Do objections count? Estimating the influence of residents on housing development assessment in Melbourne

Abstract

This paper explores relationships between community opposition, planning assessments and local political processes. While resident opposition to development proposals is thought to delay housing supply, the nature, extent and pathways of influence have not been quantitatively established. In Victoria the number of third party objections has no direct legal weight, but in practice, development applications involve multiple decision makers. Community expectations that objection numbers “count” may reflect suspicion that refusals are more likely from elected local decision makers. This paper tests for relationships between procedural and political pathways in planning. It uses descriptive statistics and binary logistic regression models based on one year (15 676) of Melbourne residential development assessments. It is found that objection numbers increase significantly with local socio-economic status and that, as applications receive more objections, elected representatives more often intervene. Assessments by elected councilors are significantly more likely to be refused, and have relative odds more than seven times higher of resulting in appeal. The paper argues that local contestation of housing, particularly from better-resourced groups, is highly adaptable to reforms seeking to overcome or rationalise it. Reducing or shifting opportunities for third party opposition may less reduce planning uncertainty, than increase its variation, complexity, and spatial concentration.

本文探讨社区反对、规划评估和地区政治议程之间的关系。人们认为居民对开发计 划的反对阻碍了住房供给，但对其性质、范围和影响通道并未做量化研究。在维多 利亚，第三方的反对人数不足以直接影响立法，但在实践中，开发项目的实施须要 多方决策者参与。社区认为反对人数“作数”，或许印证了一种怀疑，即反对大多来 自选举产生的地方决策者。本文基于墨尔本居民开发项目评估一年的数据（15 676）， 用描述统计学和二分类逻辑回归分析的方法，验证规划中程序通道与政治通道的关 系。研究发现社会经济状况好的地区，反对人数激增；反对人数越多，当选代表出 面干预的可能性越大。由选举产生的议员所做的评估更容易遭到否决，导致上诉的 可能性高出7倍多。本文指出当地资源优势阶层对住房项目的反对完全可能适应试图 消除反对或使之理性化的改革。减少或转移第三方反对不能减少规划的不确定性， 却会增加其变化、复杂性和空间集中性。

Keywords:

• Development assessment
• housing
• resident opposition
• Melbourne
• third party objection and appeal

Funding

This work was supported by the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute [grant number 30678].