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Abstract
On the morning of 7 October 2023, at 6:29 AM, Israel was surprised when forces of the Hamas organization attacked Israel from the Gaza Strip, along the border between Gaza and Israel, and caused enormous damage to human life and property. On that day, about 1,300 Israelis were killed, most of them civilians and the rest soldiers. About 240 Israelis were kidnapped and taken into Gaza as hostages. Israel had no concrete warning of the coming attack. It was a complete surprise to the Intelligence Community (IC) and security system. Following this attack, Israel went to war against Hamas, in Gaza, calling it the Iron Swords War, with the intent of collapsing its military power and governing rule. The lack of intelligence warning raises many questions about the capability of the Israeli IC, especially the Israel Military Intelligence Directorate (IMI) and the Israel Security Agency (ISA). Israel’s intelligence had known of the strengthening of Hamas, but there was an assumption that Hamas had changed its objectives and aimed to establish its rule and statehood in Gaza. As a result, it was assumed that Hamas would refrain from offensive action that would, in turn, provoke counterattacks by Israel, which would not serve its interests. The Israeli IC assumed that if Hamas decided to attack, the ISA and the IMI would provide early warning. Only on 7 October did Israel learn that Hamas was secretly intensifying its efforts to prepare an attack on Israel.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, Warning and Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962).
2 Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, Warning and Decision (Tel Aviv: Maaracot Publishing, Modan Publishing, 2023), in Hebrew.
3 Amos Harel, “The Surprise Will Come—The Question Is How the IDF Will Get Ready,” Haaretz, 24 September 2023, in Hebrew.
4 John Gentry and Joseph S. Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence: History, Challenges and Prospects (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019), pp. 27–53.
5 Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor.
6 Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 7–36.
7 Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott, Intelligence Success and Failure: The Human Factor (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 17–19, 143–183.
8 Richard K. Betts, “Fixing Intelligence,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81 (2002), pp. 43–59.
9 Richard K. Betts, “Two Faces of Intelligence Failure: September 11 and Iraq’s Missing WMD,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 122, No. 4 (2007), pp. 585–606.
10 9/11 Commission Report (2004), https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq (2004), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB254/doc12.pdf
11 Ibid., p. 14.
12 Richard Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, Knowledge & Power in American National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 3.
13 Bruce Berkowitz, “U.S. Intelligence Estimates of the Soviet Collapse: Reality and Perception,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 21 (2008), pp. 237–250.
14 Bar-Joseph and McDermott, Intelligence Success and Failure.
15 Avner Barnea, “Strategic Intelligence: A Concentrated and Diffused Intelligence Model,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 35, No. 5 (2020), pp. 701–716. By diffused surprise, I mean a development that surprises, yet is not an organized effort to surprise but, rather, is a gradual and spontaneous development that is difficult to recognize by an intelligence target that stands on the side.
16 For example, the former head of the Mossad, Tamir Pardo, said of the extreme delay in recognizing the Syrian nuclear reactor that “here there was a resounding (intelligence) failure.” See Atila Shumfalby, “The Head of the Mossad against the Military Intelligence,” https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5185184,00.html. The same conclusion was established by the state comptroller in one of his reports. See Alex Fishman, “State Comptroller Criticizing the Intelligence on the Syrian Nuclear Facility,” https://www.yediot.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5189884,00.html
17 Fredrich Kamp, Berlin 1961 (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2011), pp. 150–153, 313–319, in Hebrew. The emergence of ISIS can be viewed as a concentrated surprise that was the result of a wrong assessment of the organization’s capabilities and intentions. See Michael Brenner, “Intelligence Failure in Iraq,” Huffington Post, 30 June 2014, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/intelligence-failure-in-i_b_5544340
18 Omer Dostri, “Hamas’s October 2023 Attack on Israel,” Military Review (November 2023), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/journals/military-review/online-exclusive/2023-ole/dostri/
19 Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprise (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 173–188.
20 Michael Handel, “Intelligence and the Problem of the Strategic Surprise,” Journal of Strategic Studies, No. 7/3 (1984), p. 230.
21 Eric Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), pp. 9–14, 128–129, 158–159.
22 Bar-Joseph and McDermott, Intelligence Success and Failure; Walter Laqueur, World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (London: Twentieth Century Fund, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985), p. 255; Michael Lowenthal, U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), p. 19; Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 1 (1978), p. 62.
23 Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack; Uri Bar-Joseph, “The Complacency That Led to the War Was Not Only Due to an Intelligence Failure,” Haaretz, 1 November 2023, in Hebrew, https://www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/the-edge/2023-11-01/ty-article/.highlight/0000018b-8ad0-ddfb-a78f-fefb7ade0000
24 Ishaan Tharoor, “How Israel Helped Create Hamas,” Washington Post, 30 July 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/07/30/how-Israel-helped-create-hamas/
25 Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas Vision, Violence and Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
26 Mustafa Kabbah, The Palestinian People: Seeking Sovereignty and State (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014).
27 Encyclopedia Britannica, “Two State Solution: Israeli-Palestinian History,” https://www.britannica.com/topic/two-state-solution
28 Imad Alsoos, “From Jihad to Resistance: The Evolution of Hamas’s Discourse in the Framework of Mobilization,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 57, No. 5 (2021), pp. 833–856. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2021.1897006.S2CID234860010
29 Joseph Krauss, “Poll Finds Dramatic Rise in Palestinian Support for Hamas,” AP News, 14 June 2021, https://apnews.com/article/hamas-middle-east-science-32095d8e1323fc1cad819c34da08fd87
30 Richard Davis, Hamas, Popular Support and War in the Middle East: Insurgency in the Holy Land (London: Routledge, 2016).
31 Akiva Eldar, “The IMI Did Not Expect the Win of the Hamas and Its Control of Gaza Strip—Intelligence Failure? Not Necessarily,” Haaretz, 9 January 2009, in Hebrew.
32 Barak Ravid, “Former Head of the ISA—Hamas Can Hit Beer Sheba,” Haaretz, 21 December 2008, in Hebrew.
33 Amnesty International, “Operation ‘Cast Lead’—Facts and Figures,” www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/mde150212009eng.pdf
34 Yaacov Katz, “A Year’s Intel Gathering Yields Alpha Hits,” Jerusalem Post, 28 December 2008.
35 Ethan Bronner and Allan Cowell, “Israel Completes Gaza Withdrawal,” New York Times, 22 January 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/world/middleeast/22mideast.html?_r=1&scp=8&sq=israel%20gaza&st=cse
36 Hanan Grinberg, “Senior IDF Officer Reveals about the Tunnels,” Ynet, 21 January 2023, in Hebrew, https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3659383,00.html
37 Amnesty International, “Operation ‘Cast Lead.’”
38 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Operation Cast Lead (2008),” https://www.gov.il/en/departments/general/operation-cast-lead
39 Dan Murphy, “How Many Rockets Were Fired from Gaza at Israel This Year?” Christian Science Monitor, 15 November 2012, www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/Backchannels/2012/1115/How-many-rockets-were-fired-from-Gaza-at-Israel-this-year
40 IDF, “Operation Pillar of Defense,” https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/wars-and-operations/operation-pillar-of-defence/operation-pillar-of-defense/
41 Ibid.
42 Stuart Winer, “Netanyahu: Gaza War Caused 98% Drop in Rocket Fire,” Times of Israel, 1 November 2013, www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-gaza-war-caused-98-drop-in-rocket-fire/
43 Editorial, “UN Doubles Estimate of Destroyed Gaza Homes,” Ynet, 19 December 2014, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4605408,00.html
44 Editorial, “Hamas Was Severely Beaten,” Israel Hayom, 27 August 2014, in Hebrew, https://www.israelhayom.co.il/article/213857
45 Anat Kurtz and Shlomo Brum, “Protective Edge, Lessons and Implications” (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2014), https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-lessons-of-operation-protective-edge/
46 Yossi Yehoshua, “In the Hands of Dheff,” Ynet, 15 October 2023, in Hebrew, www.ynet.co.il/news/article/yokra13631818?utm_source=ynet.app.ios&utm_term=yokra13631818&utm_campaign=general_share&utm_medium=social&utm_content=Header
47 State Comptroller of Israel, Report about Operation Defensive Edge, in Hebrew.
Walla, 15 December 2023, https://news.walla.co.il/item/3628936?utm_source=Generalshare&utm_medium=sharebuttonapp&utm_term=social&utm_content=general&utm_campaign=socialbutton, pp. 13–23.
48 Nadav Shragai, “Still Thinking on 1948,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 4 February 2022, in Hebrew, עדיין חושבים על 1948 - המרכז הירושלמי לענייני ציבור ומדינה (jcpa.org.il)
49 Ronen Bergman, “The Lights Were Not On,” Ynet, 24 December 2023, in Hebrew, www.ynet.co.il/news/article/yokra13729290?utm_source=ynet.app.ios&utm_term=yokra13729290&utm_campaign=general_share&utm_medium=social&utm_content=Header
50 State Comptroller of Israel, Report about Operation Defensive Edge.
51 ” Brian McKernan, “Israel and Hamas at War after Surprise Attacks from Gaza Strip,” The Guardian, 7 October 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/07/hamas-launches-surprise-attack-on-israel-as-palestinian-gunmen-reported-in-south
52 Ronen Bergman and Adam Goldman, “Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More Than a Year Ago,” New York Times, 30 November 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/30/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-attack-intelligence.html
53 Sari Makover Belikov, “Major General Giora Ailand Explains,” Maariv, 19 January 2024, in Hebrew, https://www.maariv.co.il/news/military/Article-1069074
54 Yossi Yehoshua, “Assessments That Have Been Collapsed,” Ynet, 19 November 2023, in Hebrew, www.ynet.co.il/news/article/yokra13694671?utm_source=ynet.app.ios&utm_term=yokra13694671&utm_campaign=general_share&utm_medium=social&utm_content=Header
55 Paul Schoemaker and George Day, “How to Make Sense of Weak Signals?” MIT Sloan Management Review, April 2009, www.maariv.co.il/journalists/Article-1059909
56 Ibid.
57 Makover Belikov, “Major General Giora Ailand Explains.”
58 Avner Barnea, “Where was the Ashraf Marowan of the ISA Inside Hamas,” Ynet, 8 December 2023, in Hebrew, https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/rjitpwjlt
59 Ibid.
60 Amir Bochbot, “There Were indications before the Black Saturday,” Walla, 28 November 2023, https://news.walla.co.il/item/3625456?utm_source=Generalshare&utm_medium=sharebuttonapp&utm_term=social&utm_content=general&utm_campaign=socialbutton
61 In July 2023, the ISA received one piece of information from an agent operating in Gaza about a major attack planned by Hamas in early October 2023. This information did not appear again later. It was not evaluated as a warning and was ignored. See Haaretz’s editorial, “An Agent Warned,” 23 December 2023, https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/2023-12-27/ty-article/0000018c-ac6d-d22d-a3dd-bd7dad4a0000
62 Amos Yadlin and Udi Evental, “Why Israel Slept: The War in Gaza and the Search for Security,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2024), pp. 20–29.
63 Begman and Goldman, “Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More Than a Year Ago.”
64 Kathrine Donlevy, “Israel had Hamas Attack Plan Year before Oct. 7 Invasion, but Officials Dismissed as ‘Imaginative,’” New York Post, 30 November 2023, www.nypost.com/2023/11/30/news/israel-had-hamas-attack-plans-for-year-before-bloodbath-report/
65 Bochbot, “There Were indications before the Black Saturday.”
66 Ronen Bergman, “What Really Happened in Unit 8200?” Ynet, 27 November 2023, in Hebrew, www.ynet.co.il/news/article/yokra13692782
67 Nadav Eyal, “New Revelations on the Intelligence Failure,” Yedioth Ahronot, 2 February 2024, in Hebrew, www.ynet.co.il/news/article/sj3qrvtca?utm_source=ynet.app.ios&utm_term=sj3qrvtca&utm_campaign=general_share&utm_medium=social&utm_content=Header
68 Yehoshua, “Assessments That Have Been Collapsed.”
69 Yoav Zeiton, “There Were Some Indications before the Attack,” Ynet, 12 October 2023, in Hebrew, www.ynet.co.il/news/article/rybln5e11p?utm_source=ynet.app.ios&utm_term=rybln5e11p&utm_campaign=general_share&utm_medium=social&utm_content=Header
70 Makover Belikov, “Major General Gira Ailand Explains.”
71 Sade Yuval, “Major General Tamir Hayman: Subject to a Movement towards the Palestinians, a Saudi Nuclear Capability Is a Worthwhile Risk,” Calcalist, 28 September 2023, in Hebrew, https://www.calcalist.co.il/local_news/article/skd7aiwep
72 Ben Caspit, “The Protocols of the Time before the War are Exposed: Netanyahu Knew Everything,” Maariv, 15 December 2023, in Hebrew, https://www.maariv.co.il/journalists/Article-1059909
73 Uzi Rubin, “Did the IDF Rely Too Much on Innovation and Technology?” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2 November 2023, in Hebrew, jiss.org.il/he/rubin-did-idf-rely-excessively-on-innovation-and-technology/
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Barnea, “Where Was the Ashraf Marowan of the ISA Inside Hamas.”
77 Haim Wiseberg, “Hamas Is Deterred: How We Fell in the Hamas Trap of Conception,” Globes, 19 October 2023, https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001460561
78 Yitzhak Brik, “We Do Not Have Solutions to the Tunnels,” Haaretz, 25 December 2023.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Bergman, “The Lights Were Not On.”
82 Rubin, “As It Planned for Oct. 7, Hamas Lulled Israel into a False Sense of Calm.” The Washington Post, 6 December 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/06/israel-knew-hamas-attack-oct-7/
83 Georges Malbrunot, “How Hamas Organized Its Attack on Israel in Secrecy,” Le Figaro, 26 December 2023, www.lefigaro.fr/international/comment-le-hamas-a-organise-dans-le-plus-grand-secret-son-attaque-contre-israel-20231226
84 Smadar Perry, “Egyptian General Intelligence Director Supposedly Warned Netanyahu about ‘Something Fierce from Gaza,’” Yedioth Ahronot, 10 September 2023.
85 Jacob Magid, “Top US Lawmaker Affirms Cairo Warned Israel Days before Onslaught,” Times of Israel, 11 October 2023, Top US lawmaker affirms Cairo warned Israel days before onslaught | The Times of Israel
86 State Comptroller of Israel, Report about Operation Defensive Edge.
87 Eyal Pinko, “How Hamas Gathered Open Source Intelligence on Israel before October 7,” Israel Defense, 29 November 2023, in Hebrew, https://www.israeldefense.co.il/node/60112
88 Ibid.
89 Revital Hovel, “Too Much Information Was Open: That’s How Hamas Knew Where to Attack,” Hamakom, 11 January 2024, www.ha-makom.co.il/open-int
90 Ibid.
91 Amir Bochbot, “The Secrets of the Open Source Intelligence Revealed,” Walla, 18 November 2023, in Hebrew, news.walla.co.il/item/348291
92 Uri Bar-Joseph and Avner Cohen, “How Israel’s Spies Failed—And Why Escalation Could Be Catastrophic.” Foreign Policy, 19 October 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/19/israel-intelligence-gaza-nuclear-weapons-hezbollah-iran-escalation-could-be-catastrophic/
93 Amy Zegart, “Open Secrets,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2023), p. 70.
94 Bergman, “The Lights Were Not On.”
95 Barnea, “Where Was the Ashraf Marowan of the ISA Inside Hamas?”
96 Ronen Bergman, “The Warning Letter That Has Never Been Sent Out,” Ynet, 31 October 2023, in Hebrew. www.ynet.co.il/news/article/yokra13656308?utm_source=ynet.app.ios&utm_term=yokra13656308&utm_campaign=general_share&utm_medium=social&utm_content=Header
97 Rubin, “Did the IDF Rely Too Much on Innovation and Technology?”
98 Ibid.
99 Bochbot, “The Secrets of the Open Source Intelligence Revealed.”
100 Bar-Joseph and Cohen, “How Israel’s Spies Failed—And Why Escalation Could Be Catastrophic.”
101 9/11 Commission Report.
102 Barnea, “Strategic Intelligence.”
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Avner Barnea
Avner Barnea is a Research Fellow at the National Security Study Center at the University of Haifa in Israel. He is also a Lecturer in the School of Business Administration at Netanya Academic College, and the School of Management and Economics at the Academic College of Tel Aviv-Yaffo in Israel. He is a former senior member of the Israeli Security Agency. He received a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Haifa. Barnea is the author of We Did Not Anticipate That: Comparative Analysis of Intelligence Failures in the National Field and the Business Field (Tel Aviv: Resling Publishing, 2019; in Hebrew), His new book, We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence, was published in the United States (Lexington Books) in 2021. The author can be contacted at [email protected].