ISLAMOPHOBIA, CULTURE AND RACE IN THE AGE OF EMPIRE

Abstract

This paper offers a genealogical sketch of the figure of the Muslim Other as it is figured in the post-Cold War popular and political imaginary. It explores why ‘culture’ has acquired a putative explanatory power in the post-Cold War (geo)politics. In addressing differentialist racism, it posits Islamophobia as an ideological response that conflates histories, politics, societies and cultures of the Middle East into a single unified and negative conception of an essentialized Islam, which is then deemed incompatible with Euro-Americaness. In this context, the category of brown, once the signifier of an exotic Other, is undergoing a transformation in conjunction with the deepening of Islamophobia, a formation that posits brown, as a strategy of identification, as alterity to the Euro-Americanness, and as terror and threat.

Keywords:

• Islamophobia
• race
• culture
• brown
• difference
• differentialist racism
• Muslim identity
• terrorism

Notes

1. See Silva's introduction to this issue.

2. That the second edition of this book was published in 1997 (with a new introduction) is already an indication that the central problems it raised remained unresolved, if not exacerbated, 16 years later.

3. See Bernstein (1993).

4. See Naureckas (1995) for a compilation of statements by the press and the experts that attributed the Oklahoma City bombing to the Middle East. See Semati (1997) for an analysis of racialized imagination, terrorism, and the discourse of the Middle East and Islam in the immediate aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing. For a comparison of the press coverage of two ‘religious extremists’ (Muhammad Salameh and David Koresh), see Haynie (1994).

5. On CIA's covert actions see Woodward (1987).

6. Moreover, it was through the Persian Gulf War that, as President Bush Sr. famously exulted, ‘By God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.’

7. For a catalog of representations of Arabs see the extensive research by Jack Shaheen, especially Shaheen (2001).

8. Comparing the 1980s to the 1990s Hollywood narratives, Semati (2001) has argued that the popular films in the 1990s continued the Orientalist vision of the 1980s films, albeit in a ‘kindler, gentler’ disguise.

9. The title of Huntington's (1993) article, ‘The clash of civilizations’, included a question mark at the end. This article was worked into a book by 1996, titled The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. The popularity of the paradigm meant there was no room for that question mark in the new title.

10. See Abrahamian (1993) for a detailed analysis of American print media's response to 9/11, which, unlike many of their European counterparts, used the ‘clash of civilizations’ paradigm to frame the terrorist attacks.

11. For a response from a professional historian, see Ray Mottahedeh (1996), who is a Harvard professor in Islamic history. Abrahamian (1993) neatly summarizes the shortcomings of the clash of civilizations paradigm. See Said (2003) and Trumpbour (2003) for other perspectives on Huntington's paradigm.

12. See the statement by President Bush, posted on the White House website: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html.

13. See the transcript of Oprah for October 5, 2001, titled, ‘Islam 101; guests discuss Islam and common misconceptions about the religion.’ The transcripts and the press reports were obtained through LexisNexis data base. The pagination, where given, reflects LexisNexis's listing of section and page numbers.

14. Here I am excluding the academic voices from the left, which I view to be fairly marginal in relations to the official and popular discourses of Islam and terrorism in the United States.

15. For a discussion of ‘culture talk’ in this context, see Mamdani (2004).

16. I have not been able to locate in the (mainstream) American media any single discussion of the list of demands by Osama bin Laden or even by Muhammad Atta. For more on these, see Abrahamian (2003).

17. See Abdo (2006). For more information on the Arab Americans and Muslim Americans see also Naber (2000).

18. For a complete report on these, see Cainkar's (2004) report for Global Security Cooperation.

19. Hardt and Negri (2000) attribute the notion of ‘differentialist’ racism to Balibar. However, it should be pointed out that Balibar (1991, p. 21) borrows this term from Taguieff (2001), who has written on immigration complex in France. For a collection of his writings in English, see his book, Force of prejudice (Taguieff 2001).

20. See the following: Shalal-Esa (2004); Herbert (2006); ‘Gifts from Washington’ (2002); Elmasry's (2003); ‘Robertson says some Muslims “satanic”’ (2006); Human Rights Watch report on hateful comments directed at Islam and Muslims at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/usahate/usa1102-05.htm.

21. See Ford's (2001) report for Christian Science Monitor, titled, ‘Europe cringes at Bush “crusade” against terrorists.’

22. For more discussions of Islamophobia in Europe and Australia see Halliday (1999); Marranci (2004); Modood and Ahmad (2007); MacMaster (2003); Cigar (2003); Sells (2003); Bunzl (2007); Taguieff (2001); Modood, Triandafyllidou, and Zapate-Barrero (2006); Poynting and Mason (2007).

23. See transcript # 032901cb.h02 for Glenn Beck show for March 29, 2007.

24. See transcript # 042601cb.h02 for Glenn Beck show for April 26, 2007.

25. See transcript # 122102cb.140 for Your World with Neil Cavuto for December 21, 2006.

26. See MacFarquhar's (2006) New York Times report for an example of this view.

27. See transcript # 111401cb.h02s for the Glenn Beck show for November 14, 2006.

28. The larger context of Grossberg's (1996) remarks about Said's work is the problematic of identity and identity politics in cultural studies, ‘the subsumption of identity into a particular set of modernist logics,’ and their implications for political struggle (p. 88).