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Abstract
Effective coastal zone management requires regulations of various forms. Inevitably, some of these have an impact on seaports. Understandably, regulations that may weaken the competitive position of a seaport are difficult to implement. The stakeholders of ports are well aware of their local, regional, and national economic impact. These stakeholders proclaim the need to ensure a level playing field between ports and oppose regulations that distort it and damage their competitive position. If possible, regulations should be developed in such a way that the playing field between ports remains level. For this to be arranged, an analysis of the effects of regulations on the playing field is needed. This article contains an analysis of the effects of different charging systems for waste disposal on the playing field between three leading North West European ports. First, a framework to analyze the distortions of the playing field is described. Second, the framework is applied to charging systems for waste disposal. This analysis reveals substantial differences in charging systems and shows that these differences distort the playing field. The distortion puts pressure on ports not to introduce the most environmentally friendly charging system. In the concluding section, alternative policy options to align the need for protecting the marine environment with the need to ensure a level playing field are discussed.
Notes
1. This is partly because the regulation of shipping often affects ports: for instance, monitoring the quality of ships takes place in ports and ports need to develop facilities for the disposal of waste and ballast water.
2. In this example it is assumed that higher environmental standards lead to higher (generalized) port costs. This is not necessarily the case for all such regulations.
3. This concept is essentially the same as generalized transport costs (see CitationCombes Lafourcade, 2005 for a study of the level of generalized transport cost), but is limited here to costs that occur in ports.
4. In Figure 3 it is assumed that shipping lines pay the terminal operator and port authority. This is not always the case, but it is the most common market structure. In some cases, PAs charge cargo charges directly from the cargo owner (CitationAshar, 2001). In other cases, TOCs are paid directly by cargo owners and not by shipping lines.
5. A part from differences in regulation, one could argue that differences in the monitoring of regulations are relevant as well, because some of the regulation may be officially in place, but not adhered to in practice. This issue is not included in this analysis, for two reasons. First, there is no causal relationship between monitoring efforts and compliance with a regulation. Limited monitoring may indicate that many firms comply with a regulation, but it is also possible that limited monitoring means noncompliance is tolerated. Second, we assume that port users, port workers, and other stakeholders put at least equal pressure on firms to comply with regulations as formal monitoring agencies. A focus on monitoring would not, therefore, add to the clarity of the discussion.
6. The recently rejected port package focused on enhancing market access and intra-port competition (European Commission, 2004), not on ensuring a level playing field. At least two reasons account for the limited progress of policies to ensure a level playing field related to the financing of port infrastructure. First, there are huge differences in the division of responsibilities between the public and private sectors (CitationChlomoudis & Pallis, 2002); second, in some countries port infrastructure is (still) considered as a public good (CitationBaird, 2004).
7. In a large number of ports, only licensed port workers are allowed to work in the port. This restriction drives up prices and consequently distorts the playing field with respect to ports with free labor markets. Furthermore, in a number of ports, governments subsidize a labor pool.
8. The Marpol Convention also deals with air pollution from ships (see CitationHyvättinen & Hildén, 2004), but this issue is not addressed in this article.
9. However, not all countries complied with the directive. As a consequence, the European Commission decided in 2006 to lodge a case at the European Court of Justice against five countries that have insufficiently implemented waste reception and handling plans.
10. This bilgewater is produced because of condensation in the engine room of the ships and occasionally from leakage along the propeller axis.
11. Source: based on a personal interview with E. Donkers, Port of Rotterdam, Department Infrastructure and Environment.
12. Source: based on a telephone interview with V. Stark, Behörde für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt, department Marpol/Schiffsentsorgung.
13. The measurement of waste by volume is somewhat strange because waste can be compressed. A substantial number of ships have such a waste compressor.
14. Source: E. Donkers and R. van Gelder, Port of Rotterdam.
15. Source: based on a telephone interview with Guido van Meel, Port of Antwerp.
16. Data provided by E. Donkers, Port of Rotterdam and G. van Meel, Port of Antwerp.
17. It should be noted, however, that Hamburg and Rotterdam have only had a relatively short period of experience with the new system. Especially in Rotterdam, the revenues from the indirect fees are higher than the expenditure. Thus, the tariffs may be reduced or otherwise altered to rectify that imbalance.
18. On the other hand, private sector firms could offer such administration services for shipping lines. Thus, they may not necessarily be huge administrative burdens for shipping companies.