The attribution theory of emotion (Weiner, 1986) is presented as a common example of a naïve theory finding that people expect attributions of personal control and other control to underlie feelings of guilt and anger respectively. The study predicts that supporters use this implicit knowledge to focus their supportive messages on the attributions corresponding to their recipients’ reported emotions. It is also possible that supporters are influenced by their own attributions about support recipients’ problems. The data from 84 college students indicate that the supporters’ intended and actual messages tended to follow their own attributions about their recipients’ situation rather than the attributions implied by the emotions reported by their recipients. It is suggested that some supporters fail to be comforting to their recipients because they do not perceive the situation in the same way as their recipients, and may therefore try to change their recipients ‘ perceptions of their problems.
Attributional support: Targeting attributions underlying recipient emotions
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