The Ongoing Debate Over Political Ignorance: Reply to My Critics

ABSTRACT

The participants in this symposium raise many insightful criticisms and reservations about my book Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is Smarter. But none substantially undermine its main thesis: that rational political ignorance and rational irrationality are major problems for democracy that are best addressed by limiting and decentralizing government power. Part I of this reply addresses criticisms of my analysis of the problem of political ignorance and its causes. Part II assesses challenges to my proposed solution.

Keywords:

• deliberative democracy
• democracy
• democratic competence
• democratic theory
• federalism
• foot voting
• rational ignorance
• rational irrationality
• retrospective voting
• voting theory

Notes

1. I have also recently considered some relevant related issues in Somin 2014a and Somin 2014b.

2. The idea of rational political ignorance was first developed in Downs 1957, ch. 13. For a more detailed elaboration of the theory and its implications, see Somin 2015a.

3. This implies that most of those who acquire unusually large amounts of knowledge do so because they value it as a consumption good, rather than because they are investing in information that would help them become better voters.

4. I briefly examined this case in my book (133–34).

5. I discuss this in greater detail in the book (Somin 2013, 97–100).

6. For a review of several such studies, see Klein and Chang 2015.

7. For a brief overview, see Somin 2011b; cf. Howell and Pevehouse 2007.

8. Cf. my discussion of “on-line” information processing in the book (Somin 2013, 107–10).

9. Page (2015, 377) briefly cites Althaus, but does not engage with his arguments, except to endorse a minor methodological suggestion advanced by Althaus for improving analysis of survey data.

10. See, especially, Landemore 2012 and 2013.

11. For my take on these matters, see Somin 2013, 114–16, and Somin 2014b.

12. For reviews of such theories and their knowledge prerequisites, see Somin 2013, ch. 2, and Kelly 2012).

13. Landauer also suggests that, instead of relying on foot voting, we should work to “improve” democratic processes. However, he does not respond to my extensive analysis of various proposals for alleviating voter ignorance, which indicates that they are unlikely to generate substantial increases in voter knowledge in the foreseeable future (Somin 2013 ch. 7).

14. Much of the widespread public support for increasing taxes on the wealthy appears to be a result of ignorance about the tax rates they currently pay (Somin 2013, 17–18).

15. The same survey also indicates that large numbers of respondents claim that their decision to pay taxes is strongly influenced by moral considerations such as “personal integrity” (ibid). But this still suggests that many would pay less if not for the additional effects of fear. Moreover, it seems likely that some of those who chose “integrity” and other similar answers did so insincerely because this is a socially acceptable response.

16. For a more extended argument along the same lines, see Bennett and Friedman 2008.

17. I cited the survey myself, to prove a different point. Somin 2013, 74.

18. I made a similar point in ibid., 74.

19. For a classic account, see Hornby 1998.

20. See also Somin forthcoming, ch. 5, which adds some additional evidence.

21. For a recent overview, see Stringham 2015.

22. For my critique of the “rule of experts” solution to the problem of political ignorance, see Somin 2013, 183–85.

23. See Somin 2013, 122–28 and 145. I also criticize the standard “race to the bottom” argument against devolution of power, invoked by Page (2015, 378). See Somin 2013, 145–47.

24. Despite Gunn's (2015, 288–90) suggestions otherwise, the evidence also shows that foot voters tend to gravitate towards jurisdictions with greater economic freedom. See Ashby 2007 and Sorens 2013.

25. Here he is quoting Przeworski 2010, 101, a passage I quoted in Somin 2013, 121.

26. Cf. the classic account of the market as a mechanism for collective information transmission in Hayek 1945.

27. Sortition is also sometimes referred to as “lottocracy,” the term Lane uses.

28. The latter also tells against Ober's efforts to use ancient Athenian democracy, which relied extensively on sortition, as a model for the reform of modern democracy (Ober 2008 and 2015a). Sortition and other similar mechanisms worked relatively well in Athens because its government was far smaller and simpler than ours today, and because the franchise was largely limited to those who had extensive experience in its operations. I discuss these points in greater detail in Somin 2009.

29. Lane (2015, 357) briefly notes this later in her article, but does not consider how it undermines her own earlier criticism of the book.