The Age of Enlightenment Comes to the Kremlin

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Notes

1 Warren Christopher, In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 2002).

2 See Jeffrey A. Engel, When the World Seemed New: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017); Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, The Man Who Ran Washington: The Life and Times of James A. Baker III (New York: Doubleday, 2020).

3 Talbott, The Russia Hand, p. 68.

4 Angela Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.–Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 19.

5 The initial statement was later watered down.

6 Mary Elise Sarotte, “Not One Inch Eastward? Bush, Baker, Kohl, Genscher, Gorbachev, and the Origin of Russian Resentment toward NATO Enlargement in February 1990,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2010), pp. 119–140. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2009.00835.x; Mark Kramer, “No Such Promise,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 6 (2014), pp. 208–209; Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2016), pp. 7–44. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00236.

7 Marten argues that Russia’s prestige was at the heart of the issue, and therefore the bombing campaign, not NATO expansion (whatever its forms), led to Russia’s turn away from cooperation with the West. Kimberly Marten, “Reconsidering NATO Expansion: A Counterfactual Analysis of Russia and the West in the 1990s,” European Journal of International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2018), pp. 135–161. https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2017.16

8 James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When the U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), pp. 52–56.

9 M. E. Sarotte, “How to Enlarge NATO: The Debate inside the Clinton Administration, 1993–95,” International Security, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2019), pp. 7–41; Goldgeier, Not Whether but When the U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO; James Goldgeier, “NATO Enlargement and the Problem of Value Complexity,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol, 22, No. 4 (2020), pp. 146–174. https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00968; James Goldgeier and Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “Evaluating NATO Enlargement: Scholarly Debates, Policy Implications, and Roads Not Taken,” International Politics, Vol. 57, No. 3 (2020), pp. 291–321. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00243-7

10 Sarotte, “How to Enlarge NATO,” p. 35.

11 There were only cosmetic reforms, such as breaking the KGB into separate domestic and foreign entities (renamed the Federal Security Service [FSB] and Foreign Intelligence Service [SVR], respectively). See, for example, Catherine Belton, Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took on the West (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020).

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Paul J. Welch Behringer

Paul J. Welch Behringer is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Southern Methodist University’s Center for Presidential History, where he leads the oral history project, “U.S.–Russian Relations under Bush and Putin, 2001–2009.” His book manuscript focuses on the U.S. and Japanese intervention in the Russian Civil War. He holds a Ph.D. in History from American University. The author can be contacted at [email protected].