Social Constructionism and Housing Studies: A Critical Reflection

Abstract

The article aims to outline briefly the Australian research that has adopted the social constructionist approach which, in turn, arose in the context of the inadequacies of the positivism used to examine so-called ‘social problems’. This positivism took for granted the dominant understandings, definitions, causes and the discourse of the ‘social problem’. Social constructionists maintain that humans are actors and participants who create their social world, with the consequence that perspectives, definitions, explanations of causation and discourses are constructed by them. In this way powerful housing ideas, policies and practices can be undermined as merely constructions of a time and place and for special interests. Yet in its extreme or ‘strong’ form this position is not without difficulties and, after briefly analysing several of them, the article examines a more moderate or ‘weak’ form of social constructionism which is now more generally adopted and which addresses to some extent the problems of the ‘strong’ position. The article concludes by exploring the possibility that the feminist standpoint epistemology of Sandra Harding, while different in some respects, has the potential to both illustrate and compliment the more moderate constructivist position.

Keywords:

• Social constructionism
• housing research
• homelessness
• reflexivity
• relativism

Acknowledgements

This article is a revised and updated version of a conference paper entitled, “Social Constructionism and Housing Research: Exploring Issues”, which was presented at the Australian Housing Researchers Conference, Adelaide, 19–21 June 2006. The author would like to thank the conference and Urban Policy and Research referees for their suggestions, and others who commented on the paper after it had been delivered. In particular the subsequent comments made by Dr Keith Jacobs were very helpful.

Notes

1. In so far as the social constructionism outlined here is all-encompassing it is not that which I will eventually argue is useful in housing research. The former is known as the ‘strong’ version of constructionism. However, in the sense that it has been present and criticised in the literature, it is no ‘straw man’. See King (2004). Even if it has not been present in the fledgling constructionist housing research (as some might argue), the position has been identified in other areas. See Woolgar and Pawluch (1985).

2. My approach here is somewhat different to King's (2004, p. 38). However, while our approach to this second criticism of social constructionism differs, the conclusion reached about this criticism is similar. I prefer to approach it in terms of epistemological relativism, which states that it is impossible to arbitrate between values, that there are no external or independent criteria by which to adjudicate rival value claims.

3. The issue of whether Jacobs and Manzi are adopting what seems to be something of a ‘realist’ position here is a moot point. Certainly one of the critiques of constructionism has come from a resurgence of such approaches which are usually known under the heading ‘critical realism’. For a general discussion of critical realism in the social sciences, see Sayer (2000). In housing research, see Somerville and Bengtsson (2002, pp. 124–134).

4. On the management of the ‘underclass’, see, for example, Haworth and Manzi (1999). For the construction of perspectives and practices to manage the unemployed, see Parker and Fopp (2004b, 2005).