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ABSTRACT
The little-studied presidency of Benjamin Harrison offers valuable insights into the surprising role that political ideas can play in government. Harrison was a highly qualified president who demonstrated energetic leadership and political skill, but whose ideological commitment to the Republican party as a quasi-sacred enterprise overrode other important considerations, thereby contributing to one of the greatest economic catastrophes in U.S. history: the Depression of 1893-1897. His ideas about the Republican party were forged in its early years, when it led the political battle against slavery; but when Harrison became president, the party’s interests in trade protectionism, veterans’ pensions, and silver drove him to support policies that eventually sent the economy into a tailspin from which it took years to recover.
Notes
1 Refers to Robert H. Bishop (1777-1855).
2 His party selection may also have been driven by three additional factors: the strong Presbyterian bent of the early Republican party; the greater chances for a young neophyte to move up in a new party versus the long-established Democratic organization; and the unique networking opportunities provided by his new law partner, William Wallace (a Republican, son of a former Governor, and a candidate himself, with strong connections to the local party organization).
3 Fremont was a former Governor and Senator from California, and an early standard bearer for the Republican party.
4 In 1860, Harrison had won election as Supreme Court Reporter of Indiana. “The post was not only a dignified one, but most lucrative,” notes his biographer (Sievers Citation1960, 137). During the war, Harrison relied heavily on its income to support his family. But in August 1862, the Democrats forced his replacement with one of their own.
5 By 1872, Harrison had established his law firm and built up his family finances, providing the financial security for him to enter politics. In addition, the governorship would allow him to stay home in Indianapolis, close to his family, friends, and church community. Thus, he felt more comfortable running for this office, rather than for Congress, after the war. Calhoun, Citation2005.
6 Harrison’s rise in Indiana politics during the late 1870s was also aided by the death of Republican governor and state machine boss Oliver P. Morton (1823 -1877). The two men had been friends and allies until 1872, when Harrison revealed in court the shady financial practices of several Republican party operatives, including Morton’s brother-in-law. Thereafter, the powerful and tyrannical Morton considered Harrison disloyal and blocked his political progress. Harrison chose not to fight back and accepted years of near political exile.
7 James Blaine (R-Maine), Republican party leader and U.S. Senator, also had a strong showing as a shadow candidate.
8 Harrison was not the first presidential candidate to campaign openly, but he did so more systematically than had anyone else. During the 1880 presidential campaign, James A. Garfield lived close to a major rail line and therefore received delegates at his home, speaking to them from his front porch. Four years later, Senator James A. Blaine toured for six weeks to meet voters but then lost the election, an outcome Harrison was eager to avoid. As for Harrison, his “home in Indianapolis was so accessible that he could not discourage visitors, so he deliberately planned his campaign around many voter pilgrimages” (Socolofsky and Spetter Citation1987, 11; Calhoun Citation2008; Bourdon Citation2019).
9 In 1888, Cleveland received 5,534,488 votes (48.6 percent of the popular vote), while Harrison won 5,443,892 (47.8 percent), yet Cleveland lost.
10 Except for labor issues, which both Cleveland and Harrison dealt with similarly, combining neglect, sympathy for the workers, and support for the occasional use of force (or threat thereof) to quell striker violence and arrest strikers.
11 New York Times, 28 August 1896, 2-3.
12 Federal taxes on alcohol then constituted roughly 75 percent of internal federal revenues. Table Ea594–608, Federal government internal tax revenue, by source: 1863–1940. Historical Statistics of the United States (henceforth HSUS).
13 In particular, the 1834 Poor Laws, under which “the charitable offering is snatched from the kind hand of the benevolent giver,” i.e., the church and fellow citizens, and placed under control of a faceless, “soulless” government and funded with “compulsory” taxes that allowed employers to reap a “princely magnificence,” while providing workers with only “a starving portion.” Quoted in Sievers, Citation1960, 65; Calhoun Citation2005, 14.
14 This is problematic because, if American production were replaced by imports from Britain, then there should not be “less goods all around.” And even if there were, then a change in supply would not necessarily affect demand, at least not in the direction indicated by Harrison. In fact, even during the Gilded Age, many accepted Say’s Law, which suggests that supply and demand should move together, not in opposing directions. Finally, if domestic prices increased so dramatically, then they would draw domestic producers back into the market.
15 For example, Harrison supported President Arthur’s efforts to reduce tariffs during 1882-1883.
16 In his 1888 campaign, Harrison simplified his tariff logic to this: “[economic] competition with foreign countries, without adequate discriminating and favoring duties, means lower wages to our working people … free trade, means larger importations of foreign goods, and that means less work in America.” Speech in Indianapolis, October 20, 1888. Quoted in Hedges Citation1892.
17 Speech in Danville, Indiana, August 18, 1876. Quoted in Wallace Citation1888, 279.
18 Harrison had a particularly delicate relationship with Senator James Blaine, a.k.a. “the Plumed Knight,” whom Harrison reluctantly appointed as Secretary of State. Thrice a candidate for President, a former Senate leader, ex-Secretary of State, and Republican party boss, Blaine was an ambitious political diva throughout the Gilded Age. But by 1893, he was in physical decline. For much of the Harrison administration, severe illness and the deaths of several of his children kept Blaine on the sidelines. On foreign policy, the two men agreed on much; at times, Harrison even took significant advice from Blaine. But Harrison served as his own Secretary of State for much of his administration.
19 NBER Macrohistory Database: IV. Prices. https://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/contents/chapter04.html
20 Table Cc1–2, Consumer price indexes, for all items: 1774–2003 (HSUS); Municipal Bond Yields for New England, Percent, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted (NBER n.d.).
21 The first session alone lasted 303 days and has been compared with the ambitious 37th “Civil War” Congress (under Lincoln) of 1861-1863, and the 63rd “Progressive” Congress (under Wilson) of 1913-1915. Over 2,250 bills and resolutions were passed during the 51st Congress, more than any other Congress in the nineteenth century (and most of the twentieth) (HSUS).
22 Applicants had to prove that they had served in the Union Army for 90 days or more, had been honorably discharged, and that their disability was not due to addiction or sexual promiscuity (i.e., “vicious habits”).
23 The new states were North and South Dakota (November 1889), Montana (November 1889), Washington, (November 1889), Idaho (July 1890), and Wyoming (July 1890). Congress had passed, and President Cleveland had signed, enabling legislation for the first four admissions in late February 1889; but their formal admission as states awaited Harrison’s signature seven months later. Cleveland and the Democrats had opposed these admissions, but gave way in light of victories by pro-statehood candidates in the 1888 elections. Also, Oklahoma was formally organized by Congress in the Oklahoma Organic Act (May 1890).
24 Payment would be in the form of Treasury certificates, which could be redeemed in silver or gold. There was also considerable leeway for the president, and market forces, to prevent rampant silver coinage.
25 Historian and biographer Charles Calhoun suggests that Sherman was being “disingenuous” here and that “rather than grandstanding in a fashion that could paint the silverites into a corner, Harrison [had] worked behind the scenes [on monetary policy].” Calhoun therefore contends that “there was little doubt” that Harrison would veto silver free-coinage legislation. Personal correspondence (July 2020).
26 New York Times, 12 September 1890, 4.
27 Table Ee424–430, Merchandise imports and duties: 1790–2000, HSUS.
28 U.S. Total Imports 07/1866-10/1969, NBER Macro Database.
29 Table Db132–149, Metals–selected imports and exports: 1851–2000, HSUS; Table Ee446–457, Exports and imports of merchandise – crude and manufactured goods, 1821–1984, HSUS.
30 The Economist, 25 April 1891, 534.
31 Strangely, the NBER does not record this period as recessionary, or at least not until January 1893. US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NBER Macro.
32 Wholesale Price of Wheat, Chicago, Six Markets for Chicago, IL (Cents per Bushel, Not Seasonally Adjusted), National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER Macro.
33 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 12 November 1892, 782.
34 Ibid.
35 Wall Street Journal, 10 November 1892.
36 Iron Age, 17 November 1892, 937.
37 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 12 November 1892, 782.
38 Table Ea584-587, Federal government finances-revenue, expenditure, and debt: 1789-1939, HSUS.
39 Wall Street Journal, 17 December 1892. Also, after some encouraging discussions with foreign governments about bimetallism, the Harrison administration enthusiastically participated in a November/December 1892 international monetary conference to discuss a coordinated move towards silver. When the conference ended in failure, speculators who had bid up the price of silver in anticipation of an international agreement sold off. Wall Street pressured the Treasury Department for new bond sales so as to avert a panic and to defend federal gold inventories. This time, Harrison refused. He saw in the demand a financial scheme to drive up interest rates. The stock market remained unperturbed. However, these events increased the air of uncertainty and rising risk around the U.S. currency. (See also Reit Citation1998 and Sievers Citation1968, 252.)
40 Quoted in Wall Street Journal, 15 February 1893.
41 Quoted in New York Times, 28 August 1896, 2-3.