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Abstract
Advocates of “deliberative democracy” want citizens to actively participate in serious dialogue over political issues, not merely go to the polls every few years. Unfortunately, these ideals don't take into account widespread political ignorance and irrationality. Most voters neither attain the level of knowledge needed to make deliberative democracy work, nor do they rationally evaluate the political information they do possess. The vast size and complexity of modern government make it unlikely that most citizens can ever reach the levels of knowledge and rationality required by deliberative democracy, even if they were better informed than they are at present.
Notes
1. For brief or incomplete analyses of these issues, see Pennington Citation2003, Pincione and Tesón Citation2006, Pennington Citation2010 and forthcoming, 50–52. The present article represents a substantial expansion and reworking of arguments I briefly discussed in Somin Citation1998, 438–42. For a survey of other criticisms of deliberative democracy, see Ryfe Citation2005.
2. The idea of rational ignorance was first developed by Anthony Downs (Citation1957), ch. 13).
3. For the most famous version of this theory, see Schumpeter Citation1950; for a recent defense see Posner Citation2003, reviewed in Somin Citation2004b.
4. For discussions of such theories see Shapiro Citation2003 and Somin Citation2004a.
5. This example draws on Pincione and Tesón Citation2006, 10–13.
6. For an analysis of the knowledge requirements of the major theories of democratic participation, see Somin Citation2004a and 2010, ch. 2.
7. Overestimation is likely because some survey respondents are unwilling to admit to ignorance. See Somin Citation2010, ch. 2.
8. The survey data cited in this paragraph are described in Somin Citation2010, ch. 2.
9. I survey the relevant data in Somin Citation2010, ch. 2. See also Delli Carpini and Keeter Citation1991; Nie, et al. Citation1996; Althaus Citation2003; and Pew Research Center Citation2007.
10. Parts of this discussion of rational ignorance and altruism are adapted from Somin Citation2006.
11. Some might suggest that the same logic would lead rational citizens to abstain from voting in the first place. However, voting is a relatively low-cost activity that takes far less time and energy than acquiring political information. As a result, it is often rational for citizens to vote even if it is not rational for them to make more than a minimal effort to acquire political knowledge (Somin 2006).
12. Data compiled from Department of Commerce 2008, vii–ix.
13. For a survey and critique of the relevant literature see Somin 2010, ch. 4.
14. For a discussion of relevant studies, see Somin 2010, ch. 4; see also Taber and Lodge Citation2006.
15. This argument is related to, but distinct from, Mark Pennington's well-taken concern that deliberative democracy might exacerbate social conflict by forcing people to confront each other over disagreements on strongly held values. (Pennington 2010).
16. The term is borrowed from Kuran 1995.
17. I discuss the relationship between rational irrationality and information shortcuts more fully in Somin 2010, ch. 4.
18. See the discussion in Part II.
19. For a more detailed discussion of the limits of education as a tool for increasing political knowledge, see Somin 2010, ch. 7.
20. For more detailed critiques of the ‘‘deliberation day’’ proposal, see Somin 2010 ch. 7, and Pincione and Teso′n 2006, 95–97.
21. The Singapore health care system uses a combination of market incentives and carefully targeted government subsidies and public health measures to achieve health outcomes comparable to those of the United States and Western Europe at a small fraction of the cost. See Ghesquiere Citation2006, 67–70.
22. For a recent discussion and critique of such theories, see Parkinson Citation2007.
23. More impressive, when we consider that attending these meetings and speaking at them requires considerably more time and effort than do activities such as voting, which many more people engage in (Bryan 2004, 281–84).
24. For a closely related criticism of localist deliberative democracy, see Pennington, forthcoming, 48–49.
25. See also Somin 2010, ch. 5.
26. Some contributions to charity are similar to voting in the sense that any individual's contribution is unlikely to make any difference to the outcome. In many cases, however, an individual contribution can make a big difference for at least some of the specific beneficiaries of the charity in question. For example, an individual who donates a few hundred dollars to a charity helping the poor in the Third World can make a major difference in the life of a single family. For this reason, individual charitable donations are often far more likely to have a decisive effect than individual votes.