The Model of The Principled Advocate and The Pathological Partisan: A Virtue Ethics Construct of Opposing Archetypes of Public Relations and Advertising Practitioners

Abstract

Drawing upon contemporary virtue ethics theory, The Model of The Principled Advocate and The Pathological Partisan is introduced. Profiles are developed of diametrically opposed archetypes of public relations and advertising practitioners. The Principled Advocate represents the advocacy virtues of humility, truth, transparency, respect, care, authenticity, equity, and social responsibility. The Pathological Partisan represents the opposing vices of arrogance, deceit, secrecy, manipulation, disregard, artifice, injustice, and raw self-interest. One becomes either a Principled Advocate or a Pathological Partisan by habitually enacting or embodying the virtues or vices in the context of professional practices.

Notes

∗The model is a continuum. “The virtues and the vices are such that as a person moves away from one end of the scale, she necessarily moves toward the other” (Gert, 1998, p. 284). The virtues and vices generate “v-rules.” Each virtue generates a prescription (“be truthful”); each vice generates a prohibition (“do not deceive”). (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 36.)

1. It is outside of the scope of this paper to engage in a discussion of Aristotelian virtue ethics, and to make distinctions between his views and contemporary virtue ethics. (Indeed, Hursthouse (2001) wrote that “it must be emphasized that those who espouse virtue ethics nowadays do not regard themselves as committed to any of the lamentable, parochial details of Aristotle's moral philosophy …” (p. 2).)

2. The Golden Mean, the Aristotelian element of virtue ethics and decision making most often discussed in journalism, PR and advertising literature, is not reviewed or discussed here because it does not seem to be the way in which virtues are discussed by contemporary virtue ethicists (see for example Hursthouse, 2001, pp. 10–14). Further, for the sake of clarity as an applied ethics decision-making tool for students and practitioners, the dichotomous or polarized model presented in this article seems most useful. (For discussions of the Golden Mean in communications literature see, for example: Christians et al., 2005, pp. 12–13; Day, 2006, p. 64; Patterson & Wilkins, 2005, pp. 7–9; Martinson, 2000, pp. 18–21; Harrison & Galloway, 2005, pp. 5–8; Harrison, 2004, pp. 1–3.)

3. It should be noted that while these accounts of Virtue Ethics (VE) embrace Care Ethics (CE), care ethicists do not necessarily agree that the two theories should be conflated. (See Noddings, 1984, pp. 96–97; Tong, 1998; and Sander-Staudt, 2006, as a portal to this literature.) It is beyond the scope of this paper, which is based in contemporary VE, to consider this issue. The point here is that the virtue of care is recognized by contemporary virtue ethicists as fundamental to the virtue ethics perspective. The virtue of care is therefore incorporated into the profile of the Principled Advocate presented in this paper, but the model does not claim to simultaneously incorporate the full theory of Care Ethics.

4. See Pojman (2006, pp. 157–176) and MacIntyre (2002, pp. 93–111) for discussions about the relationships between rules and virtues.

5. Virtue ethics (VE) is by nature grounded in the character of the individual. What value does it have for those who work in organizations and have limited autonomy? Two initial responses might suffice at this point. First, corporate ethical decisions always are made by individuals, not by inanimate entities (see Bivins, 2006, for a discussion of individual responsibility and accountability within organizations); second, corporations have reputations and “characters” just as individuals do (see Dezenhall & Weber, 2007, p. 147). Corporations can assess and be assessed using the virtue/vice scales presented in The Model of The Principled Advocate and The Pathological Partisan as well as can individuals.

6. The title “Virtuous Advocate” would be more precise in this context than “Principled Advocate” in that the former would emphasize that the model presented here is a virtue ethics perspective; that it is not a model that emphasizes principles of behavior. Nevertheless, the term Principled Advocate has been deliberately chosen (instead of Virtuous Advocate) because virtuous is a term that some consider to be pretentious, burdensome, onerous, or outdated. The model presented in this paper is designed to be a practical tool for moral deliberation that actually will be used, and it is assumed that many practitioners would feel uncomfortable describing themselves or others as virtuous. The term principled, however, is another matter, in that it is a term consistent with current usage, and people understand what it means to be a person of principle. The phrase “highly-principled” is a synonym for the word virtuous, so it seems appropriate, even in a virtue-based model to speak of a Principled Advocate as one who represents and embodies the virtues.

7. This definition takes the position (not discussed further in this article) that one cannot be a Principled Advocate in promoting a cause that is not morally justifiable. (See Baker, 1999, pp. 71–73, for a critique of the idea that all causes deserve advocacy in the marketplace of ideas.) The Principled Advocate does not engage in putting lipstick on an ethically unjustifiable pig.

8. The profile of the Principled Advocate identifies a cluster of virtues that are fundamental to the ethical practices of advocacy and PR. These virtues are not unique, of course, to these practices. (Truthfulness is a universal virtue.) Also, there are many virtues that are not considered here. Hursthouse (2001), for example, identifies temperance with respect to the pleasures of food as a virtue (p. 227), but it is not a virtue that is pivotal to the ethical practice of public relations. The objective of The Model of The Principled Advocate and The Pathological Partisan is to identify the virtues (and antithetical vices) that taken together are most critical and specific to the practices of advocacy in public relations and advertising.

9. For more on the TARES Test, see also Lieber, 2005; Tilley, 2005, p. 318; Patterson & Wilkins, 2005, pp. 62–64; Martinson & Baker, 2003; Baker & Martinson, 2002. Lieber (2005) conducted an empirical study of the moral decision making of public relations practitioners based on the TARES Test. He concluded that the 5-part test would be “better suited for a 3-factor configuration” (Lieber, 2005, p. 288) that he identifies as civility, integrity and credibility (Lieber, 2005, p. 296). His findings are descriptive rather than normative in that they report on practitioner practices. The principles of the TARES Test are used in The Model of The Principled Advocate and The Pathological Partisan because they are inclusive and specific to advocacy virtues normatively required for ethical public relations and advertising practices.

10. Quinn (2007) discusses this process through the concept of the “regulative ideal” (pp. 179–181): “Again, any reference to the ideal journalist—whether real or imagined—does not imply a perfect journalist, free of flaws or error, but rather a journalist one would consider excellent because of a range of realistic professional qualities that person possesses … that is, he might think to himself: ‘I feel inclined to do X, but would (my conception of) the ideal journalist do X?’ By no means does this guarantee one will act rightly, but it is, in essence, an activity that promotes moral growth through reflection and experience” (pp. 180–181).