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Abstract
The paper argues that a significant change in Japanese post-Cold War security policy has occurred, as compared to its Cold War security policy. Instead of relying solely on power-based realist variables, this paper argues that a significant change is taking place because of the shift in Japan's security identity from a ‘peace state’ to an ‘international state’. What this refers to is that Japan sees itself as playing a more active role in military-strategic affairs in the post-Cold War period due to the normative structure shift within Japan in relation to the practices and role(s) in the regional and international security environment. To show change in Japan's security identity and its resultant security behaviour, norms in three areas that define and shape its security policy are contrasted – Japan's definition of national security; its contribution, in military terms, to regional and international security affairs; and the level of agency (control) Japan has in its security policy. The international-state security identity is increasingly recognised by the members of Japan's security policy-making elite and is used to formulate Japan's security policy in the post-Cold War period. It is also gradually being accepted by the larger Japanese society and has become a permanent feature of Japan's security discourse.
Notes
1. Kondo Shigekatsu (interview, Tokyo, 22 September 2005) argued that Japan could be both a peace state and international state simultaneously. The author only partially agrees with this statement. Both the ‘peace state’ and ‘international state’, as used in this paper, are treated as analytically different and have different meanings and implications for Japan's behaviour. As will be discussed below, the concept of peace still remains important for Japan as an international state. The only difference is the means of achieving it.
2. It is important to note that this paper focuses on Japan becoming an international state in military-strategic issues. Japan was already an international state in other areas, such as economics, finance, technology, and investment. The chapters in CitationHook and Weiner (1992) prove this point. However, a discussion on security issues is clearly absent in this volume. This is a consequence of Japan's Cold War security policy.
3. The aim of the paper is simply to illustrate the shift in the patterns of Japan's security behaviour resulting from a transformation of its security identity (and the related norms) from a peace state to an international state. It is not to show how the transformation of the security identity occurred. The author discusses the processes behind the change in identity in CitationSingh (2006), where change in Japanese security identity is shown to come from its interaction with external military crises. The evolution and strengthening of the Japanese international-state security identity and concomitant weakening of the peace-state security identity is analysed through Japan's interaction with the 1990–91 Persian Gulf Crisis, the 1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis, the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the 1998 Taepodong Crisis, and the US-led war on terror.
4. Norms are defined as collective understandings and expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity (CitationJepperson et al. 1996: 54).
5. There were two other groups that shaped Japan's national security discourse: (1) the revisionists (which included Kishi Nobusuke), while supportive of the US–Japan security relationship, viewed Japan's delegation of security responsibilities to the United States as a ‘humiliation’ (CitationInoguchi and Bacon 2006: 2). They pushed for Japan to develop a stronger military and greater security independence from the United States (CitationBoyd and Samuels 2005: 3); and (2) the progressives’ (including intellectuals, labour activists, and left-of-centre politicians) position, as articulated by the Heiwa Mondai Danwakai (Peace Issues Discussion Group), supported the concept of ‘unarmed neutrality’ that opposed the use of organised violence. They supported the institutionalisation of the Peace Constitution, and opposed the US–Japan Security Treaty and the rearmament efforts based on the justification that both contradicted the Japanese Constitution (CitationInoguchi and Bacon 2006: 2).
6. The peace-state identity emerged as a compromise between the pragmatists and revisionists before the 1960s and between the pragmatists and progressives after the 1960s.
7. At this point it is important to highlight that the definition of the Yoshida Doctrine is contested. This is because there is no official historical record that clarifies the definition and Yoshida himself did not refer specifically to such a doctrine or strategy. One of the most common definitions of the Yoshida Doctrine is: (1) the reliance on the United States for Japan's security; (2) the maintenance of a limited defence capability; and (3) the concentration of its international efforts on economic development. For the contested nature of the Yoshida Doctrine, personal interviews with Igarashi Takeshi (Tokyo, 22 September 2005) and Tanaka Akihiko (Tokyo, 6 September 2005); and CitationPyle (1987: 245, fn. 5). For the features of the Yoshida Doctrine, personal interview with Tanaka Akihiko (Tokyo, 6 September 2005) and CitationBerger (1993: 140).
8. One clear example of Yoshida's reliance on the peace-state conception for Japan's security policy was his strict refusal to consider remilitarisation in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s (see Citation[Obar]take 1986: 340–1).
9. The other dimensions were: (1) Japan would no longer be a follower nation; (2) Japan would be prepared for global leadership by being remade into an international state; and (3) a new liberal nationalism would be based on the concept of the country's national interests beyond traditional nationalism (CitationPyle 1987: 254–68; 1992: 89).
10. Many competing identities emerged to account for the developments in Japan's post-Cold War security policy, including Japan as a ‘global civilian power’ (CitationFunabashi 1991–92; Hughes 1999); a ‘normal’ state (CitationHughes 2004; CitationOzawa 1994; Singh 2002); and an ‘ordinary’ state or country (CitationInoguchi and Bacon 2006). Japan as a global civilian power falls within the peace-state category, as it argues for a continuation of Japan's minimalist security policy in military-strategic affairs. Japan as a normal state and an ordinary power can be subsumed under the international-state category. In fact, this paper prefers the use of the international-state term for the following three reasons. First, it is difficult to define the term ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ state academically, as reflected in the lack of consensus in the literature on the definition of these terms. Second, the ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ state phrases owe their origins to the attempts made by the previous Japanese governments beginning in the 1970s to construct Japan as an ‘international state’. The goals defined by those who argued for Japan to become a normal state correspond to those of Japan as an international state, which were raised in the 1970s and 1980s. Third, the use of the international-state label corresponds to Japan's official security discourse, which has frequently expressed the need for Japan to behave as an international state – assuming international responsibilities not only in the area of economics but also in military-strategic matters.
11. Kojima Tomoyuki stressed that there was no consensus on the appropriate form that Japanese post-Cold War security should take. Resultantly, he added, the lack of form means that the change in Japanese post-Cold War security policy will occur in a process. This point concurs with the evolutionary feature of the change in Japanese security policy, as discussed in the conclusion section of this paper (interview with Kojima Tomoyuki, Tokyo, 14 September 2005).
12. Yanai Shunji (interview, Tokyo 24 May 2006) noted that the Persian Gulf Crisis widened the national security definition not only for the Japanese state but also for the Japanese public. According to Yanai, the attitude shift within Japanese society towards international security facilitated Japan's enhanced participation in efforts that contributed to the peace and stability of the international security environment during the post-Cold War period even if the conflict did not affect Japan directly. On a similar point, Tokuchi Hideshi (interview, Tokyo 14 September 2005) highlighted that the significant difference between Japanese security policy in the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods is that the Japanese public during the latter period view the stability of Japan as being tied to regional and international stability not only in economic terms but also in political security terms. These points were also supported by Hoshino Toshiya (interview, Tokyo, 21 September 2005). As Masuda Masayuki (interview, Tokyo, 28 August 2005) commented, for MOFA, security identity is no longer defined at the regional level but has expanded to the global level.
13. For the 1996 Joint Declaration and the revised guidelines, see CitationHook (1998); CitationKatzenstein and Okawara (2001); CitationMochizuki (1997a, Citationb); CitationMorimoto (1997); CitationMurata (2000); CitationSmith (1999); CitationSoeya (1998a, Citationb). On the October 2005 agreement, see CitationDunphy (2005); International Herald Tribune, 29 October 2005; CitationTyson (2005).
14. The Japanese refer to TMD as Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), with a special focus on the ‘defensive’ nature of the project against ballistic missiles.
15. For the various initiatives on national defence concepts, see CitationMomoi (1977: 350–60).
16. For Japan as a ‘reactive state’, see CitationCalder (1988). For the institutional rigidities characterisation, see Hellmann (1988: 345–78); CitationPyle (1992: 107–9).
17. The fear of international isolation was especially pronounced when Japan was excluded in Kuwait's congratulatory message to the United States and members of the ‘United Nations Coalition’ published in the New York Times and Washington Post on 11 March 1991 following the successful conclusion of the crisis. This came as a shock to Japan, especially after its enormous US$13 billion contribution to the war effort. Michael Armacost, US Ambassador to Japan, in his memorandum to the US State Department analysing the impact of the Gulf War on US–Japan relations, acknowledged Japan's concerns in relation to the issue of ‘international isolation’ (CitationUSG, Department of State 1991). The fear of international isolation was both a genuine concern for the Japanese leadership and also served as useful grounds on which the supporters of Japan's security role expansion attempted to gain greater support for Japan's full participation in the US-led multinational effort against Iraq. See CitationSingh (2006: 157–64).
18. According to Tokuchi, the quick passage of the ATSML by the Diet surprised everyone and it changed the perceptions of the international community that the Japanese security policy-making process was slow and immobile (interview, Tokyo, 14 September 2005).