Introduction to our Special Issue on Positive Psychology

At the 2006 Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, one of us (Friedman) discussed with Stanley Krippner, an eminent humanistic psychologist, the sorry state of divisiveness between humanistic and positive psychology, and how it could possibly be remedied. Later at that convention, Krippner had a conversation with Martin Seligman, the major founder and voice of positive psychology, and found him receptive and even supportive of finding grounds for reconciliation between the two fields through offering some common projects. This was despite the fact that considerable animosity had been emblematically expressed in the notorious introduction to a special issue of the American Psychologist on positive psychology coauthored by Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000). This introduction greatly maligned humanistic psychology—and an excerpt from this is quoted in the article by Friedman (this issue). Essentially, the founder of positive psychology accused humanistic psychology of being unscientific and having spawned all sorts of destructive excesses, and boldly declared that the new field would rectify these problems and offer great benefits beyond what humanistic psychology had initially promised but squandered.

Out of this fortuitous conversation between Krippner and Seligman, a number of projects were planned. First, a proposal was made by us, along with Kirk Schneider, to offer a symposium—sponsored by the American Psychological Association Division of Humanistic Psychology (Division 32)—focused on reconciling humanistic and positive psychology at the 2007 Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association. In fact, this occurred, with us two coeditors presenting our understandings of the major bases of the divide between the two fields in conjunction with presentations by two prominent positive psychologists, Laura King and Shane Lopez, on the same topic; Schneider and Christopher Peterson, a prominent positive psychologist, served as discussants. This provided a very balanced panel where each side gave voice to their respective positions.

Second, we discussed plans to coedit a special issue of The Humanistic Psychologist on the relationship between humanistic and positive psychology, and are very pleased to see this come into fruition here. In fact, the first two articles of this special issue are slight modifications of our presentations at the 2007 Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association symposium. In these articles, we outline what we consider to be the most important bases of the break between the two fields. In “What is the Good Life? Positive Psychology and the Renaissance of Humanistic Psychology,” Robbins (this issue) explores the value-laden aspects of positive psychology that unsuccessfully attempts to present itself as a neutral and totally objective scientific project, which surely it is not. In “Humanistic and Positive Psychology: The Methodological and Epistemological Divide,” Friedman (this issue) explores the positive psychology critique that humanistic psychology has been devoid of traditional scientific approaches and, hence, is of spurious value by outlining some of the strong quantitative research traditions within humanistic psychology that fully meet all of the most stringent criteria of mainstream science that positive psychology has claimed to be its new territory. In addition, the epistemological limitations of narrowly defining science in only a positivistic way and legitimizing only one method, namely quantitative approaches to research, are explored and a call for methodological pluralism (or mixed-methods) is made to counter the privileging of either qualitative or quantitative methods, which is often the case for humanistic and positive psychology, respectively.

Additional articles further this type of critique of positive psychology. Matthew McDonald and Jean O'Callaghan (this issue), in “Positive Psychology: A Foucauldian Critique,” explore the power dimensions implicit in how this divide was created through the lens of analytic concepts derived from Foucault. In “The Psychology of Self-Esteem: A Potential Common Ground for Humanistic Positive Psychology and Positivistic Positive Psychology,” Christopher J. Mruk (this issue) outlines two types of humanistic psychology, which he calls “humanistic positive psychology” and “positivistic positive psychology,” clearly delineating their commonalities and differences, but subsuming both within the field of humanistic psychology and denying legitimacy to the claim by positive psychology for being a separate field. His analysis focuses on self-esteem, as a crucial area neglected by positivistic positive psychology, and he presents a research program exploring this from a mixed-method approach that integrates the approaches favored by both fields. Last, a somewhat unusual article by Zeno Franco and Mike Arons, along with Friedman (this issue), “Are Qualitative Methods Always Best for Humanistic Psychology Research? A Conversation on the Epistemological Divide Between Humanistic and Positive Psychology” is included. This article captures parts of an interactive conversation that occurred on the Division 32 listserv among these authors. The focus of this article is on clarifying the methodological and epistemological preferences by humanistic psychology and positive psychology for qualitative and quantitative methods and natural and human science approaches, respectively. Friedman considers this to be the main barrier preventing the reconciling of the two fields, and argues for a unified vision of science that allows for methodological pluralism and multiple epistemologies to coexist. Arons mostly agrees with this line of argument regarding the relative importance of both quantitative and qualitative methods—and to some extent rejects a rigid conception of humanistic or positive psychology with a particular epistemological stance—to embrace a more postmodern appreciation for the a priori, nonempirical ground of any scientific endeavor. Where Friedman and Arons appear to differ is primarily in their understanding of the role of intuition in science. Franco, who writes a synthesizing conclusion, is left with the unenviable task of integrating these many insights, and he does a fine job of that. He ultimately draws the conclusion that the qualitative versus quantitative, humanistic versus positive psychology divide is a detour from the real task of humanistic psychology, which is to boldly take a progressive attitude toward an as yet discovered methodology that may one day do justice to a truly human science—an endeavor that will require all sides to eschew overly-rigid adherence to any particular epistemology or methodology.

In addition to this special issue of The Humanistic Psychologist, other plans for reconciling humanistic and positive psychology are underway. A positive psychology interest group has been formed within Division 32, cochaired by us. We are also in process of coediting another special issue of The Humanistic Psychologist on methodological pluralism as a response to the schism between humanistic and positive psychology on methodological and epistemological grounds. And we are exploring coediting a book reconciling the two fields with invited chapters from leaders of both movements.

Undoubtedly, positive psychology has renewed much energy and infused many resources into areas where humanistic psychology had staked claim. It is our hope that efforts such as this special issue can bring together these now separate, but closely aligned, fields for the mutual benefit of both—and the world.