Regulatory governance regimes and interregionalism: exploring the dynamics of EU–Mercosur negotiations

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the impact of interregionalism on regulatory governance. Specifically, it analyses an underexplored aspect of the negotiation process for an interregional agreement between the European Union (EU) and the Common Market of the South (Mercosur): to what extent and how has this given rise to particular forms of regulatory governance in Mercosur? The paper empirically explores the trade and cooperation agendas involved in trade facilitation and education, and argues that the long negotiation process between the EU and Mercosur has affected the ways in which different forms of regulatory governance are expressed. Still, these show variation across policy issues. Both the type of norm promoted and the capacity-building mechanisms envisaged create a particular ideational and material context, all of which affects the actor constellation and leads in turn to different regulatory governance regimes, yet within the same interregional negotiation process.

RESUMEN

Este artículo examina el impacto del interregionalismo sobre la gobernanza reguladora. Específicamente, analiza un aspecto inexplorado del proceso de negociación del acuerdo interregional entre la Unión Europea (UE) y el Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur): ¿En qué medida y de qué manera dicho proceso ha dado lugar a formas particulares de gobernanza reguladora en el Mercosur? El trabajo explora empíricamente las agendas comerciales y de cooperación implicadas en el área de facilitación del comercio y educación, y argumenta que el largo proceso de negociación entre la Unión Europea (UE) y el Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur) ha afectado las formas en que las diferentes formas de gobernanza reguladora se expresan. De todas maneras, éstas muestran variación entre las áreas de política. Tanto el tipo de norma promovida como los mecanismos establecidos para el desarrollo de capacidades dan lugar a un particular contexto ideacional y material, todo lo cual afecta la constelación de actores y conduce a su vez a diferentes regímenes de gobernanza reguladora, aún dentro del mismo proceso interregional de negociación.

KEYWORDS:

• Interregionalism
• European Union
• Mercosur
• trade facilitation
• education
• regulatory regimes

Acknowledgement

I am thankful to the editors as well as two anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback. Any remaining errors are my own.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Negotiations with the EU include Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, who have been members of Mercosur since 1991. Though also a member, Venezuela is not part of this negotiation because it only joined the bloc in 2012, years after the process formally began, and is still in the process of adapting to Mercosur’s rules and regulations.

2. The Framework was the next step from the 1992 Inter-institutional Cooperation Agreement, the Joint Declaration of 22 December 1994, which already established the institutionalization of political dialog and economic negotiations as the two pillars of the relationship, and the Declaration on Political Dialogue of 15 September 1995.

3. Similar differences explain the delay of negotiations since the 2010 relaunch (Van Loon 2015).

4. The other two areas of the cooperative strategy were intended to make the bloc’s economic and trade structures more dynamic and integrated and to support civil society (44% and 30% of total funding, respectively).

5. Since 1994, WCO gives voice to 180 customs administrations across the globe, and provides leadership, guidance and support to customs administrations to secure and facilitate trade, protect society and build capacity, among other objectives. For further details, see http://www.wcoomd.org/en.aspx (last accessed 21 April 2016).

6. Available at http://arcaconsortium.weebly.com/paduem.html (last accessed 20 April 2016).

7. See “‘Fantastic Summit’ effectively turns Mercosur into a Customs Union”, available at http://en.mercopress.com/2010/08/04/fantastic-summit-effectively-turns-mercosur-into-a-customs-union (last accessed 20 April 2016).

8. The document states that only six articles are currently without brackets, one of these being “The Article on Special Committee on Customs, Trade Facilitation and Rules of Origin”.

9. Interview with MEBF executive, Buenos Aires, 21 November 2007.

10. Interview with IRAM executive, Buenos Aires, 23 November 2007.

11. Interview with MEBF executive, Buenos Aires, 21 November 2007.

12. Interview with IRAM executive, Buenos Aires, 23 November 2007.

13. See http://www.iadb.org/en/projects/project-description-title,1303.html?id = RG-T1282 (last accessed 20 April 2016).

14. Interview with IRAM executive, Buenos Aires, 23 November 2007.

15. The CMG is the executive branch of Mercosur, made up of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Economy, and Central Banks’ presidents, plus permanent coordinators from each member country.

16. AMN is a private non-profit and non-governmental organization, composed by the four national institutions of standardization and certification. For further details, see http://www.amn.org.br/ (last accessed 21 April 2016).

17. Another relevant international norm in the area is the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) passed in 2013. The agreement sets out measures to eliminate non-tariff barriers and to promote more efficient customs procedures. It also supports cooperation between customs and other appropriate authorities on trade facilitation, and contains provisions for technical assistance and capacity building. So far, Brazil and Paraguay are the only Mercosur members that have ratified the TFA.

18. Building on the new Development Cooperation Instrument, the European Parliament called on the Commission to withdraw this initiative, in particular the creation of European/Mercosur documentation centers, EU and Mercosur Study Chairs and Masters’ degrees in EU and Mercosur Studies, as this would only widen the gap between rich and poor (EP 2007).

19. In 1995, the RME was incorporated into Mercosur’s institutional structure, though the Ministers of Education were not granted veto power over the bloc’s formal decisions.

20. Bolivia and Chile are fully-fledged members of the SEM.

21. Regional regulatory developments in the area of HE in Mercosur comprise the Experimental Mechanism of Accreditation (MEXA) and the University Degree Accreditation System (ARCU-SUR), which also include Bolivia and Chile into a permanent and binding regional mechanism. For further details, see Botto (2016).

22. In 2004, the CMC established the Educative Sector Financing Fund (FEM) to finance education policies and programs for regional integration. Member states’ annual contribution is US$30,000, plus US$2200 per million inhabitants aged between five and 24 years old (Mercosur 2011). Venezuela joined the FEM in 2015.

Additional information

Funding

Part of this research was funded by the KFG “The Transformative Power of Europe”.

Notes on contributors

Andrea C. Bianculli

Andrea C. Bianculli is Juan de la Cierva-Incorporación Fellow at the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI). Her main research interests cross international and comparative political economy, and lie in the areas of global and regional governance, regulation, trade and development, with a special focus on Latin America. Her most recent publications include Regional Organizations and Social Policy in Europe and Latin America: A Space for Social Citizenship?, co-edited with Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann (Palgrave, 2016) and ‘Latin America’ in Tanja A. Börzel, and Thomas Risse (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism (Oxford University Press, 2016). She is currently working on Negotiating Trade Liberalization in Argentina and Chile: When Trade Policy Creates Domestic Politics (Routledge, 2016).