ABSTRACT
How can EU actorness be conceptualized within the context of Neighborhood? The central purpose of this essay is to contribute a “bottom-up” and more contextually sensitive perspective to the critical assessment of European Union actorness and, in this way, also contribute to a more inclusive understanding of Neighborhood as a regional cooperation project. In doing this, the essay also deals with local Ukrainian rather than EU-centric perspectives on the EU’s more general societal impacts. Based on research that specifically targeted civil society actors in Ukraine with clear pro-EU sympathies the essay explores the ambivalent nature of the European Union as a political actor on the international scene. This also includes perceptions of the evolving quality of the EU’s social and political influence. Rather than pre-supposing a specific geopolitical role for the EU within the so-called Neighborhood, this contribution will emphasize perceived contradictions and contested political and socio-cultural underpinnings of EU cooperation policies. At the same time, the paper will also indicate the ways in which local actors interpret the EU as a potential promoter of greater intercultural dialogue and social transformation. While the picture that emerges is one of a policy divide between the EU and Ukraine, spaces for social engagement and dialogue nevertheless exist and urgently need to be developed.
Notes
1. See, for example, the Financial Times article of April 7, 2016, entitled “Dutch reject EU-Ukraine trade deal. Blow to anti-Kremlin unity and boost to Brexit campaign as turnout breaches mandatory 30% level” (author Duncan Robinson).
2. Reference is made here the Security and Development Research within the “Wider Europe Initiative Security Cluster,” funded by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (contract: HEL 8207-75) and EUBORDERREGIONS, financed by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (Contract 266920).
3. Interview in Kyiv (Ukraine), June 2010 with a representative of a migration rights organization (ID 11).
4. For information regarding the border security implementation projects, see the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) website, available at: http://www.eubam.org/. Last access 04 February 2013.
5. Interview in Kyiv (Ukraine), June 2010 with a representative of a migration rights organization (ID 7).
6. Interview in Kyiv (Ukraine), June 2010. with a representative of a womens’ rights NGO (ID 12).
7. Interview in Kyiv (Ukraine), June 2010 with a representative of a migration rights organization (ID 9).
8. Voiced during interviews in Kyiv, May/June 2010 (ID 2, 5, 6–8, 9, 12).
9. See Follis (Citation2012) and Korosteleva (Citation2012).
10. Interview in Kyiv (Ukraine), May 2010 with a representative of a migration rights organization (ID 4).
11. The head of EU Foreign Affairs, Federica Mogherini, has, for example, rejected claims that the EU coerced Ukraine into choosing between Russia and the EU, thus exacerbating regional tensions. And yet, there are plentiful interpretations that suggest that the EU has “misread” the situation in Ukraine as well as the political aspirations of Russia (see Umland Citation2015)
12. As substantiated by interviews with representatives of Ukrainian and international organisations, May 2010, June 2010 in Kyiv (ID 2, 6–8) and October 2011 in Kharkiv (ID 15).
13. Interview carried out in May 2010 with a migrants’ right organization that monitors hate crimes (ID 2).
14. See the Ukrainian Europe Without Barriers website at: http://novisa.com.ua/en/. Last access: February 4, 2013.
15. See footnote 11.
16. See footnote 8.