The Evolving Ethic of Authenticity: From Humanistic to Positive Psychology

Abstract

This article attempts to resolve the apparent tensions between humanistic and positive psychology regarding their respective notions of what constitutes a good life. It argues that an ethic of authenticity provides a unifying normative framework for both traditions, including interpretations of the various dimensions of authenticity and of the moral virtues and principles associated with this ethical ideal. The article provides a working definition of authentic selfhood that draws on both the existential-phenomenological tradition and the communitarian ethical framework associated with positive psychology. It demonstrates how these two very different philosophical traditions contribute to a shared, integrative theory of authentic self-development which, in turn, provides needed clarity to the normative framework of positive psychology.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The inspiration for this article came from collaborative inquiry with Bob and Judith Wright and Mike Zwell, founders of a unique graduate school—the Wright Graduate Institute—whose mission is personally transformative learning. The work is also inspired by my teaching and mentoring work with the WGI students engaged in the process of personal transformation.

Notes

¹Robbins (2008) identified the requirement of Aristotelian ethics that moral virtues be understood “holistically as interdependent constituents of a good life” (p. 104). He pointed to the principle of practical wisdom or phronesis as the organizing principle of ethical judgment within that framework, and argues that this holistic, integrative perspective is missing in the writings of positive psychology. I agree with that assessment, and am offering the principle of authenticity as an alternative approach to addressing this concern, drawing more explicitly on the existential–humanistic tradition to help provide the unifying normative framework.

²Rorty (2008) considered autonomy and authenticity to be primarily aesthetic matters concerning the private sphere of life, and as distinct and separate from moral matters concerning the public sphere. He argued that these two spheres are completely separate, and we should not expect them to cohere into a unified world view. “My ‘poeticized’ culture is one which has given up on the attempt to unite one's private ways of dealing with one's finitude [i.e., one's authentic life project] and one's sense of obligation [i.e., moral world view] to other human beings” (Rorty, 2008, p. 68). In this respect, he is at odds with Taylor and with the views I'm expressing.

³Tiberus and Hall (2010) provided an interesting overview of subjective versus objective interpretations of happiness within the context of normative theory. They provided a theory of values-based life satisfaction based on the premise that “what counts as well-being is satisfaction with how one's life is going overall with respect to ones values” (Tiberius & Hall, 2010, p. 218).

⁴ Objectivity in ethics is based on the fact that claims are not simply personal preferences, but rather depend on the rational justification of claims (Habermas, 1990). The exercise of practical reason and related critical thinking skills thus become fundamental components of authenticity, as individuals need to rationally justify their value orientations and actions as legitimate vis-à-vis conflicting claims and positions.

⁵Browning (1987) argued that the ethic of humanistic psychology is a form of ethical egoism. It postulates self-actualization as a fundamental, nonmoral human good that “all humans should pursue to the degree that this is possible” (p. 73). He argued that the humanistic psychologists “never actually derive ethical norms from the principle of self-actualization even though they talk as though they do” (p. 70). My position here is that authenticity includes a relational/dialogical dimension that is missing from the notion of self-actualization, and thus can include a set of related moral virtues and principles for addressing conflicts of interests and moral claims. It also emphasizes the ethical dimension of authentic selfhood that was missing in much of the earlier humanistic interpretations of self-actualization.

⁶The antecedents of this paradigm shift were actually found much earlier during the 1930s in Husserl's The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1970) and in Mead's Mind, Self, & Society (1962). They did not have a substantive impact on the fields of humanistic psychology and sociology until much later.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Gordon Medlock

Gordon Medlock's background includes a combination of academic, clinical, educational and consulting experience in fields related to humanistic psychology. He has worked for 20+ years as a psychotherapist and educator with the Wright Institute, and concurrently as a consultant in the field of human capital management. His educational background includes a Ph.D. in philosophy from Yale University, with a dissertation on Sartre's theory of existential psychoanalysis. He currently serves on the faculties of the Wright Graduate Institute, the University of Chicago Graham School of General Studies, and Purdue North Central Department of Social Work. Collaborative research with Bob Wright, Ed.D., has included articles and presentations on such topics as the nature of bad faith, the development of an existential–developmental paradigm for personal growth work, and the merits of integrative versus eclectic models of psychotherapy.