Emissions, the Strategic Omission: Climate Security and Australia’s National Intelligence Community

Abstract

The Australian Government has identified climate change as being a threat to national security. With the emerging prospect that a climate security policy will be established, the question arises as to how the extraordinary powers of Australia’s security agencies could be effectively, but proportionately, utilized. Currently, discourse remains restricted to the tactical capacity of the Department of Defence or intelligence agencies’ assessment functions. Conversely, this article outlines strategic opportunities for Australia’s National Intelligence Community to enhance substantially the Commonwealth’s climate security response. Specifically, the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGO), the Australian Federal Police (AFP), and the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) are found well placed to support the monitoring of breaches to specific components of Australia’s federal climate change legislation. Hence, it is recommended that the collection and provision of greenhouse gas emissions data be prioritized within AGO, and, regarding the AFP and ACIC, that Subsection 22XF(1) of the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 be amended to include a criminal penalty to form a hybrid criminal/civil regime.

In 2022, the United Nations Environment Programme declared that, due to a global failure to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, there is currently “no credible pathway” by which to limit global warming to 1.5 °C. As such, the world is well underway to ensuring that catastrophic climate change becomes “the default scenario.”¹

In light of the above, Australia’s principal strategic ally, the United States, has officially declared climate change a direct threat to national security. In 2021, the United States released a “National Intelligence Estimate that placed climate change at the heart of America’s security planning.”² The Albanese government appears to be following suit, stating that “climate change … is a national security issue,” and commissioning the development of a security-focused climate risk assessment (2022) led by the Office of National Intelligence (ONI).³ Calls have been made to use this (yet-to-be-made-public) assessment as the basis on which an Australian climate and security policy be established.⁴

However, despite calls to implement a national security response to climate change, little information is available, in Australia or elsewhere, as to what declaring climate change a security issue practically entails. To clarify, it is common to read government statements that identify climate change as a national security “risk” or “threat” due to its influence on, for example, sea level rise, droughts, and bushfires, or as a result of its impact on the economy, infrastructure, or community health, and what could or should be undertaken to protect from these specific threats or risks (manifestations of climate change).⁵ It is, however, much less common to find government statements that comment on what can practically be undertaken to counter the threat of climate change writ large in a security context.

As such, there exists significant ambiguity as to what the establishment of a climate security policy would mean for Australia’s security community. This article seeks to rectify this ambiguity by identifying strategic opportunities for Australia’s National Intelligence Community (NIC) to substantially enhance the Commonwealth’s climate security response. For this process to begin, the current climate security discourse needs to, first, be assessed to evaluate whether current approaches are sufficient to elicit substantial change.

Before proceeding, some key concepts require clarification. First, “climate security” refers to the security implications that arise as a result of anthropogenic changes to the gaseous composition of the Earth’s atmosphere, which are causing the climate to warm. This is a narrower focus than “environmental security,” which refers to broader environmental threats, which have and always will provide challenges.⁶ For example, projected increases in sea level rise are the result of a warming climate, whereas, despite the increasing intensity and frequency of bushfires being attributable to climate change, the occurrence of bushfires is a natural phenomenon.⁷

Second, “strategy” is understood as the pursuit of continuing advantage.⁸ Strategic studies literature suggests that to ensure strategic pitfalls are avoided, a strategic approach to climate security needs to not only possess the basic elements of ends, ways, and means, but importantly first, be practical; second, be preemptive and proactive; and third, consist of longer time horizons (a decade or more).⁹ Finally, “substantially enhance” refers to points of leverage, being, as per Donella H. Meadows’ definition, areas within a system in which relatively small interventions have the potential to result in large-scale change. ¹⁰

CLIMATE CHANGE AND AUSTRALIA’S SECURITY

A review of the literature that discusses climate change specifically concerning Australia’s security reveals a predominant theme: the Department of Defence is the primary emphasis; that is, particularly regarding its ability, or otherwise, to deploy military resources in response to the impacts of climate events.¹¹ Matt McDonald’s 2021 article supports this claim, stating that “analysts have pointed most consistently to the challenges posed to Australia’s defence capability … [and] … locate (limited) climate security responses within the jurisdiction of Defence.”¹² Despite noting that climate security has had limited integration into the broader “security establishment,” McDonald does not investigate how such an integration might work in practice.¹³ This is indicative of the majority of the academic work in this space.¹⁴

While the Department of Defence is integral to managing and responding to issues of climate security, the lack of focus on other agencies within NIC and their roles and responsibilities regarding Australia’s climate security render latent opportunities to strengthen the government’s approach to climate security overlooked.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

A review of the literature that discusses climate change regarding intelligence agencies broadly, including NIC, reveals that the majority of these works share a common emphasis; a focus on the assessment role of intelligence agencies.¹⁵ For example, the Australian Security Leaders Climate Group’s (ASLCG) 2021 report recommends that an Office of Climate Threat Intelligence be established to assess climate security risks and “provide an integrated flow of analysis to government and departments.”¹⁶ In 2022, the ASLCG suggested that a climate and security risk assessment be conducted every nine months in which expertise from intelligence and the Department of Defence (among other government departments) are drawn on.¹⁷

Although a focus on assessment is justified given that this is a significant, and in some cases the sole function, of the various intelligence agencies, the lack of attention and focus on other functions that certain intelligence agencies possess is a significant oversight. The preceding analysis has, hence, illuminated two interrelated gaps; the first being a lack of focus on nondefense and nonassessment intelligence agencies, the second being an absence of legal analysis concerning NIC’s response capabilities regarding climate change. These gaps are symptomatic of the third and largest oversight, being a lack of strategic focus.

A LACK OF STRATEGIC FOCUS

NIC’s current approach to climate security lacks a strategic focus as, while attention on the manifestations of climate change is important, such approaches do not consider climate security as a whole. That is, current approaches merely focus on specific climate change–related threats or risks—this being only one component or aspect of climate security. As such, current approaches to climate security have not only remained reactive but have rendered the realization of potential leverage points to strengthen the government’s approach to climate security, in its entirety, overlooked. Both factors undermine practical potential and, hence, proactive and preemptive abilities as well as long-term security outcomes.

To respond to climate security as a whole, climate change’s causes need to be addressed alongside its manifestations. This is not only because addressing causes ensures that a hitherto overlooked element of climate security is addressed, but also because addressing causes impacts manifestations and, thereby, the security issue as a whole.

To be clear, although ONI has allegedly conducted assessments on “climate security” writ large, it is worth reiterating that, as stated by Mr. Andrew Shearer, ONI’s role regarding climate security is helping government make sense of the complexities, navigate the uncertainties, as well as manage “the diverse impacts of climate change.”¹⁸ Hence, ONI also conforms to a reactive and tactical approach to climate security.

What the above alludes to is that strategic pathways forward require conceptual clarity. That is, concepts, or lack thereof, establish “… a particular horizon for potential experience … and in this way [set] a limit” on perceptions, thoughts, and, importantly, actions.¹⁹ This article will now demonstrate one such pathway forward. This is by no means the only pathway; rather, it exemplifies the strategic effect conceptual clarity holds. To be clear, and as will be seen, a lack of conceptual clarity hinders strategic outcomes, while the yet-to-be-identified leverage point is an example by which to further strategic outcomes.

GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

Understanding climate security as encompassing more than merely the manifestations of climate change illuminates new and strategic threat responses. Irrespective of how one conceives of climate security (human, traditional, or international/collective), the security issues associated with climate change stem from the same origin: excessive anthropogenic GHG emissions.²⁰ Hence, approaches to climate security that do not incorporate considerations of GHG emissions reduction merely treat the symptoms rather than the cause and, as such, are effectively “Band-Aid solutions.” Involving intelligence agencies in assisting GHG emissions reduction would ensure a strategic approach due to its practical, preemptive, and longer-term-impact potential.

However, other than merely recognizing “climate change mitigation through emissions reductions as a fundamental part of protecting Australia’s national security” (Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee’s 2017 inquiry into the “Implications of Climate Change for Australia’s National Security”),²¹ no government documentation and precious little literature exists outlining how GHG emissions should be dealt with in a security context.

Although many authors recognize GHG emissions as the root cause of issues of climate security, and even call for GHG emissions as the source of the threat to be reduced or eliminated, what the broader intelligence establishment can do to assist in the mitigation of climate change in the first instance has been majorly overlooked.²² Some notable exceptions include Simon Dalby’s 1995 article and Louis Bruhnke’s 2013 master’s thesis for the Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, California).²³

Dalby recommends that intelligence agencies could inform “governments about innovative developments…” in renewable energy technologies and could gauge foreign governmental threat perceptions to aid the formation of “international agreements [regarding GHG emissions]…”²⁴ However, these recommendations for how intelligence agencies could assist in the reduction of GHG emissions do not target the source itself. This raises concerns regarding the effectiveness of Dalby’s recommendations, as not targeting an issue at its source has the potential to exacerbate a problem by diverting attention and delaying the necessary change.²⁵ In contrast to Dalby, Bruhnke explores how intelligence involvement could directly target GHG emissions reduction.

Bruhnke’s central contention is that the U.S. Intelligence Community could support climate change mitigation via assisting the international monitoring, reporting, and verification of GHG emissions, were a binding and enforceable international GHG limitation treaty to be formed.²⁶ To support this, Bruhnke references the potential for intelligence agencies to ascertain signatory intentions and thereby accelerate the process of treaty violation identification, the provision of a secure means of confidential reporting, and the potential deployment of technologies with covert GHG monitoring capacities.²⁷ It must be noted that although the world does now possess an international GHG limitation treaty (the Paris Agreement), its objectives are essentially nonbinding and nonenforceable.²⁸

As such, Bruhnke’s central contention is hypothetical. With the prospect of a binding international GHG emissions limitation agreement in the near future appearing distant, considerations as to how intelligence agencies might contribute to GHG emissions reduction in the meantime remain neglected.²⁹ This neglected consideration of the role intelligence could play in assisting GHG emissions reduction in a way that ensured strategic outcomes under current geopolitical circumstances constitutes a potential point of leverage for NIC regarding climate security.

As such, the question arises: Could NIC play a role in assisting GHG emission reduction and would this substantially, but proportionately, enhance the Australian Commonwealth’s current threat response?

As will be seen, the answer to the above question is that certain NIC agencies could substantially, but proportionately, enhance the Commonwealth’s current climate security response. Specifically, it is found that the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGO), the Australian Federal Police (AFP), and the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) are well placed to support the monitoring of breaches to specific components of Australia’s federal climate change legislation.

This article continues as follows; section one will outline the article’s research methodology. Section two will analyze how NIC could potentially act on the leverage point of GHG emissions reduction to ensure strategic outcomes. As areas of strategic weaknesses offer the most effective opportunity to enact a leverage point, this section will analyze and assess the Commonwealth’s current threat response to GHG emissions.

Section three will lay out the article’s results, being the current ability or inability of each agency within NIC to address the leverage point and whether there exists a potential capacity for future involvement. The fourth and final section will discuss whether future involvement is feasible and could be effective, evaluate reasons for and against possible legislative amendments, and offer several recommendations.

It is important to note that this article does not contribute to the debate surrounding the legitimacy or otherwise of climate change as a security issue. Rather, its focus is on analyzing the effectiveness and proportionality of increasing NIC’s involvement should a climate security policy be established. Furthermore, the research conducted was limited to open-source material. Finally, although this article focuses on Australia as a case study, the broader findings and recommendations have relevance internationally.

METHODS

This article employed a qualitative research method, which entailed a combination of discourse, content, and legal analysis. This involved reviewing and critically analyzing a range of sources. For example, government documentation and transcripts such as committee inquiries, commission reports, white papers, and departmental reports were searched to gain an awareness of policy intentions, whereas approximately twenty pieces of federal legislation were examined to ascertain agency functions and limitations.

During the research’s early exploratory phase, several unstructured focus groups were also undertaken to test hypotheses. Additionally, various forms of structured analytical techniques were employed throughout the project to ensure academic rigor. For example, an “Analysis of Competing Hypotheses” and “Devil’s Advocacy” were employed throughout the research to challenge the validity of various outcomes. ³⁰ The employment of such techniques is perhaps most evident in the discussion where various reasons for and against possible policy amendments are evaluated.

The combination of these methods ensured triangulation while providing a wide and varied scope. It also enabled results to be cross-checked; for example, between academia and government documents, areas of divergence and convergence to become evident, and trends to materialize. Furthermore, considering that this thesis focused on Australia’s NIC, other research methods, such as interviews, questionnaires, or surveys, were, due to the classified nature of intelligence, largely infeasible.

AN OPPORTUNITY FOR AUSTRALIA’S NIC?

Potential International Opportunity

Climate diplomacy, especially focusing on GHG emissions reduction, has been a prominent feature of international relations since the lead-up to the establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992.³¹ As previously discussed, however, GHG intelligence has remained limited. This is despite the fact that diplomacy and intelligence comprise two sides of the same coin.³² That is, intelligence provides an additional covert source of information that supplements overt sources, bolstering abilities to influence external actors.³³ If “Good diplomacy goes hand-in-hand with good intelligence,” it would appear reasonable to explore the plausibility of involving NIC in an effort to bolster international climate mitigation efforts.³⁴

Potential Domestic Opportunity

Australia’s current approach to practically reducing GHG emissions is sought to be achieved, almost exclusively, via incentives.³⁵ Although these initiatives are extensive, “To ensure decarbonization outcomes, the carrots of investment need to go hand in hand with regulatory sticks.”³⁶

The only Australian scheme designed to mitigate the threat of climate change that is neither incentivized nor voluntary is the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (Safeguard Mechanism) Rule 2015 under the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (NGER Act).³⁷ This scheme is administered by the Clean Energy Regulator (CER).³⁸ The Safeguard Mechanism “requires Australia’s largest GHG emitters [covering around 28% of national emissions] to keep their net emissions below an emissions limit (a baseline).”³⁹ Australia’s largest emitters are those that produce equal to or above 100,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalence per annum, currently covering around 215 facilities.⁴⁰ The Safeguard Mechanism (Crediting) Amendment Act 2023 (SMCA Act), has instated several reforms that commenced on the first of July 2023. One of these is of particular importance to this article; that safeguard baselines are set to decline at a rate of 4.9% each year until 2030.⁴¹ Post-2030 annual decline rates will be subject to consultation in 2026–2027 to ensure that emissions reductions will reach net zero by 2050.⁴²

Despite possessing this “stick,” various gaps throughout the regulatory framework appear to undermine the effectiveness of the Safeguard Mechanism. Factors such as self-reporting, time given to respondents, and selective testing suggest that strong surveillance is currently not taking place.⁴³ For example, although there are benefits to self-reporting, such as reduced costs, information attained through this process has a higher inaccuracy potential than that attained through independent means.⁴⁴ This is for numerous reasons, intentional and unintentional.

Regarding intentional inaccuracies, unfavorable information, practices, processes, and outcomes can be excluded, concealed, and/or manipulated, while favorable information exaggerated.⁴⁵ Research that has uncovered the propensity among Australia’s high emitters to engage in greenwashing (being the portrayal of false environmental concern and/or claims, while in reality perpetrating environmental harms) demonstrates an inclination toward selective disclosure, concealment, and industry dishonesty.⁴⁶ Regarding unintentional inaccuracies, endogenous selection biases can also result in performance misrepresentation.⁴⁷ As such, this reduces the likelihood of misconduct identification, in turn reducing the CER’s propensity to have “reasonable grounds to suspect” noncompliance and, hence, making it less likely that an audit will be initiated.

Although these practices of weak, if any, surveillance, comprise the standard approach to regulating corporations, the security implications of excessive GHG emissions are not a standard consequence of corporate misconduct and, hence, should be regulated accordingly.⁴⁸

This is particularly pressing as GHG emissions will need to have peaked before 2025 to mitigate the worst impacts of climate change.⁴⁹ To provide some perspective, the cost of merely two recent climate events more than doubles the annual budgets of the AFP, ACIC, and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) combined: the fallout of the 2019–2020 bushfires cost the Australian food system (alone) $4–5 billion, whereas the fallout from Australia’s 2022 “rain bomb” event cost $2.32 billion.⁵⁰ “Even under a low emissions scenario, the cost of natural disasters in Australia is estimated to increase to $73 billion per year by 2060.” As the world is currently, however, following a high, rather than a low, emissions pathway, this figure is expected to be closer to $94 billion per year by 2060.⁵¹

Recent research questioning the integrity of Australia’s emission reporting scheme and noncompliance detection abilities supports the contention that sufficient surveillance is currently not occurring.⁵² In 2021, Dutch scientists used civilian satellite imagery to discover that several coal mines in Queensland—including four safeguard-covered facilities—were emitting emissions that were “significantly higher than reported to the Australian government.”⁵³ It appears that the CER did not detect these reporting inaccuracies, something that is of concern considering the lead author of the paper allegedly informed the Australian Broadcasting Corporation that the cumulative emissions from the mines were twice as high as the reported figures.⁵⁴

Although the occurrence of noncompliance regarding the Safeguard Mechanism might currently be perceived as low given that most baselines are currently effectively “non-binding as they are above current facility emissions,” this is set to change with baselines to continuously reduce to achieve Australia’s recently legislatively enshrined commitment to reach net zero by 2050.⁵⁵ As such, compliance is set to become increasingly difficult rapidly. As the costs to companies associated with compliance increase, so too does the risk of noncompliance.⁵⁶

The above stands even before proposals to expand the scope of the Safeguard Mechanism are considered. A recent report released by the Productivity Commission has recommended that the Safeguard Mechanism should be extended to encompass a greater range of facilities.⁵⁷ An expanded scope without enhanced regulatory capabilities would further increase the risk of nondetection and ineffective enforcement.

The strengthening and expansion of the CER’s surveillance capabilities could take many forms. For example, ground and airborne surveillance powers and capabilities could be developed to compile or verify not only assessments and reports, but GHG emissions estimates, such as those conducted by satellite observations.⁵⁸

Despite the allure in the seeming simplicity of GHG emissions monitoring via satellite observations, such as that conducted by the Dutch scientists as outlined above, these researchers noted that satellite observations do not possess “… the granularity of ground-based measurements and/or monitoring of individual shafts. …”⁵⁹ This is indicative of the fundamental ongoing challenges of remote satellite observation.⁶⁰ Hence, although employment of satellites may enhance the agency’s response, it is far from a “silver bullet” solution.

As such, other types of more invasive surveillance mechanisms and powers would also benefit intelligence-gathering capabilities. These may include capabilities such as the ability to remotely access computers to verify the integrity of the information provided as well as to enhance the robustness of data analysis, and hence, the identification of relationships, inconsistencies, risks, and targets. Not only would this be beneficial to intelligence in and of itself, but it would also contribute to the effectiveness of existing information sources—reporting and audits—through the reduction, if not elimination, of noncompliance concealment opportunities, the enhancement of knowledge relating to actual GHG emission production, as well as a deepening and broadening of test coverage and continuality.

Despite this, there are various potential concerns associated with the CER’s implementation of particularly these more invasive surveillance mechanisms. First, conferring surveillance powers on the CER may constitute an unnecessary duplication of powers because other agencies, specifically Australia’s NIC, already hold these. The powers of NIC, including their surveillance powers, will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections; however, suffice for now to say that their powers include an extensive range of capabilities, such as the ability to remotely access computers and employ surveillance devices.⁶¹

Second, and due to invasive surveillance powers being the remit of NIC, employment of these capabilities by the CER could also be viewed as further extending Australia’s national security apparatus. Such an extension may have precedent-setting potential. Due to the intrusive nature of such powers and the lack of accountability mechanisms that typically accompany them, this is not a desirable occurrence in a democratic society. Security powers are necessarily restricted to a few agencies to limit encroachment on democratic values and freedoms.⁶²

Third, due to their lack of specialization, experience, and expertise, the CER could be perceived as unfit for the administration of surveillance capabilities.⁶³ Comparatively, various NIC agencies were developed specifically for surveillance purposes and have been operationally active to this end since the Cold War.⁶⁴ The difficulties and sensitivities associated with surveillance would render the development of the necessary capabilities, expertise, and safeguards, not only within the CER but also regarding oversight mechanisms, costly, difficult, and time-consuming.⁶⁵ As such and in sum, it appears that perhaps it would be more efficient and effective for the CER to simply collaborate with NIC agencies when such expertise and capabilities are required.

RESULTS: ABILITY OF AUSTRALIA’S NIC TO DELIVER ON THE STRATEGIC LEVERAGE POINT

Cannot Deliver

Investigation found the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), the Department of Home Affairs (HA), the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), and ONI unable to utilize the identified leverage point—that is, intelligence collection to assist GHG emissions reduction. This was largely to do with the niche and purpose within NIC that each agency holds; DIO as a traditional security-focused assessment agency, HA as an immigration and border control agency, and AUSTRAC as a financial agency.⁶⁶ Similarly, while ONI possesses the capacity to further develop conceptual clarity regarding climate security, as an assessment agency it cannot directly address the identified leverage point via either the international nor domestic opportunity as both necessitate the ability to collect intelligence. As such, these agencies will not be further considered here.

Could Deliver

ASIO

ASIO is a domestic intelligence collection and assessment agency.⁶⁷ What constitutes “security” is central to the enactment of ASIO’s functions and remit, being legislatively defined within the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act) as the protection of Australia; its territorial and border integrity, and people from “espionage; sabotage; politically motivated violence; promotion of communal violence; attacks on Australia’s defence system; or acts of foreign interference. …”⁶⁸ This arguably reflects the “ordinary” and “traditional” understanding of “security,” where the use of force, violence, military aggression, or other forms of adversarial interaction are regarded to constitute threats to security.⁶⁹ Importantly, ASIO possesses various surveillance powers; for example, regarding computer access, the use of surveillance devices, the interception of telecommunications, the entering and searching of premises, as well as the examination of postal articles.⁷⁰

As GHG emissions, let alone climate change, are not included within the ASIO Act’s definition of “security,” ASIO is unable to respond practically to climate change. The ASIO Act’s narrow and traditional definition of security excludes the possibility of considering climate change, except in instances when a traditional security threat has its risk multiplied or exacerbated because of it. If climate change is only dealt with in an incidental and indirect manner, the narrower and more specific condition of responding to GHG emissions is rendered unattainable.

However, although ASIO’s current statutory functions do not presently include climate security or GHG emissions, as a domestic intelligence collection agency ASIO holds the potential to deliver practical outcomes regarding surveillance under the Safeguard Mechanism and, thereby, enhance the Commonwealth’s response to the threat of climate change. That is, legislation is liable to change. As standards emerge, evolve, and develop over time, an absence of legal standards or statutory functions in relation to an issue is not necessarily indicative of a lack of need for legal standards regarding that issue.

Surveillance powers and capabilities, such as ASIO’s, are greatly needed by the CER to ensure noncompliance detection and deterrence. Despite the uncertainties involved with direct GHG emissions monitoring, ASIO could leverage its existing technologies and capabilities to identify attempted noncompliance concealment, verify the integrity of reported information, as well as enhance the robustness of data analysis and, hence, the identification of relationships, inconsistencies, risks, and targets.⁷¹ As such, were ASIO enabled to engage with GHG emissions (as a security threat) via legislative change, practical outcomes and thereby enhancement of the Commonwealth’s climate change threat response would be ensured.

Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) and Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)

ASD and ASIS are two of Australia’s three foreign intelligence collection agencies primarily governed by the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (IS Act).⁷² As such, ASIS and ASD possess similar core functions, which are to be performed “… in the interests of Australia’s national security, Australia’s foreign relations or Australia’s national and economic well-being. …”⁷³ None of these core concepts are defined. Despite this, the fundamental functions shared by these agencies—the duty to obtain or collect “…intelligence about the capabilities, intentions or activities of people or organisations outside Australia”—provide a good indication as to what is considered to provide advantage to, or threaten, Australia’s security, foreign relations, as well as national and economic well-being.⁷⁴

As anthropogenic GHG emissions can be perceived as an issue that has implications for “national security,” “foreign relations,” or “national and economic wellbeing,” they have the potential to fall within the remit of the intelligence agencies governed by the IS Act. This is further supported by the fact that GHG emissions are engendered by “people” and “organisations” through their “capabilities, intentions or activities.”⁷⁵ As such, ASD and ASIS possess the capability to practically respond to the threat posed by GHG emissions and thereby potentially deliver on the identified leverage point.

As these agencies are primarily foreign intelligence collection agencies, opportunities to bolster the effectiveness of the Safeguard Mechanism can be ruled out. This leaves strategic opportunities to pursue GHG emissions reduction in the international realm. As outlined by Bruhnke, foreign intelligence collection agencies could contribute to the mitigation of climate change by potentially ascertaining signatory intentions and thereby accelerating the process of treaty violation detection, by providing a secure means of confidential reporting, and via the deployment of covert GHG monitoring capabilities.⁷⁶

AGO

AGO is the third foreign intelligence collection agency, alongside ASD and ASIS, primarily governed by the IS Act.⁷⁷ As such, its functions and ability to address climate security and GHG emissions largely resemble those of ASD and ASIS. This section will, however, outline some important points of difference.

Although AGO is first and foremost a foreign intelligence collection agency, it possesses specific functions that allow it to aid Commonwealth or state authorities in certain instances. AGO can assist Commonwealth authorities with imagery if it is not intelligence that has been obtained under its foreign intelligence functions.⁷⁸ This could potentially include imagery of GHG emissions in Australia. In addition, AGO can assist other Commonwealth authorities in the performance of certain functions relevantly, including “safety functions … and environmental protection functions.”⁷⁹ Furthermore, if managing GHG emissions is conceptualized as a national security function, then AGO could provide its full spectrum of intelligence assistance.⁸⁰

As GHG emissions have been identified by the Australian government as a fundamental part of protecting national security as well as the environment, it is conceivable that AGO would be able to engage in GHG emissions monitoring on one or more of the above bases.⁸¹ Due to this, and its role of obtaining, among other things, geospatial and imagery intelligence, AGO has the potential to support the bolstering of surveillance concerning the Safeguard Mechanism, particularly regarding data obtained via satellites.⁸² This, and/or the expertise of its personnel in satellite imagery analysis, would prove beneficial to GHG emissions surveillance. Through this, AGO would be able to contribute to substantially enhancing the Commonwealth’s climate security response.

AFP

The AFP is the Commonwealth of Australia’s primary law enforcement agency. Although pertaining to crime, the AFP’s functions as well as search and surveillance powers are numerous and varied.⁸³ As such, only the key ones potentially relevant to the leverage point will be discussed.

The AFP can seek warrants under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 and the Telecommunications Act 1997. In short, the warrants obtainable allow the AFP to access the content of communications, including stored communications and associated data. Importantly and unlike ASIO, there are statutory obligations to consider regarding the interference this might impose on privacy and whether this is proportionate to the gravity of the suspected prejudice to security.⁸⁴

The AFP also possesses search and surveillance warrants, which not only allow the search of premises, inspection of postal articles, the use of listening and “sophisticated” surveillance devices, and powers to seize items and use force, but also allow remote computer access. Here “computer access” pertains to computers as well as computer systems and networks. Importantly, unlike ASIO, the AFP cannot engage in covert searches.⁸⁵

Finally, “controlled operations” powers are held by the AFP. Controlled operations powers provide civil and criminal immunity for authorized officers and allow assumed identities to be adopted. Importantly, again unlike ASIO, the use of these powers is subject to judicial scrutiny.⁸⁶

The AFP can only become involved with matters considered a crime; hence, as only civil penalties apply for breaching designated baselines, the AFP only has a secondary or indirect remit regarding the Safeguard Mechanism. This is, however, an enhancement of previous arrangements, as the SMCA Act updated the NGER Act so that sections 134.1, 134.2, 135.1, 135.2, 135.4, 136.1, 137.1, and 137.2 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 now apply to it.⁸⁷ These sections pertain to deception, dishonesty, misleading, and fraud.⁸⁸ This means that, once suspected or uncovered by the CER, these matters can be transferred to the AFP or the AFP’s assistance can be sought. This is commendable; however, it does nothing to ensure that the CER uncovers the matter in the first instance and as such renders the AFP’s ability to engage the identified leverage point unattainable. Despite this, the AFP could be well suited to addressing the leverage point.

Despite the above, the AFP could, if legislation was amended, deliver on the domestic opportunity to enact the identified leverage point by utilizing its comprehensive domestic surveillance powers to bolster the effectiveness of the CER. This would enhance the Commonwealth’s response to the threat of climate change.

ACIC

ACIC is the Commonwealth’s statutory agency responsible for protecting Australia from serious criminal threats.⁸⁹ ACIC was established under the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 with its main functions being to collect, correlate, analyze, and disseminate criminal information, undertake special Australian Crime Commission operations and investigations, as well as provision the Board of the Australian Crime Commission with reports, assessments, and advice regarding criminal matters. Importantly, all the functions of ACIC also pertain to crime.⁹⁰

ACIC possesses a range of coercive powers (similar to a Royal Commission), such as the power to compel individuals to produce evidence, as well as possessing “a full range of traditional investigative methods,” such as the use of surveillance devices and telecommunications interception.⁹¹

Similarly to the AFP, as penalties regarding the breach of baselines under the Safeguard Mechanism are civil, ACIC cannot become involved under the Safeguard Mechanism. ACIC, like the AFP, could only become involved under the Safeguard Mechanism when instances of fraud, dishonesty, and deception were uncovered or if factors under the Safeguard Mechanism were connected to some type of other crime within their remit.

Despite its current legal limitations, ACIC, as a strategic law enforcement intelligence body, has the potential to engage with the leverage point identified by bolstering GHG emissions surveillance under the Safeguard Mechanism. As ACIC provides strategic support to the AFP, this would largely be contingent on potential AFP involvement.⁹²

DISCUSSION: WHICH OF AUSTRALIA’S NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WOULD BE BEST SUITED TO UTILIZE THE STRATEGIC LEVERAGE POINT?

Should Not Deliver

ASIO

Although the ASIO Act’s current definition of “security” excludes the possibility of incorporating climate change into its remit, as a domestic intelligence collection agency with comprehensive surveillance powers and capabilities, ASIO holds the potential to deliver practical outcomes regarding the Safeguard Mechanism. As such, and because what is defined as “security is central to the functions and powers enabled in the ASIO Act, the best way to leverage ASIO’s potential would be to include a new section in the definition of security. Just as terrorism under the ASIO Act corresponds with terrorism offenses under federal criminal law, so too could GHG emissions under the ASIO Act correspond to offenses under the Safeguard Mechanism.⁹³ As the Safeguard Mechanism only targets Australia’s top GHG emitters, any such amendment would ensure a tight and limited remit (e.g., ASIO’s questioning and detention powers would not apply) toward Australia’s most consequential emitters.⁹⁴

Despite this, various concerns render enacting this currently undesirable. First, ASIO possesses few safeguards and low thresholds; ASIO is subject to substantially less judicial scrutiny than law enforcement authorities, possesses few meaningful constraints and controls (e.g., regarding the collection, retention, and dissemination of personal telecommunications data and the issuing of various warrants), and holds various immunities and protections that render challenging ASIO’s activities and assessments largely ineffective.⁹⁵

Second, ASIO lacks robust oversight. The oversight mechanisms that apply to other “ordinary” government departments, including various forms of public, judicial, and parliamentary scrutiny, largely do not apply or are severely limited in the case of ASIO.⁹⁶ Although executive oversight is meant to compensate for these inadequacies, as such mechanisms form part of the same arm of government, “horizontal” accountability under the separation of powers is undermined. This manifests itself in weak account-holding abilities in the form of recommendatory powers. As such, executive oversight, although important, is also problematic.⁹⁷

Third, the extreme level of secrecy and immediacy associated with ASIO’s powers would largely be unnecessary when applied to the Safeguard Mechanism. Many of ASIO’s powers, their associated lack of safeguards and low thresholds, are designed so that the agency can act swiftly against an immediate existential threat. As the threats associated with GHG emissions reduction are not immediate, the application of legislation accompanied by low thresholds and a lack of safeguards is not justified. Similarly, such an extreme level of secrecy, where, for example, a defendant cannot be privy to the information held against them during a trial, is also unnecessary, as the individual in question is not likely to pose an immediate security risk to any members of the public or informants as a result of information exposure.

As such, the lack of safeguards and oversight, as well as low thresholds, render ASIO an unjustifiable first line of response in a liberal democratic society. It may, however, constitute a secondary line of response in the future; for example, under circumstances in which first response lines (as will be discussed in the final sections) were ineffective and/or in instances in which the need to respond has become more acute.

Ineffective at This Stage

ASD and ASIS

As anthropogenic GHG emissions have the potential to fall within the remit of ASD and ASIS, and as these agencies are primarily foreign intelligence collection agencies, ASD and ASIS have the potential to pursue GHG emissions reduction in the international realm. However, although ASD’s and ASIS’ capabilities could be deployed to service this end, it is essential to consider what tangible impact, if any, their deployment might hold.

First, there is the potential for foreign intelligence agency involvement to induce the opposite effects desired. International efforts to reduce global GHG emissions effectively depend on cooperation and trust. However, “mistrust between nations is the raison d’être of intelligence agencies” and covert intelligence monitoring “the antithesis of cooperation.”⁹⁸ As such, rather than favorably alter behavior, intelligence monitoring could conversely undermine international GHG emission reduction efforts and induce resentment.⁹⁹ The latter appearing rather likely given that intelligence-based judgments are difficult to publicly support or explain.¹⁰⁰

Second, deploying these capabilities in service of an international GHG emissions limitation agreement is currently unrealistic, as the current treaty is essentially nonbinding and unenforceable.¹⁰¹ There has, however, been speculation regarding the merit of states imposing their own enforcement mechanisms to abate the GHG emissions of other nations in the absence of a global enforcement authority. For example, GHG intelligence collected by ASIS and ASD could inform the employment of unilateral or multilateral sanctions.¹⁰²

However, several studies call into question the effectiveness of such an approach.¹⁰³ For example, Falkner, Nasiritousi, and Reischl find that “external carbon tariffs would more likely provoke trade retaliation or legal challenges at the WTO than…” encourage major emitters to reduce their emissions. Furthermore, they hold that it could undermine the legitimacy, and cause the unraveling, of existing frameworks that address climate change.¹⁰⁴ Other studies have indicated that sanctions, due to costs incurred, have generally negative impacts on overall environmental performance and can impede the transition to renewable energy systems.¹⁰⁵ As such, any unilateral or multilateral attempts to enforce GHG emissions reduction appears likely to render little, if any, benefit to an actual reduction in GHG emissions.

Furthermore, the effectiveness of attaining GHG emissions reduction via the application of targeted political pressure (enabled through the collection of foreign intelligence) also appears questionable. First, although political pressure may be punitively successful via the invocation of humiliation, disgrace, and fear of political isolation, effective behavioral change is, conversely, far from assured.¹⁰⁶ This is particularly the case when action, as opposed to abstinence, is required (the former being more psychologically demanding and politically complicated than the latter).¹⁰⁷ Second, whether political pressure will be successful is case specific and often depends on other influencing variables such as interstate relationships, public opinion, or personality of, and affinity between, leaders.¹⁰⁸

Finally, Australia, as one of the most emissions-intensive states in the world (on an exporter or per capita basis), is currently not in a position to call out the inadequate emissions reductions of other states.¹⁰⁹ For political pressure to be effective, Australia would first need to build up some legitimacy and leadership in the GHG emissions reduction space.¹¹⁰ As such, although GHG emissions intelligence used to exert political pressure may well have some impact, whether this constitutes a point of leverage regarding Australia’s climate security, from which substantial change is engendered, appears doubtful.

Given the ambiguity of whether foreign GHG emissions intelligence could stimulate effective change, current international GHG emissions estimates (based off, for example, civilian satellite data) would seem largely to suffice.

As such, when the relatively minimal benefit derived from the above approaches of involving foreign intelligence agencies is weighed against the economic investment required to establish and maintain a GHG intelligence capability and the opportunity cost of such an endeavor, it becomes clear that involving Australia’s foreign intelligence agencies in the collection of global GHG emissions information is currently an ineffective approach.¹¹¹ More efficient and effective ways for NIC to become involved in GHG emissions reduction likely exist, ones that may incidentally serve diplomatic ends to a greater extent. For example, demonstrating domestic GHG emissions reduction leadership is likely to be just as, if not more, effective at serving diplomatic ends. This is because it would first establish the requisite legitimacy and leadership required to ensure that any future foreign GHG emissions intelligence collected could be effectively utilized to engender desired results, and second, could encourage other states, particularly close partners, to follow suit.

As such, ASD and ASIS are currently not considered substantially able to enhance the Commonwealth’s climate security response. However, factors such as current international treaty arrangements or Australia’s poor GHG emissions reduction record are liable to change. If or when these factors change, this determination will need to be reconsidered.

Well-Suited

AGO

As AGO possesses functions that would allow it to engage in GHG emission monitoring in assistance to Commonwealth authorities, and due to its ability and expertise of obtaining and analyzing particularly high-quality satellite data, it has the potential to bolster GHG emissions surveillance under the Safeguard Mechanism. The legislation to allow AGO to realize this potential already exists. The only change required would be to prioritize this undertaking.

This change should be actioned, as, despite section two concluding that satellite surveillance is not a silver bullet solution, the provision of high-quality satellite data and sharing of highly experienced satellite analysis would bolster less invasive surveillance capabilities and output.

AFP

Despite being currently unable to do so, the AFP was found to have potential to deliver on the leverage point by utilizing its comprehensive domestic surveillance powers to bolster the effectiveness of the CER. For this to be realizable, the civil penalty under Subsection 22XF(1) of the updated NGER Act would need to be changed to include a criminal penalty. A hybrid civil/criminal scheme would allow the CER to collaborate with the AFP regarding the Safeguard Mechanism if required. This would be beneficial, as the AFP is a well-funded and well-resourced agency with, as outlined above, access to a range of surveillance and investigative powers that would likely be of assistance to monitoring, investigation, and prosecution success. Furthermore, the ability to initiate criminal prosecutions allows greater regulatory flexibility and noncompliance deterrence, the latter via reputational and financial penalties.¹¹²

Here it is important that Part 2.5 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 is not excluded from any prospective criminal provision. Part 2.5 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 prescribes how a corporation might be held criminally responsible for an offense.¹¹³ This is of importance, as not only are corporations the principal offenders in matters relating to federal environmental protection, but because the Safeguard Mechanism targets Australia’s top GHG emitters and, as such, inevitably pertains to companies or corporations.¹¹⁴ This would ensure that the AFP would have a wider remit by which to pursue criminal emissions production by corporations, namely not only regarding the liability of senior individuals within a corporation who have failed in their oversight and management responsibilities.¹¹⁵

This is paramount given that, as corporations are generally complex and diffuse, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to identify or attribute individual responsibility.¹¹⁶ This is largely due to the inappropriateness of ascertaining individual responsibility given the power imbalances, hierarchies, and informational siloes that potentially render individuals more suspectable to “group think” and less able to perceive the consequences of their engagement and, hence, more likely to inadvertently participate in illegal activities.¹¹⁷

Maintaining the civil element, however, would remain important to ensure that the idiosyncrasies of corporation criminal prosecution do not impede effective deterrence due to a (perceived or actual) reduced likelihood of enforcement.¹¹⁸ This is because corporate criminal prosecution engenders its own complications and impediments to successful prosecution. These include, first, the long delays associated with corporate criminal trials. This is an issue for various evidentiary and punitive reasons. For example, concerning the former, as years are likely to have passed, the viability of evidence (e.g., the memories of witnesses) and hence, the likelihood of successful prosecution, fades. Regarding the latter, the entity being charged is likely “a different beast” to what it was, with new employees and executive officers. In such instances, the challenges of successful prosecution are again enhanced while liability is likely to become misplaced.¹¹⁹

Second, the difficulties of criminal proof are accentuated regarding corporate misconduct “…given the fundamental requirement of the criminal law that, for the most part, the corporation must not only commit the physical elements of an offense but also have the requisite state of mind.”¹²⁰ As such, the requisite evidence, for example, corporate culture, is often located within the corporate structure itself, which, as it involves the shared values and norms of an entity, is a difficult piece of evidence to obtain, let alone prove in a criminal trial.¹²¹

Third, and substantiating the claims just made, comparatively to the prosecution of individuals, the prosecution of corporations in Australia is “extremely rare.” This is an occurrence that does not arise due to a reduced likelihood of engaging in illegal activity.¹²² Conversely, academic literature suggests that incentives to offend increase, rather than decrease, in corporate contexts. From this, the Australian Law Reform Commission has deduced that “significant amounts of corporate misconduct do in fact occur” and that it is the incoherence and complexity related to corporate misconduct that results in the lack of regulation and enforcement.¹²³

Fourth, maintaining a civil penalty averts the complications that arise in the absence of a corporate “body” toward which punishment can be directed.¹²⁴ That is, as imprisonment is not a viable option, corporate prosecution becomes reliant on fines. As such, criminal and civil penalties become largely indistinguishable in practice.¹²⁵ Given this and the reduced likelihood of prosecutorial success in a corporate criminal context, a civil component (accompanied by heightened chances of prosecutorial success) is important to ensure that deterrence is maintained.

Despite this, the points highlighted above concerning the difficulty of attributing individual responsibility within corporate criminal settings still stand. As such, regarding corporate criminal responsibility, the obstacles faced in whichever way the issue is approached, individual or corporate, render the attribution of criminal responsibility regarding corporations difficult in practice. In this context and in line with current practices, it appears necessary and most effective to maintain the civil regulation of corporate conduct to ensure that effective deterrence is not undermined by the inclusion of a criminal penalty.¹²⁶

The implementation of a hybrid regime would, hence, ensure that where criminal prosecution was not successful, the same intelligence collected via the use of the AFP’s surveillance mechanisms could be used in a civil case. This would bolster the practical outcomes of the CER substantially and thereby enhance the Commonwealth’s climate security response.

This change should be actioned, as it would ensure both practical and proportionate outcomes. As alluded to above, although the AFP possesses similar powers to ASIO, it also possesses greater safeguards and oversight mechanisms. For example, the AFP is subject to greater judicial scrutiny, possesses greater public transparency, and its powers are constrained by statutory obligations to ensure proportionality.¹²⁷ Unlike ASIO, the AFP is also subject to various oversight mechanisms, including public, judicial, and parliamentary scrutiny. For instance, the AFP, unlike ASIO, is subject to oversight from the Commonwealth ombudsman.¹²⁸ As such, the AFP would be able to deliver similar results to ASIO; however, it would do so in a way that offered substantially greater protections to democratic rights and freedoms.

ACIC

Despite its current legal limitations, ACIC, largely on the basis of the AFP having been identified as well-suited, has the potential to engage with the leverage point by bolstering GHG emissions surveillance under the Safeguard Mechanism. As ACIC’s current threat response is limited by the same factors as the AFP, namely that excessive GHG emissions are currently not considered a crime, again, the civil penalty under Subsection 22XF(1) of the updated NGER Act should be amended to include a criminal penalty. The inclusion of a criminal penalty would allow ACIC’s board to initiate a response if deemed necessary.¹²⁹

This change should be actioned, as it would ensure that the leverage point is capitalized on in a democratically proportionate manner. That is, similarly to the AFP, ACIC is subject to a range of different safeguards and oversight mechanisms, including by judicial, parliamentary, and public means.¹³⁰ Hence, by supporting the AFP, ACIC would be able to deliver robust results in a way that aligned with Australia’s democratic values.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, NIC could play a role in assisting GHG emissions reduction and, in so doing, certain NIC agencies could substantially, but proportionately, enhance the Commonwealth’s current climate security response. It was found that the agencies most suitable for this task were AGO, the AFP, and ACIC. This was uncovered through the process of first developing some conceptual clarity around the term “climate security”; that was, understanding climate security as a term that encompasses more than just the manifestations of climate change. This led to the uncovering of a practical pathway forward that has hitherto remained overlooked; that NIC may be able to assist GHG emissions reduction. This constituted a strategic leverage point.

From here, the analysis turned to how this leverage point might best be employed to ensure strategic outcomes. Specifically, these employment opportunities were whether NIC may be able to enhance the outcomes of climate diplomacy and/or support the monitoring of breaches to specific components of Australia’s federal climate change legislation.

As such, an assessment of each of NIC’s agencies and their respective functions was conducted to analyze current abilities to, or constraints on, the potential of each respective agency to address the leverage point, investigate whether future involvement might be feasible and effective, and evaluate reasons for and against possible amendments. First, and largely due to the niche and purpose within NIC that each agency holds, DIO, HA, AUSTRAC, and ONI were found unable to utilize the identified leverage point. Second, and despite its contribution potential, ASIO was found to be an inappropriate first response in a democracy due to its low thresholds, weak safeguards, and being the subject of minimal oversight. Finally, although ASD and ASIS were found potentially able to incorporate issues of climate security broadly, and GHG emissions reduction more specifically, into their remits, their potential to aid climate diplomacy to the degree in which substantial change (in the form of GHG emissions reduction) would be engendered was questionable. As more certain, efficient, and effective ways for NIC to assist GHG emissions reduction exist, involving ASD and ASIS was deemed to currently be an ineffective approach.

The remaining intelligence agencies presented the greatest contribution potential. These were AGO, the AFP, and ACIC. These agencies were found to have potential to administer surveillance pertaining to the Safeguard Mechanism in a way that would be proportionate to the values of a democratic society. Regarding AGO, it is recommended that the collection and provision of GHG emission satellite data and analysis to the CER be prioritized. Comparatively, to enable the AFP and ACIC to directly capitalize on the leverage point it is recommended that the legislation under the CER’s Safeguard Mechanism be amended, specifically Subsection 22XF(1), to include a criminal penalty in addition to the preexisting civil penalty to form a hybrid criminal/civil regime. This process, in which civil proceedings could be pursued in cases in which criminal proceedings were not successful, would ensure the necessary surveillance was undertaken, while enhancing deterrence and the likelihood of penalty success.

As such, this article addressed all three gaps identified; it focused on the broader intelligence community rather than merely the Department of Defence or agencies with assessment functions, underwent a legal analysis regarding intelligence agencies’ climate security response capabilities, and, finally, identified ways in which NIC could become involved in a strategic approach to climate security and thereby substantially enhance the Commonwealth’s climate change threat response.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This article follows research conducted for a subthesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree of Master of Strategic Studies Advanced at the Australian National University. The author thanks Dr. James Mortensen and Associate Professor Jake Blight for their guidance and wisdom throughout the project.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

All research within this article was completed before the author began her employment with the Australian Department of Defence. The author reports that a position with the Clean Energy Regulator was held during the latter part of the research. However, all research regarding the Clean Energy Regulator was conducted before taking the position and all information used is open source.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Isabelle Bond

Isabelle Bond is an International Policy Officer at the Department of Defence, Austalia. She recently finished a Master of Strategic Studies (Advanced) at the Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. The author has previously worked as part of the investigations team at the Clean Energy Regulator. The author can be contacted at [email protected].

This article is solely the author’s work and does not represent the views or position of the Department of Defence, Australia.

Notes

1 Tessa Satherley and Lizzie Smith, “Climate Action and Natural Disaster Mitigation,” text, Parliament of Australia, Australia, https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/BudgetReviewOctober202223/ClimateActionNaturalDisasterMitigation?fbclid=IwAR3GE7Drb4R5jZmfaWvfV-hYPOY4-FxAU-xLexRkTAuZaHYUJpbGCPENdoE; United Nations Environment Programme, “Inadequate Progress on Climate Action Makes Rapid Transformation of Societies Only Option—UNEP,” UN Environment, 27 October 2022, http://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/inadequate-progress-climate-action-makes-rapid-transformation.

2 Evan Barnard, Loch K. Johnson, and James Porter, “Environmental Security Intelligence: The Role of US Intelligence Agencies and Science Advisory Groups in Anticipating Climate Security Threats,” Journal of Intelligence History (28 December 2021), p. 2. https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.2021687; “Office of the Director of National Intelligence—Global Trends,” last modified n.d., https://www.dni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home/emerging-dynamics; Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, “Implications of Climate Change for Australia’s National Security” (Canberra, ACT: The Senate, Commonwealth of Australia, May 2018), p. 30.

3 Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, “Annual Climate Change Statement 2022: The First Annual Climate Change Statement to Parliament as Required by the Climate Change Act 2022” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2022), p. 23; Climate Change is a “National Security Issue”, Says PM (ABC News, 2022), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-05-24/climate-change-is-a-national-security-issue-says-pm/13896852

4 Chris Barrie, John Blackburn, Neil Greet, Cheryl Durrant, Michael Thomas, and Ian Dunlop, “Australian Climate and Security Risk Assessment: Implementation Proposal” (Canberra, ACT: Australian Security Leaders Climate Group, June 2022), p. 3.

5 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, “Implications of Climate Change,” p. 91; Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, “Annual Climate Change Statement,” p. 23; Australian Government Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), p. 16.

6 A. V. Whyte, “Environmental Security,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, edited by Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (Oxford: Pergamon, 2001), pp. 4663–4667. https://doi.org/10.1016/B0-08-043076-7/04153-X; Jon Barnett, “Environmental Security,” in International Encyclopedia of Human Geography (Second Edition), edited by Audrey Kobayashi (Oxford: Elsevier, 2020), pp. 247–251. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-102295-5.10789-9

7 Nicky Phillips and Bianca Nogrady, “The Race to Decipher How Climate Change Influenced Australia’s Record Fires,” Nature, Vol. 577, No. 7792 (2020), p. 611. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-020-00173-7

8 Everett Dolman, Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2005), p. 6; Jeffrey Meiser, “Ends Ways Means=(Bad) Strategy,” The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, Vol. 46, No. 4 (2016), pp. 81, 86. https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.3000

9 Meiser, “Ends Ways Means,” pp. 82, 83, 86, 87; Lukas Milevski, “Western Strategy’s Two Logics: Diverging Interpretations,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 46, No, 4 (2019), pp. 1, 2, 4–5, 9–10, 14, 19, 21–22, 24; Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 77.

10 Donella H. Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer (London: Earthscan, 2009), p. 145.

11 Tobias Ide, “Climate Change and Australia’s National Security,” Australian Journal of International Affairs (25 January 2023), pp. 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2170978; Matt McDonald, “After the Fires? Climate Change and Security in Australia,” Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 56, No. 1 (2021), pp. 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2020.1776680; John Blaxland, “Defending Australia from Future Catastrophe: The Australian Defence Force Was Not Built to Fight Fires—The Country Needs Another Way Forward,” Policy Forum, Asia & The Pacific Policy Society (blog), 19 January 2020, https://www.policyforum.net/defending-australia-from-future-catastrophe/

12 McDonald, “After the Fires?,” pp. 8–9, 11.

13 Ibid., pp. 10–11.

14 Ide, “Climate Change and Australia’s National Security,” pp. 7–8; Carol Farbotko, “Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for Geography,” Australian Geographer, Vol. 49, No. 2 (3 April 2018), pp. 248, 250–251. https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2017.1385119; Robert Glasser, “The Rapidly Emerging Crisis on Our Doorstep,” Strategic Insights (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, April 2021), p. 8.

15 Alan Dupont and Pearman Graeme, “Heating up the Planet: Climate Change and Security” (New South Wales, Australia: Lowy Institute for international Policy, 2006), p. x; Joshua Busby, “Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action” (Council on Foreign Relations, November 2007), pp. 1, 17, 24–25; Peter H. Gleick, “A History of U.S. Defense, Intelligence, and Security Assessments of Climate Change,” in World Scientific Encyclopedia of Climate Change: Case Studies of Climate Risk, Action, and Opportunity, Vol. 3 (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2021), pp. 203–209. https://doi.org/10.1142/9789811213960_0026

16 Chris Barrie, John Blackburn, Neil Greet, Cheryl Durrant, Michael Thomas, and Ian Dunlop, “Missing in Action: Responding to Australia’s Climate and Security Failure: Whole-of-Government Climate-Security Risk Assessment” (Canberra, ACT: Australian Security Leaders Climate Group, September 2021), pp. 3, 37.

17 Barrie et al., “Australian Climate and Security Risk Assessment,” pp. 16–17.

18 Australian Government Office of National Intelligence, “Senate Estimates,” last modified n.d., https://www.oni.gov.au/senate-estimates (emphasis added).

19 Christian Volk, “The Problem of Sovereignty in Globalized Times,” Law, Culture and the Humanities, Vol. 18, No. 3 (2019), p. 13. https://doi.org/10.1177/1743872119828010; Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1991), pp. 314–315, 317.

20 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Summary for Policymakers,” in Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis: Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by Valérie Masson-Delmotte, Panmao Zhai, Anna Pirani, Sarah Connors, Clotilde Péan, S. Berger, N. Caud, Y. Chen, L. Goldfarb, Melissa I. Gomis, et al. (Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021), p. 5; Australian Government Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, “Understanding Climate Change,” Australian Government website, last modified 7 November 2022, https://www.dcceew.gov.au/climate-change/policy/climate-science/understanding-climate-change; University of Southampton, “Assessing the Impact of Geo Engineering the Climate,” Ocean and Earth Science, National Oceanography Centre Southampton, 2021, https://www.southampton.ac.uk/oes/research/impact_projects/assessing_the_impact_of_geo_engineering_the_climate.page#pro__

21 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, “Implications of Climate Change,” pp. 37, 96 (emphasis added).

22 McDonald, “After the Fires?,” pp. 10–11, 13; Farbotko, “Climate Change and National Security,” p. 250; Barrie et al., “Missing in Action,” p. 2.

23 Simon Dalby, “Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global Environment,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1995), pp. 175–197. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684529508432332; Louis Bruhnke, “Climate Change Mitigation: Can the U.S. Intelligence Community Help?” (Master’s thesis, Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013).

24 Dalby, “Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global Environment,” pp. 188–189.

25 Daniel Sarewitz and Richard Nelson, “Three Rules for Technological Fixes,” Nature, Vol. 456, No. 7224 (2008), pp. 871–872. https://doi.org/10.1038/456871a; Duncan McLaren and Nils Markusson, “The Co-Evolution of Technological Promises, Modelling, Policies and Climate Change Targets,” Nature Climate Change, Vol. 10, No. 5 (May 2020), pp. 392–397. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0740-1

26 Bruhnke, “Climate Change Mitigation,” pp. v, 212, 214.

27 Ibid., p. 214.

28 Daniel Bodansky, “The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement,” Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2016), p. 146. https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12154; Margaretha Wewerinke-Singh, State Responsibility, Climate Change and Human Rights Under International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018), pp. 52–53.

29 Maiko Meguro, “Litigating Climate Change through International Law: Obligations Strategy and Rights Strategy,” Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, No. 4 (2020), pp. 946–947. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156520000473; Savaresi Annalisa, “Inter-State Climate Change Litigation: ‘Neither a Chimera nor a Panacea,’” in Climate Change Litigation: Global Perspectives, edited by Ivano Alogna, Christine Bakker, and Jean-Pierre Gauci (Leiden: Koninklijke Nijhoff NV, 2021), p. 5; Vanessa Tsang, “Establishing State Responsibility in Mitigating Climate Change under Customary International Law” (Master’s thesis, Columbia University, 2021), pp. 9–10.

30 U.S. Government, “A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving intelligence Analysis” (UC Berkeley Statistics Department, March 2009), https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/∼aldous/157/Papers/Tradecraft%20Primer-apr09.pdf

31 Lorraine Elliott, “Climate Diplomacy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, edited by Andrew Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 840–844.

32 Daniel W. B. Lomas, “Diplomacy and Intelligence,” in A New Theory and Practice of Diplomacy: New Perspectives on Diplomacy (1st ed.), edited by Jack Spence, Alastair Masser, and Claire Yorke (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021), pp. 55, 74, https://salford-repository.worktribe.com/output/1355341/diplomacy-and-intelligence

33 Ibid.; Michael Herman, “Diplomacy and Intelligence,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2007), pp. 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592299808406081; John D. Stempel, “Diplomacy and Intelligence,” International Studies Association and Oxford University Press, 1 March 2010. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.151

34 Lomas, “Diplomacy and Intelligence,” p. 55.

35 Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Gerrit De Geest, “Carrots, Sticks, and the Multiplication Effect,” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2010), pp. 365–366; Australian Government Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, “Powering Australia | Energy.Gov.Au,” Australian Government Website, Government priorities, last modified 28 June 2023, https://www.energy.gov.au/government-priorities/australias-energy-strategies-and-frameworks/powering-australia

36 Jonas Meckling and Jesse Strecker, “Green Bargains: Leveraging Public Investment to Advance Climate Regulation,” Climate Policy, Vol. 23, No. 4 (21 April 2023), p. 419. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2022.2149452

37 Australian Government Clean Energy Regulator, “The Safeguard Mechanism,” Australian Government website, last modified 17 March 2023. https://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/NGER/The-safeguard-mechanism

38 Australian Government Clean Energy Regulator, “Our Role,” Australian Government website, About the Clean Energy Regulator, last modified 18 March 2023, https://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/About/Pages/Accountability%20and%20reporting/Corporate%20plans/Corporate%20Plan%202019-23/Our-role.aspx; Clean Energy Regulator, “About the Clean Energy Regulator,” Australian Government website, last modified 17 March 2023, https://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/About/About-the-Clean-Energy-Regulator

39 Australian Government Clean Energy Regulator, “Legislation,” Australian Government website, last modified 17 March 2023, https://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/NGER/Legislation; Clean Energy Regulator, “The Safeguard Mechanism”; Australian Government Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, “Safeguard Mechanism Reforms,” Position Paper (Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth of Australia, January 2023), p. 1.

40 Australian Government Productivity Commission, “5-Year Productivity Inquiry: Managing the Climate Transition,” inquiry report, Vol. 6 (Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth of Australia, February 7, 2023), p. 24; Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, “Safeguard Mechanism Reforms,” p. 11.

41 Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, “Safeguard Mechanism Reforms,” pp. 1, 5.

42 Ibid., pp. 5, 9; Safeguard Mechanism (Crediting) Amendment Bill 2023 (Cth) s 1c.

43 National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) ss 73(3), 73A(3), 74(ba), 74A(2), 74B(3), 74C(3); Australian Government Clean Energy Regulator, “Safeguard Mechanism Production Adjusted Baseline Audit Template” (Canberra, ACT, July 2022), p. 12; Australian Government Clean Energy Regulator, “Safeguard Mechanism Audit Templates” (Canberra, ACT, December 2019), p. 8.

44 Alex Scott and Andrew T. Balthrop, “The Consequences of Self-Reporting Biases: Evidence from the Crash Preventability Program,” Journal of Operations Management, Vol. 67, No. 5 (2021), p. 588, https://doi.org/10.1002/joom.1149; Australian Government Australian Law Reform Commission, “Corporate Criminal Responsibility,” Final Report (Brisbane, QLD: Commonwealth of Australia, April 2020), p. 492.

45 Scott and Balthrop, “The Consequences of Self-Reporting Biases,” p. 588.

46 Linda Kusumaning Wedari, Christine Jubb, and Amir Moradi-Motlagh, “Corporate Climate-Related Voluntary Disclosures: Does Potential Greenwash Exist among Australian High Emitters Reports?,” Business Strategy and the Environment, Vol. 30, No. 8 (2021), pp. 3721–3723, 3730, 3733–3734. https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.2836

47 Scott and Balthrop, “The Consequences of Self-Reporting Biases,” p. 588.

48 Ibid., p. 588; Australian Law Reform Commission, “Corporate Criminal Responsibility,” pp. 470–471.

49 IPCC, “The Evidence is Clear: The Time for Action is Now. We Can Halve Emissions by 2030,” Newsroom post, IPCC, 4 April 2022, https://www.ipcc.ch/2022/04/04/ipcc-ar6-wgiii-pressrelease/

50 Joshua Bishop, Tina Bell, Chuan Huang, and Michelle Ward, “Fire on the Farm: Assessing the Impacts of the 2019–2020 Bushfires on Food and Agricultures in Australia,” United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (2021), https://www.preventionweb.net/publication/fire-farm-assessing-impacts-2019-2020-bushfires-food-and-agricultures-australia, p. 5; Camille Cadiou, Robin Noyelle, Nemo Malhomme, and Davide Faranda, “Challenges in Attributing the 2022 Australian Rain Bomb to Climate Change,” Asia-Pacific Journal of Atmospheric Sciences, Vol. 59, No. 1 (2023), p. 84. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13143-022-00305-1

51 Tessa Satherley and Daniel May, “Natural Disasters and Climate Risk,” Australian Government Website, Parliament of Australia, Australia, https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook47p/NaturalDisastersClimateRisk (emphasis added); Rene M. van der Zande, Michelle Achlatis, Dorothea Bender-Champ, Andreas Kubicek, Sophie Dove, and Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, “Paradise Lost: End-of-Century Warming and Acidification under Business-as-Usual Emissions Have Severe Consequences for Symbiotic Corals,” Global Change Biology, Vol. 26, No. 4 (2020), p. 2203. https://doi.org/10.1111/gcb.14998

52 Pankaj Sadavarte, Sudhanshu Pandey, Joannes D. Maasakkers, Alba Lorente, Tobias Borsdorff, Hugo Denier van der Gon, Sander Houweling, and Ilse Aben, “Methane Emissions from Super-Emitting Coal Mines in Australia Quantified Using TROPOMI Satellite Observations,” Environmental Science & Technology, Vol. 55, No. 24 (21 December 2021), pp. 16573, 16576. https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.1c03976; Australian Government Clean Energy Regulator, “Safeguard Facility Reported Emissions 2020–21,” Australian Government Website, last modified 9 September 2022, https://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/NGER/The-safeguard-mechanism/safeguard-data/safeguard-facility-reported-emissions/safeguard-facility-reported-emissions-2020-21#2020-21%20Safeguard%20facilities%20data

53 Ibid.

54 Steve Cannane, “How Satellites are Challenging Australia’s Official Greenhouse Gas Emission Figures,” ABC News, 2 December 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-12-03/satellites-are-challenging-australias-coal-mining-industry/100663676

55 Productivity Commission, “5-Year Productivity Inquiry,” p. 20; Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, “Safeguard Mechanism Reforms,” pp. 1–2, 5; Climate Change Act 2022 (Cth) ss 10 (1a)–(1b).

56 Australian Law Reform Commission, “Corporate Criminal Responsibility,” pp. 35, 171, 207, 333.

57 Productivity Commission, “5-Year Productivity Inquiry,” p. 20.

58 Michelle Cayford, Wolter Pieters, and Constant Hijzen, “Plots, Murders, and Money: Oversight Bodies Evaluating the Effectiveness of Surveillance Technology,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 33, No. 7 (2018), pp. 1006–1005, 1012. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2018.1487159; Dennis Richardson, “Comprehensive Review of the Legal Framework of the National Intelligence Community,” Recommendation and Executive Summary; Foundations and Principles; Control, Coordination and Cooperation (Barton ACT: Commonwealth of Australia, December 2019), p. 239.

59 Sadavarte et al., “Methane Emissions from Super-Emitting Coal Mines in Australia Quantified Using TROPOMI Satellite Observations,” p. 16578.

60 Oleg Dubovik, Gregory L. Schuster, Feng Xu, Yongxiang Hu, Hartmut Bösch, Jochen Landgraf, and Zhengqiang Li, “Grand Challenges in Satellite Remote Sensing,” Frontiers in Remote Sensing, Vol. 2 (2021), pp. 2–3, 6.

61 Jake Blight, “Powers and Functions of Australian Security and Intelligence Agencies,” in National Security Law in Australia (Federation Press, forthcoming), pp. 12–13.

62 David Martin Jones, “Intelligence and the Management of National Security: The Post 9/11 Evolution of an Australian National Security Community,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2018), p. 13. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2016.1259796; Keiran Hardy and George Williams, “Executive Oversight of Intelligence Agencies in Australia,” in Global Intelligence Oversight: Governing Security in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Jane Harman, Zachary K. Goldman, and Samuel J. Rascoff (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 315–318. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190458072.003.0013; James Renwick, “Trust but Verify; A Report Concerning the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 and Related Matters,” 3rd INSLM (Barton, ACT: Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, Australian Government, 2020), p. 34.

63 Renwick, “Trust but Verify,” p. 34.

64 Blight, “Powers and Functions of Australian Security and Intelligence Agencies,” p. 3.

65 Hardy and Williams, “Executive Oversight of Intelligence Agencies in Australia,” pp. 315–318; Richardson, “Comprehensive Review of the Legal Framework of the National Intelligence Community,” p. 95; Blight, “Powers and Functions of Australian Security and Intelligence Agencies,” p. 31.

66 Hardy and Williams, “Executive Oversight of Intelligence Agencies in Australia,” pp. 321–322; Australian Government Department of Defence, “DIO Mandate: DIO Defence Intelligence Organisation,” https://defence.gov.au/dio/mandate.shtml, pp. 1–2; Başar Baysal and Uluç Karakaş, “Climate Change and Security: Different Perceptions, Different Approaches,” Uluslararası İlişkiler/International Relations, Vol. 14, No. 54 (2017), pp. 27, 29; Richardson, “Comprehensive Review of the Legal Framework of the National Intelligence Community,” pp. 291, 299–300; Australian Government AUSTRAC, “What We Do,” Australian Government Website, Fighting Financial Crime Together, last modified 29 June 2023, https://www.austrac.gov.au/about-us/what-we-do

67 Hardy and Williams, “Executive Oversight of Intelligence Agencies in Australia,” p. 320.

68 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 4, 17.

69 Cf. Baysal and Karakaş, “Climate Change and Security,” pp. 27, 29; Matt McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2008), pp. 578–579. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066108097553; Milevski, “Western Strategy’s Two Logics,” pp. 1–2.

70 Australian Government Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, “With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility | ASIO,” last modified 2023, https://www.asio.gov.au/resources/need-know/great-power-comes-great-responsibility

71 Cayford, Pieters, and Hijzen, “Plots, Murders, and Money,” pp. 1006–1005, 1012.

72 Ibid., pp. 319–322; Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) ss 6, 6B-7.

73 Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) s 11 (emphasis added).

74 Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) ss 6(1) (a); 6B(1)(a), 7(1)(a); Hardy and Williams, “Executive Oversight of Intelligence Agencies in Australia,” pp. 319, 321; Blight, “Powers and Functions of Australian Security and Intelligence Agencies,” p. 18.

75 Blight, “Powers and Functions of Australian Security and Intelligence Agencies,” p. 24.

76 Bruhnke, “Climate Change Mitigation,” p. 214.

77 Hardy and Williams, “Executive Oversight of Intelligence Agencies in Australia,” pp. 319–322; Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) ss 6, 6B-7.

78 Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) s 6B(1)(e).

79 Ibid., s 6B(1)(ea).

80 Ibid., s 6B(c).

81 Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, “Annual Climate Change Statement,” p. 23; Climate Change is a “National Security Issue”, Says PM.

82 Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) ss 6B (1) (a)-(ea).

83 “Our Organisation,” Australian Government Website, Australian Federal Police, last modified 1 February 2016, https://www.afp.gov.au/about-us/our-organisation

84 Blight, “Powers and Functions of Australian Security and Intelligence Agencies,” pp. 8–12.

85 Ibid., pp. 12–13.

86 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss IAB; Dominique Dalla-Pozza and Greg Weeks, “A Statutory Shield of the Executive: To What Extent Does Legislation Help Administrative Action Evade Judicial Scrutiny?,” in Interpreting Executive Power, edited by Janina Boughey and Lisa Burton Crawford (Rochester, NY: Federation Press, 2020), pp. 196–198. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3517900; Blight, “Powers and Functions of Australian Security and Intelligence Agencies,” p. 14.

87 Safeguard Mechanism (Crediting) Amendment Bill 2023 (Cth) s 7, 22NXF.

88 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss 134.1, 134.2, 135.1, 135.2, 135.4, 136.1, 137.1, 137.2.

89 Australian Government Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, “About,” Commonwealth of Australia, last modified 2021, https://www.acic.gov.au/about

90 Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) ss 4, 7(1), 7A.

91 Commonwealth of Australia Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, “Operations and Investigations,” Australian Government Website, “About,” last modified 2021, https://www.acic.gov.au/about/operations-and-investigations; Commonwealth of Australia Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, “Legislation,” Australian Government Website, “About,” last modified 2021, https://www.acic.gov.au/about/legislation

92 Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, “About”; Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 3ZZUK.

93 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 4.

94 Clean Energy Regulator, “The Safeguard Mechanism”; Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34A, 34B.

95 Danielle Ireland-Piper and Jonathan Crowe, “Whistleblowing, National Security and the Constitutional Freedom of Political Communication,” Federal Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2018), pp. 341–343. https://doi.org/10.22145/flr.46.3.1; Hardy and Williams, “Executive Oversight of Intelligence Agencies in Australia,” pp. 315–316, 325, 334; Blight, “Powers and Functions of Australian Security and Intelligence Agencies,” pp. 8–10, 12, 14–18, 31–32.

96 Hardy and Williams, “Executive Oversight of Intelligence Agencies in Australia,” pp. 315–317.

97 Ibid., pp. 318–319.

98 Ibid., pp. 8, 11.

99 Ibid., pp. xxii, xxiii, xxvi.

100 Ibid., p. xxix.

101 Bodansky, “The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement,” p. 146; Wewerinke-Singh, State Responsibility, Climate Change and Human Rights Under International Law, pp. 52–53.

102 Juan Sesmero and Alecia Evans, “The Potential of Trade Sanctions to Overcome the Small Coalition Paradox: A Review of the Literature,” in Handbook on Trade Policy and Climate Change(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2022), pp. 125–144. https://www.elgaronline.com/display/edcoll/9781839103230/9781839103230.00017.xml

103 Robert Falkner, Naghmeh Nasiritousi, and Gunilla Reischl, “Climate Clubs: Politically Feasible and Desirable?,” Climate Policy, Vol. 22, No. 4 (21 April 2022), pp. 481, 484. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2021.1967717; Qiang Fu, Yin E. Chen, Chyi-Lu Jang, and Chun-Ping Chang, “The Impact of International Sanctions on Environmental Performance,” Science of the Total Environment, Vol. 745 (25 November 2020), pp. 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.141007; Achim Hagen and Jan Schneider, “Trade Sanctions and the Stability of Climate Coalitions,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 109 (1 September 2021), pp. 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102504; Achim Hagen and Jan Schneider, “Small Climate Clubs Should Not Use Trade Sanctions,” Energy Research & Social Science, Vol. 92 (1 October 2022), pp. 1–4. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2022.102777

104 Falkner, Nasiritousi, and Reischl, “Climate Clubs,” pp. 481, 484.

105 Fu et al., “The Impact of International Sanctions on Environmental Performance,” p. 1; M. Hazrati and Z. Malakoutikhah, “An Unclear Future for Iranian Energy Transition in Light of the Re-Imposition of Sanctions,” Oil, Gas and Energy Law, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2019), p. 1. http://www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=3810

106 Katharine Murphy (Political Ed.), “Australia Asks UN to Dismiss Torres Strait Islanders’ Claim Climate Change Affects Their Human Rights,” The Guardian, 13 August 2020, sec. Australia News, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/aug/14/australia-asks-un-to-dismiss-torres-strait-islanders-claim-climate-change-affects-their-human-rights; Asli Ilgit and Deepa Prakash, “Making Human Rights Emotional: A Research Agenda to Recover Shame in ‘Naming and Shaming,’” Political Psychology, Vol. 40, No. 6 (2019), p. 1300. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12616; Dustin Tingley and Michael Tomz, “The Effects of Naming and Shaming on Public Support for Compliance with International Agreements: An Experimental Analysis of the Paris Agreement,” International Organization, Vol. 76, No. 2 (February 2022), p. 1. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000394; Tami Biddle, “Coercion Theory: A Basic Introduction for Practitioners,” Texas National Security Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2020), pp. 95, 97, 99.

107 Biddle, “Coercion Theory,” p. 102; Bruce W. Jentleson, “Coercive Diplomacy: Scope and Limits in the Contemporary World,” Policy Analysis Brief (The Stanley Foundation, 2006), pp. 2, 4; Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, “Who ‘Won’ Libya?: The Force-Diplomacy Debate and its Implications for Theory and Policy,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2005), pp. 53–55.

108 Gordon Craig, “The Political Leader as Strategist,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 485, 491–92, 495, 497.

109 McDonald, “After the Fires?,” p. 11.

110 Avner Greif and Jared Rubin, “Political Legitimacy in Historical Political Economy,” ESI Working Paper (Chapman University, 2022), p. 2 and abstract.

111 Australian Department of Home Affairs, “Australian Security Intelligence Organisation: Entity Resources and Planned Performance,” in Budget 2022–23, Portfolio Budget Statements (Commonwealth of Australia, n.d.), p. 169; Bruhnke, “Climate Change Mitigation,” p. 33.

112 Australian Law Reform Commission, “Corporate Criminal Responsibility,” pp. 171–172, 182, 196.

113 Ibid., pp. 34, 219.

114 Ibid., p. 66; Australian Conservation Foundation, “Ten Biggest Safeguard Mechanism Polluters Revealed,” Australian Conservation Foundation, last modified 20 September 2022, https://www.acf.org.au/ten-biggest-safeguard-mechanism-polluters-revealed

115 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 493–496; Australian Law Reform Commission, “Corporate Criminal Responsibility,” p. 379.

116 Australian Law Reform Commission, “Corporate Criminal Responsibility,” pp. 66, 129.

117 Ibid., pp. 125–126, 128–129.

118 Ibid., pp. 35, 44, 159, 217.

119 Ibid., p. 44.

120 Ibid., p. 33.

121 Ibid., pp. 41, 126.

122 Ibid., pp. 33, 35.

123 Ibid., pp. 34–35, 96–97, 128.

124 Ibid., p. 179.

125 Ibid., p. 36.

126 Ibid., pp. 35–36, 44, 159, 217.

127 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s IAB; Dalla-Pozza and Weeks, “A Statutory Shield of the Executive,” pp. 196–198; Blight, “Powers and Functions of Australian Security and Intelligence Agencies,” pp. 8–12, 14.

128 Australian Federal Police, “Risk Oversight and Management,” Australian Government Website, Corporate Plan 2015–2019, last modified n.d., https://www.afp.gov.au/sites/default/files/HTML/Publications/AFP%20Corporate%20Plan%202015-2019/pages/riskOversight.html

129 Commonwealth of Australia Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, “Board,” Australian Government Website, “About,” last modified 2021, https://www.acic.gov.au/about/board

130 Commonwealth of Australia Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, “Governance,” Australian Government Website, “About,” last modified 2021, https://www.acic.gov.au/about/governance