![Sample our Humanities journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5939/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Humanities.jpg"})
Abstract
Michael Polanyi spent his long career thinking and writing about the workings of science and the scientific community. Moreover, he saw in the workings of that community the core principles and practices of the good political republic, as spelled out in his famous essay, ‘The Republic of Science’. There is, however, a tension between his political theory and his epistemological contribution, in particular his path-breaking writings about the tacit dimension in knowledge formation—or what he described as ‘personal knowledge’. On the one hand, his political essay supports a classical conservative position, while on the other, his theory of tacit knowledge anticipates much of the post-modern radical critique of long-standing Enlightenment assumptions about scientific objectivity and the disinterested pursuit of knowledge. This otherwise contradictory position can be understood by following Polanyi's own epistemological prescription, namely by examining the underlying assumptions that constitute his own tacit knowledge. Polanyi's personal history reveals the less-apparent assumptions tacitly underlying his republic of science. Polanyi's own ‘fiduciary community’—in particular, his deep personal and intellectual ties to classical conservative theory, his association with Frederick von Hayek, and his membership in the neo-liberal Mont Pelerin Society—shaped his theoretical conceptualization of the so-called ‘republic of science’. In this way, Polanyi's political contribution diverges from his own epistemological requirements, in a way that largely obscures important intellectual roots required to properly interpret his political thought.
Notes
Merton's Citation1973 text has long represented—and in some places still does represent—the mainstream tradition in the field. In this work, the social context of science was focused on the scientific community itself, in particular the institutional and normative factors that govern it. Also see Hollinger Citation(1998) and Jarvie Citation(2001).
It should also be pointed out that there were some similarities between the views of Polanyi and Kuhn on the dogmatic and often authoritarian nature of the scientific community, which Polanyi noted himself in comments on a paper by Kuhn (see Polanyi, Citation1963). Also see Fuller Citation(2000). We refer here as well to the more critical tradition of the social studies of science that was to follow after Kuhn, in particular the works of Latour and Woolgar Citation(1979), and Jasanoff et al. Citation(1995).
The narrative presented here is based primarily on the writings of Prosch Citation(1986), Gill Citation(2000), and Jha Citation(2002); Scott and Moleski Citation(2005), Gelwick Citation(2004), Knepper Citation(2005) and Hacohen Citation(2001).
Hull provides a useful discussion of this history of ideas in his essay, ‘The Great Lie: Markets, Freedom, and Knowledge’ in Plehwe et al. Citation(2005). Although his focus is different from ours, his argument that the very idea of ‘knowledge’ and ‘related intellectual inventions’, such as Hayek's ‘problem of knowledge’ and Polanyi's ‘tacit knowledge’, are ‘politically-motivated intellectual devices’ is an important contribution and most relevant to this discussion. Where Hull Citation(2001) seeks to understand the inner epistemological workings of Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge, we have a different purpose in this essay. Our task is to apply the significant insights of Polanyi's own theory of the tacit dimension in an effort to better understand his theory of the Republic of Science.
A testament to the level of these discussions about politics, science, and society is that they laid important foundations for Mannheim's later contribution to what came to be known as the sociology of knowledge, spelled out in his famous book, Ideology and Utopia Citation(1936). The book developed the early foundations of a post-positivist sociology of knowledge.
With regard to Hayek there tends to be a certain amount of confusion about the use of the term ‘conservative’. While Hayek is generally considered to be a conservative theorist, this covers over important differences among writers on the political right. Indeed, Hayek Citation(1960) had his differences with many conservatives, spelled out in his essay ‘Why I Am Not a Conservative’, first published as a chapter in The Constitution of Liberty. As opposed to traditional conservative free-market theorists, Hayek argued that capitalism required a stronger commitment to reform and change, thus necessitating a larger role for the state than was usually accepted by other free-market conservatives (see Nash, Citation1996). Thus it is more helpful to consider Hayek as a ‘neo-liberal conservative’.
It is significant to note that Hayek's most famous book, The Road to Serfdom and Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation were both published in the same year, 1944.
As noted above, whereas classical liberalism emphasized the role of the market, Hayek's neoliberalism accepts the need for a limited state in a market society.
As Polanyi described ‘Any attempt to organize the group of helpers under a single authority would eliminate their independent initiatives and thus reduce their joint effectiveness to that of the single person directing them from the centre. It would, in effect, paralyse their cooperation’ (Polanyi, Citation1962b, p. 3). See also Allen Citation(1998).
Parenthetically, it can be noted that Hayek and his associates, including Polanyi, have never succeeded in clarifying why the fragmented components of the individual's mind better come together than those of central planners. One of their standard attempts to explain this purported reality involved pointing to Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem, which shows that public preferences cannot be rationally aggregated. But always neglected in this explanation is the fact that Arrow's theorem also applies to the private sector. It thus supplies no solid support for the argument against public planning. In short, a central component of the fiduciary framework remains more of an ideological contention than an established theoretical finding.
Polanyi and Mannheim remained in touch during these years, particular through the intellectual activities of a group that referred to itself as ‘The Moot’.
The title of ‘social studies’ was decided after the sociology department at the university refused to acknowledge him as a sociologist. The president of the university thus established a free standing chair in Social Studies for Polanyi.
See Gill Citation(2000), especially chapter 1.
Also see Tradition and Discovery, a journal that specializes in Polanyi scholarship.
It is surely not by accident that Polanyi devotes 70 pages of analysis in Personal Knowledge to the role of ‘intellectual passions’ (see chapter 6, pp. 132–202). For Polanyi, passions and even love are never far away: ‘Yet personal knowledge in science is not made but discovered, and as such it claims to establish contact with reality beyond the clues on which it relies. It commits us, passionately and far beyond our comprehension, to a vision of reality. Of this responsibility we cannot divest ourselves by setting up objective criteria of verifiability—or falsifiability, or testability, or what you will. For we live in it as in the garment of our own skin. Like love, to which it is akin, this commitment is a “shirt of flame”, blazing with passion and, also like love, consumed by devotion to a universal demand. Such is the true sense of objectivity in science …’ (p. 64).
For a good discussion of this theory, see Prosch (Citation1986, chapter 4). Also see Thorpe Citation(2001).
As they argue, ‘the scientist can conceive problems and pursue their investigation by believing in a hidden reality on which science bears’ (pp. 74–75).
See Potter Citation(1993), Longino Citation(1993), Michelson Citation(1996) and Harding Citation(2008). Bat-Ami Bar On Citation(1993) refers to ‘epistemic privilege’ (pp. 83–100).
With regard to social change, it might be noted that Polanyi cautioned Hayek against his support of utilitarianism, as it can also be used to support the socialist interest in expanding the welfare state. Whereas utilitarianism offers no substantive criteria, tradition requires adherence to established, stable, authoritative pathways to societal improvement. See Allen Citation(1998). With regard to Popper and Hayek on these points, see Nordmann Citation(2005).