Migration Control in the Mediterranean Grenzsaum: Reading Ratzel in the Strait of Sicily

Abstract

Migration controls are more and more transforming borders. In this regard, this paper is a border case study focusing on the Strait of Sicily. It analyzes the border regime between Italy and its North African neighboring countries Tunisia and Libya from the point of view of the transformations of territorial borders in space and time. It provides an inventory of border control measures and instruments, and analyzes the way they actually work. The evolution of policies and practices of migration controls results in transformations of territorial borders not only in terms of their location (inward and outward flexibilization of the border) but also in terms of their shape (from boundary lines to border zones or points) and operational modalities (from fixity in space and continuity in time to mobility and intermittency). Border transformations are analyzed before the background of Ratzel's idea of Grenzsaum, that is of a borderland both in the sense of a border strip straddling two bounded territories or lying on just one side of a territorial linear border, and in the sense of a buffer zone lying between two territories.

Notes

1 This transformation process has never been really put into question by major political changes in the countries involved: since the mid-1990s (when the process started), both centre-left and centre-right governments in Italy, both the Ben Ali regime and the post-revolutionary governments in Tunisia, both the Gadhafi regime and the transitional government of post-war Libya have contributed to its development without significant differences (for a reflection on the different border policies and narratives related to the Strait of Sicily see Cuttitta, 2014).

2 Joint patrols with the participation of selected EU member states had been carried out in the Strait of Sicily, upon the initiative of the EU Council, even before Frontex was established, starting with the Neptune operation in 2003.

3 The most recent ones were signed with the transitional governments of Tunisia and Libya, in April 2011 and April 2012 respectively.

4 Italy even made funds available for the construction of detention centres in Tunisia and Libya. Though, Tunisia did not accept the offer (probably fearing Italian interferences in the management of the camps), while Italian authorities themselves changed their mind and turned the facilities built in Libya to border police and medical headquarters.

5 Both the Tunis and the Tripoli IOM offices were opened (in 2001 and 2006 respectively) only upon the initiative of the Italian government. In 2004 all staff members of the Tunis office were Italians (except for a Tunisian secretary), and most of the funds came from the Italian government. When I interviewed the staff of the local development cooperation office at the Italian embassy in Tunis, they all agreed on the fact that “the IOM office would not survive without our support.” Today, Italy is still the main donor for IOM projects carried out in Tunisia and Libya.

6 Besides, Ratzel's analysis was basically state-centred even when he talked about cultural borders.