Abstract
The article systematically reviews EMU governance reforms implemented, policy instruments introduced and further institutional reforms currently under discussion with a view of how far they have addressed the institutional shortcomings of the euro-area architecture, which have led to the euro crisis of 2010ff. It further explores how far these reforms have helped to prevent a replay of that crisis when the COVID-19 pandemic hit the euro area. To this end, the article first reviews the academic debate about the causes of the euro crisis that started with the Greek sovereign debt crisis in 2010. In a second step, it evaluates the reforms implemented since the onset of the euro crisis and during the COVID-19 crisis with regard in how far these reforms have addressed or could address the causes of the crisis and gives an outlook on potential forthcoming problems.
Acknowledgments
The author thanks two anonymous referees for very useful comments and suggestions.
Correction Statement
This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1 The analysis of causes for the euro crisis as well as the analysis of initial reforms passed in the first years after the crisis build strongly on Dullien (Citation2014, Citation2017).
2 It needs to be noted here, however, that hardly anyone actually claims that such a development is politically realistic at the moment or in the foreseeable future.
3 For an in-depth analysis of the macroeconomic imbalance procedure, see Bénassy-Quéré and Wolff (Citation2020).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Sebastian Dullien
Sebastian Dullien is Director of the Macroeonomic Policy Institute (IMK) of the Hans-Böckler-Foundation, Düsseldorf, Germany, and Professor of Economics at HTW Berlin – University of Applied Sciences, Berlin, Germany.