Entanglements of Evidence in the Turn Against Critique

Abstract

Over the past decade, a range of theorists have argued that critique, in its rigid pursuit of hidden truths, has become routinely dismissive of everyday attachments and geared towards a diagnosis of error. To explore the turn from critique, this essay revisits two of the most influential arguments against the hermeneutics of suspicion, by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Bruno Latour. It argues that while these theorists present a divisive account of methods and their potentials, when read closely, the points of differentiation between critical and post-critical methods are intriguingly mutable. These critiques of critique, animated by concern and premised on experience, trouble their own accounts of critique’s identity. The turn against critique encourages critics not to summarily dismiss ways of thought as simply and irreparably wrong. In keeping with this aim, this article asks if there might be a way to rethink, rather than retrench, critique.

Keywords:

• critique
• methodology
• social theory
• ethics
• affect
• representation

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on Contributor

Ashley Barnwell is the Ashworth Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Melbourne, Australia. Her research is based in cultural sociology and social theory, and focuses on the politics of truth-telling and sharing stories in public life.