A Framework for Institutional Analysis of Decentralization Reforms in Natural Resource Management

Abstract

Reforms directed toward decentralizing the management of natural resources are intended to increase stakeholder involvement and improve the effectiveness and sustainability of resource management arrangements though application of the principle of subsidiarity. The widespread advocacy of such reforms has given rise to numerous case-study examples around the world. This article presents a framework for such studies, based in institutional analysis, for researchers who wish to assess both the decentralization process and the outcomes of decentralization efforts. Rationale for the inclusion of variables and hypothesized relationships of variables to prospective outcomes are explained.

Keywords:

• decentralization
• decision making
• institutions
• natural resource management
• policy
• stakeholder participation

Notes

For a review of institutional analysis as a field, with several examples of contributions, see McGinnis (1999a,b, 2000).

Throughout the article we refer to resource-scale or resource-level actions and institutions. We are thus presuming that the resources for which the framework might be applicable have some geographic domain—for example, a forest ecosystem, a river basin, a fishery, and so forth. The usefulness of the framework can be drawn into question for physically unbounded common resources (e.g., the domain of knowledge and ideas). On the other hand, the notion of decentralization itself makes little sense in a context where the resource in question does not have identifiable (even if contestable) boundaries. Thus, it may not be much of a weakness that the framework assumes a resource for which terms such as “scale of the resource” or “resource-level” institutions have meaning.

This by no means indicates that the prospects for decentralization in poor areas are hopeless, or that reforms should not be attempted. This point is addressed directly in Kemper et al. (2006).

This is distinct from the discussion in variable 2.1 about the motivation for the decentralization policy. It is certainly possible (though, one might hope, rare) that a central government might adopt a decentralization policy out of benign motivations in consultation with local stakeholders, but nevertheless fail for other reasons to actually relinquish any control over resource management or establish local authority.