Science teachers as metascientists: an inductive–deductive dialectic immersion in northern alpine field ecology

Abstract

Efforts to promote more realistic conceptions about science are often limited by teachers’ inexperience in this domain. In this paper, we describe an ‘inductive–deductive, dialectic immersion’ approach towards assisting teachers in developing more realistic conceptions about science — along with corresponding revised perspectives about science teaching. Three secondary teachers of science with minimal science research experience engaged in a case study of science in action — specifically, in an episode of northern alpine ecological field research. Qualitative data analyzed by constant comparative methods suggested that these teachers shifted along a modernist through postmodernist continuum — as indicated by increased support for a more Naturalist epistemology of science, a more Antirealist ontology of science, and corresponding priorities towards science teaching and learning. Results suggest that teachers of science can develop postmodern views about science and science teaching if given opportunities to induce and deduce propositions about science in realistic cases of science in action.

Acknowledgements

The project on which this article is based was funded by a generous grant from the Imperial Oil Centre for Studies in Science, Mathematics and Technology Education at OISE/UT, under the Directorship of Dr Derek Hodson. For that support, we are extremely grateful. Also, we would like to thank Dr Steve Alsop (York University, Toronto) for his expert review of an earlier version of the manuscript for this article.

Notes

While science and technology often are considered different (but interacting), they also may be viewed, broadly, as one field — perhaps called, ‘technoscience’ (Bencze 2001). Nevertheless, for simplicity, the more common term ‘science’ is used throughout this article.

Given that it is possible that a person may, by chance, not make an observation that would disconfirm what would, otherwise, be a generalization, atheoretical induction is philosophically problematic (Hume 1748). Therefore, the terms ‘induce’ and ‘induction’ are used here in a general sense; that is, using theory as a basis for generalizing from specific instances.