply connected with their rural identities through kinship, customs, and land ownership. Many of our respondents claimed that irrespective of socio-economic status, ‘Everybody in Malawi comes from a village.’ The village does not only symbolize one’s birthplace, but it also incarnates before-life, afterlife, and the in-between, representing one’s ethnic identity, cultural roots, and ties to ancestors (Peters, 2002). Several respondents explicitly claimed that ‘Witchcraft is stronger in the village’. According to a senior civil servant⁵, ‘There is a strong belief in the supernatural, particularly in the villages – and everyone comes from a village, from the Members of Parliament to the President. Witchcraft is so entrenched in society. Everyone from the village believes in witchcraft, and everyone comes from villages, also the elites. So, everyone started off with such beliefs.’ Another civil servant⁶ working for the Malawi Human Rights Commission claimed that almost everyone in Malawi comes from the same society and similar villages. Witchcraft beliefs do not thus simply disappear with education and social and economic mobility. Similarly, an official⁷ in the Malawi Law Commission told us, ‘Educated people like professors themselves believe in witchcraft. They might be embarrassed somehow. But they themselves believe. Everybody comes from a village.’

While the first two respondents explained that one’s connection with one’s home village makes one inevitably embedded in the witchcraft realm, the second and third respondents insisted that education levels and social status do not make people less exposed to, scared of, or less prone to believe in witchcraft. On the contrary, many of our respondents asserted the danger associated with individual socio-economic progress. A current minister⁸ in the Chakwera administration dismissed the idea that higher levels of education mean reduced belief in the supernatural: ‘Why would people think it would disappear with education? It cannot! It is there, it exists!’.

As previously mentioned, ‘the dark side of kinship’ and the importance of ‘the village’ in the relations between elite-urbanities and their rural kin may blur class differences and reinforce suspicion, envy, and enmity. This dynamic may in turn result in accusations of witchcraft and related assaults (Geschiere, 2003). Our elite respondents confirmed this conundrum, stating that many urban elites, despite their loyalty and commitment, are afraid to visit their home villages, fearing that they will be exposed to suspicion, envy, and ultimately to witchcraft. The minister, however, argued that ‘It is wrong to call it a rural thing! You find it everywhere!’ Indeed, we found that the invisible domain of witchcraft spans social, material, and spatial distances, or to put it differently, ‘Witchcraft brings the village to the city’ (Geschiere, 2013, p. 46).

The role of envy

As the Afrobarometer study in Malawi concludes, social status and education level correlates positively with witchcraft beliefs. For example, an official⁹ from the Association for Secular Humanism explained that powerful elites and senior civil servants might also practice witchcraft: ‘Politicians, musicians, businesspeople, professors at the university – they use witchcraft to protect themselves. For years, people in our society have been associated with witchcraft – because of the success you have achieved, people say that you have used witchcraft, even if you claim that you have not used it.’ One explanation as to why witchcraft may appear to be common among economically well-off groups is envy. As one informant¹⁰ put it, ‘The more educated you are, the more jealous people become, and the more careful you will have to be.’ A similar rationale was offered by a representative¹¹ of the Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation, a civil society organization: ‘There is this idea that you cannot become rich based on your own skills … if successful you must have used witchcraft. The more educated and successful you are in a village, the more subjected you become to village envy and gossip of witchcraft.’ This informant addressed a theme that was common not only in our interviews but also frequently cited in the literature on witchcraft in sub-Saharan Africa – sudden, rapid, and/or non-transparent wealth accumulation and personal success are closely linked to articulations of witchcraft (Kohnert, 1996; Ellis and Ter Haar, 1998). When members of society do not understand how individuals and their household have come into possession of material goods and can afford a better lifestyle, then witchcraft is believed to be the main explanatory variable (Lwanda, 2005; West, 2005). The ambassador¹² of a Western country stationed in Lilongwe for several years told us: ‘People are scared to become more successful. You see people hiding their success.’ To illustrate how envy and concealing professional progress affect the work environment, he recounted an example from his office; the practice of, every three months, recognizing the ‘employee of the month’, which was meant to be a motivational incentive for office staff. When the management planned to officially launch the scheme, the ‘employees begged us not to announce it, out of fear of being attacked by others jealousy.’ Despite the plea, the management went ahead with the scheme, and over time, the ambassador felt that his staff began to appreciate the recognition.

It is relatively common in Malawi to be secretive about one’s career progress, travel plans and family matters. Privacy is cherished and even announcing to friends, acquaintances, or strangers that one is pregnant or has received a promotion is something many shy away from. As one civil servant¹³ described it, ‘People believe, as do politicians, that it is not wise to tell people where you are going, or what you are planning because it can be used against you. So, to protect yourself you don’t tell people, you don’t share. People say, ‘witchcraft is like corruption’, because it is evil, it is only benefitting you while leaving the rest poor.’ The common denominator for such secrecy is the fear of envy and resulting mobilization of harmful supernatural forces that can sabotage success. The discomfort that many feel when sharing personal details is deeply entrenched in all levels of society. Nonetheless, such envy directed at individuals who are seen to be prospering is not limited to Malawi or sub-Saharan countries. Indeed, envy is commonplace in virtually all societies. However, envy can be particularly vicious in societies where imperialism and exploitation over centuries and persistent poverty and income inequalities are widespread. While in many Western contexts, social inequality may be accepted as part of the economic system – sudden wealth and success that promote greater individualism at the cost of reciprocal obligations and communal standards – may in many other societies, foster resentment (Adams et al., 2018; Ferguson, 2006; Geschiere, 2013).

Navigating political witchcraft

In post-colonial Malawi, witchcraft has been strongly linked with politics. Soon after assuming power, President Hastings Banda – a medical doctor by profession – professed his belief in the supernatural and ‘publicly accused former Cabinet Ministers of an attempt to murder him by witchcraft’ (New York Times, 1964). In the three decades that followed, belief in witchcraft thrived in the country and was regularly used to attack political opponents. For example, in 2002, when parts of Malawi were agog with rumours of vampires (anomapopa) running rampant in rural areas and sucking blood from local inhabitants, President Bakili Muluzi’s government was accused of practising witchcraft. Thus, high-level politicians were accused of cooperating with foreigners to suck the blood of Malawians, which was subsequently sold to foreign aid agencies and international organizations. Such rumours fuelled vigilantism and mob-justice and those accused of being bloodsuckers faced threats of violence and death (Tenthani, 2002). And when President Bingu wa Mutharika abandoned his official residence in Lilongwe in 2005 – rumours alleged that this was because the President believed the palace to be haunted by evil spirits (News 24, 2005). Even civil servants are wary of supernatural powers and a 2012 news report cited government appointees at certain districts were reluctant to take up their posts ‘due to fear of being bewitched or plunging their families into the lion’s den of the practice’ (Nyasa Times, 2021).

One of our informants¹⁴ claimed that while ‘some professions are really risky, politics is particularly risky. Through witchcraft, people can at any time destroy your career. That is why they say to young people that they should wait until they get older, until they pursue a political career. They say, ‘They will kill you!’’. Despite general acceptance of the fear of witchcraft in political circles, elites are usually reluctant to address the topic in public. Indeed, until recently, witchcraft was largely considered taboo. Most of our informants were of the view that if one suspected that others felt intimidated by one’s success, then it was commonplace among political leaders and administrators, irrespective of education levels, to take precautionary action. Such action could entail any measure that offers a level of protection against evil forces. The most common, albeit seldom spoken of, strategy adopted is to seek the services of a traditional healer. The same informant as above, remarked, ‘You’ll see that even at president level meetings, people will bring their own chair. Because people can use magic to finish you off, you protect yourself by not sitting on any chair. You’ll see that in offices, if people start a new position, they will change the furniture, because they distrust the people that were there before them. They cleanse the office.’

Consulting traditional healers is said to be common during elections, when prospective candidates vying for political office seek protection from their opponents and aim to boost their chances of victory. A visible sign that such consultations have taken place is razorblade cuts that are clearly visible on the bodies of electoral candidates. Indeed, visible incisions on their arms was mentioned by several informants, who also were quick to add that senior civil servants and leaders routinely perform a thorough cleansing of their offices once they join an office and/or are promoted. The purpose of such cleansing is to ensure that bad spirits are banished, and that the officeholder has a clear path to achieve professional success. A widespread perception among Malawian elites is that ‘without using witchcraft you cannot get far’ and that making use of witchcraft is ‘like having a PhD or becoming the president’. Another strategy employed is to use charms and amulets given by a healer. A high-level official¹⁵ noted that Malawian politics was infested with witchcraft and that virtually every political candidate seeks some form of protection from evil forces during elections.

To demonstrate the power of witchcraft in political settings, a minister¹⁶ showed us a popular video circulating on social media of a political rally that was scheduled to take place. Before the rally began, however, a tornado ravaged the area – lifting campaign material such as posters, banners and plastic chairs in the air and destroying the rally area. The constituents scheduled to attend the rally and the leaders concerned were convinced that someone who wanted to stop it had bewitched the place. The minister who showed us the video rhetorically noted, ‘You might say it is a tornado, but someone made that tornado show up just there at this rally to stop it to happen!’ He went on to argue that protection had to be employed in such contexts to ensure the safety of those attending the rallies as well as the political future of the political party and its candidates. Thus, Malawian politics involves fighting ‘hidden power with hidden power’ (West and Sanders, 2003, p. 17). Herein lies a dilemma. Political leaders in Malawi face a dilemma: they must deny any association with witchcraft while reassuring a witchcraft-believing electorate that they will approach the issue with caution and respect, addressing voters’ concerns seriously. However, according to our interviewees, very few politicians are willing to openly admit to using its powers for self-protection. Admitting that one employs healers for protection against witchcraft is widely considered political suicide. Every consultation is secretive; although everyone knows politicians may use the power of magic to advance their career, no one is willing to attest to visiting healers because that would mean admitting that one is potentially aiming to harm someone else.

When politicians fail to relate to the everyday lives of their constituents, they lose trust and support. In 2017, six people were accused of being vampires and murdered by a violent mob in two southern districts of Malawi. During the upheaval, President Peter Mutharika went public and ‘warned suspected vampires to stop terrorizing people and told village chiefs to stamp down on witchcraft’ (Banda et al. 2017). Acknowledging the fear of local communities, the President declared, ‘If people are using witchcraft to suck people’s blood, I will deal with them and I ask them to stop doing that with immediate effect’ (Banda et al. 2017). Relatedly, in 2020, Mutharika’s successor Lazarus Chakwera was urged by The Advocacy for Alleged Witches (AFAW) group to demonstrate effective leadership by immediately putting a stop to crimes committed against individuals alleged of being witches (Gwede, 2020). In another case, a well-known politician, vocal critic, and former minister from the UDF party, was found dead in 2018, and according to one of our informants¹⁷, the body was found in a graveyard and covered with charms and amulets. The ruling party claimed that this individual was not normal and was in reality a witch. According to our informant, ‘Even the state broadcaster said he had been using spiritual powers wanting to kill the president’.

The fear of, and belief in, witchcraft has important implications for transparency and accountability in politics. A senior administrator¹⁸ told us ‘Politicians do not disclose their plans and ideas out of fear that people will use the information to harm them’. Other informants claimed that witchcraft not only affected levels of transparency; it was also a convenient excuse when political leaders failed to get the job done and deliver development. Each one of our elite interviewees believed that it was important to address and highlight the links between witchcraft and political accountability and transparency; how belief in the supernatural negatively affects governance.

As seen, there are numerous connections between the beliefs and articulations of witchcraft, and how these influence elite behaviour on delegation of power and responsibilities, transparency in the decision-making process, and the extent to which civil servants and elected officials are held to account for their performance. Despite declining satisfaction with democracy’s ability to deliver development, support for democracy remains strong in Malawi and the threat of democratic reversal has diminished over the years. With its power to cause social upheaval, including wide-scale violence, we find that belief in the forces of the supernatural has a significant potential to impact democratic politics, affecting both citizens and candidates vying for office. The widespread belief in society that candidates standing for election employ magic and/or witchcraft to boost their chances of victory (and to prevent their competitors from winning) potentially undermines public confidence in electoral institutions and contributes to the erosion of the perceived legitimacy of election winners.

The Malawian state is generally perceived by both citizens and external actors to be relatively weak. With limited domestic revenue generation and a heavy reliance on foreign aid, the policy space for leaders to deliver economic growth and development is confined, which in turn negatively affects state legitimacy. The lack of transparency in decision-making in the country further compounds the problem. Historically, political leaders have been reluctant to democratize their parties and have seldom held party conventions where critical debates and discussions take place. Even when elected to office, leaders (including presidents) have generally shied away from holding regular press conferences and interacting with the media. There is a huge distance between the public and political leaders and senior bureaucrats. Criticism of leaders was brutally suppressed during Hastings Banda’s three-decade rule. However, even after democracy was ushered into the country in 1994, citizens do not always know how and why certain decisions are arrived at. The country’s politics is characterized by considerable secrecy, and decisions are often made, and new policies are initiated, without much consultation. Moreover, government contracts are frequently awarded, and public appointments made without transparent criteria. These practices may create the impression in the minds of voters that elite politicians and bureaucrats are closely tied to each other (especially when they belong to the same ethnic group or geographical region) and with business elites.

Concluding remarks

The association of witchcraft with violence can deter citizens from participating in political activities, including running for office, or criticizing politicians for fear of falling victim to witchcraft. We have argued that this reluctance may undermine confidence in democracy. Additionally, belief in witchcraft can erode trust among political competitors and increase the likelihood of rejecting election outcomes. If officials are believed to use supernatural means to secure positions, potential challengers may be deterred, reducing turnover in office holders. The belief in witchcraft can also influence citizens’ perceptions of power and authority and can thereby undermine the legitimacy of democratic institutions and processes. Ultimately, these beliefs and practices can culminate in undermining support and confidence in democracy itself. Moreover, such beliefs and practices often impede development efforts by promoting distrust and suspicion among communities. In situations where witchcraft accusations are common, people may be less likely to cooperate with one another or to invest in social infrastructure or public goods, which are crucial for sustainable development. The belief in witchcraft, we have argued, can affect social and economic development by fuelling harmful beliefs and practices, such as the exclusion of certain individuals or groups from socio-economic and political opportunities. This can perpetuate poverty and inequality and can undermine efforts at promoting development and reducing poverty. Overall, as witchcraft accusations and beliefs are intertwined with broader social, economic, and political factors, global development and policy actors, and scholars must acknowledge the dynamics of how belief in the power of the supernatural influences politics. More specifically, to develop more responsive, nuanced, and culturally attuned policies, practitioners must acknowledge their implicit and explicit impact on witchcraft related phenomena, and practice flexibility to ensure that their policies adapt to local contexts. This can be achieved through participatory and inclusive approaches that integrate local experiences and expertise; by attending to local power dynamics and creating safe arenas for dialogue to address the hidden nature of witchcraft phenomena. All our elite interviewees stressed the importance of addressing how belief in witchcraft undermines political accountability and governance. While our focus has been on Malawi, belief in supernatural phenomena is not confined to specific contexts. Scholars have noted that individuals in all societies may hold a mix of religious, spiritual, magical, or scientific worldviews to varying degrees. Consequently, we believe our findings from Malawi may have broader implications for the political impacts of spiritual beliefs worldwide.

Ethics approvals

Department of Politics and Government, University of Malawi.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Additional information

Funding

NORHED II UIO PROGRAMME 2021-2026 [grant number QZA-21/0168].

Notes on contributors

Johanna Sofia Adolfsson

Johanna Adolfsson is a postdoctoral fellow at the University Oslo. Adolfsson’s main academic interests include how EuroAmerican psychology as a dominant academic field affects people in non-Western cultures, particularly through its strong influence on Global development policy agendas. Adolfsson has worked on research projects in Eastern Africa since 2016.

Dan Banik

Dan Banik is a professor of political science and director of the Oslo SDG Initiative at the Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo. He is also an Affiliate Professor at the Centre for Sustainable Healthcare Education (SHE), Faculty of Medicine, University of Oslo, and an Extraordinary Professor at the University of Pretoria. Prof. Banik was a Visiting Professor and Consulting Scholar at Stanford University (2010-2017) and a Visiting Professor at China Agricultural University (2012-2017). He is the host of the In Pursuit of Development podcast with listeners in 160 countries.

Boniface Dulani

Boniface Dulani is an Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Politics and Government at the University of Malawi. Among his many responsibilities, Boniface is the Director of Surveys for the Afrobarometer, a pan-African network of researchers who conduct surveys on governance, economy, livelihoods, and other topics. He is also a founding partner at the Institute of Public Opinion and Research (IPOR) in Malawi.

Notes

1 Interview, female healer, Lilongwe district, 12 May 2022.

2 Interview, male healer, Lilongwe district, 16 May 2022.

3 Interview, female healer, Lilongwe district, 30 May 2022.

4 Interview, male healer, Lilongwe district, 16 May 2022.

5 Interview, male civil servant, Lilongwe city, 22 April 2022.

6 Interview, male civil servant, Lilongwe city, 28 April 2022.

7 Interview, female official, Lilongwe city, 5 May 2022.

8 Interview, male minister, Lilongwe city, 7 May 2022.

9 Interview, male official, Lilongwe city, 6 May 2022.

10 Interview, male civil servant, Lilongwe city, 28 April 2022.

11 Interview, male representative, Lilongwe city, 5 May 2022.

12 Interview, male ambassador, Lilongwe city, 9 May 2022.

13 Interview, female civil servant, Lilongwe city, 26 April 2022.

14 Interview, male civil servant, Lilongwe city, 28 April 2022.

15 Interview, male civil servant, Lilongwe city, 28 April 2022.

16 Interview, male minister, Lilongwe city, 7 May 2022.

17 Interview, male civil servant, Lilongwe city, 28 April 2022.

18 Interview, male official, Lilongwe city, 6 May 2022.