Analysis of Power in Fisheries Co-Management: Experiences from Malawi

Abstract

In this article we analyze co-management arrangements in Malawi through the lenses of the concept of power. We focus the analysis at the local level where most of the more important actors operate. These include the fishing communities and the Department of Fisheries, but also the traditional leaders and the new local management entities created through co-management reforms—the so-called beach village committees. Our analysis, based on decentralization and power frameworks, shows that co-management arrangements are characterized by unequal power distribution among these different actors, often resulting in the marginalization of the fishers themselves. In this new institutional landscape the role of the perceived key partners including the traditional leaders and the Department of Fisheries remains unclear, with a combination of both positive and negative outcomes.

Keywords:

• Africa
• co-management
• fishing community
• power relationships
• traditional authorities

Acknowledgments

Financial support from the German Cooperation (GTZ) through the Project 03.7860.4-001.00 “Food Security and Poverty Alleviation through Improved Valuation and Governance of River Fisheries in Africa” is gratefully acknowledged.

Notes

A beach village committee (BVC) as defined in the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) of 1997 (Government of Malawi 1997) refers to people involved in fishing-related activities such as fishing, processing, fish trading, and boat building.

The term “chief” here is used to refer to the highest position in the traditional leadership and is also sometimes referred to as a traditional authority (TA). Below the chief is a sub-chief or sub-traditional authority (STA). Below the sub-chief is the group village head (GVH) with a number of village heads (VHs).