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Abstract
This article grapples with the tricky issue of democratic consolidation in post-Soeharto Indonesia. It recognizes the great strides the country has made toward establishing a rights-based democracy. This includes attempts to tackle the legacies of decades-long authoritarianism – for instance, those times when state elites have put self-interestedness aside to cooperate in the establishment of new institutions that promote genuine democratization. This article argues, however, that democratic consolidation in Indonesia will continue to be bedeviled due to the poor institutionalization of a democratic rule of law. Until state elites and government officials predictably can be relied upon to enforce democratic institutions, and are subject to the law themselves, then a meaningful deepening of Indonesia's elitist/electoral democracy will be unobtainable.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Bill Case, participants of the conference from which this special edition originated, Portia Reyes, an anonymous reviewer for The Pacific Review, and especially Marcus Mietzner for insightful comments on an earlier draft. Standard disclaimers apply.
Jamie S. Davidson is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore.
Notes
1 For results on a recent poll, see ‘Young back sharia-based bylaws: survey’, Jakarta Post, 5 June 2008; accessed at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/04/young-back-shariabased-bylaws-survey.html, 3 February 2009.
2 One observer who has grasped its magnitude has remarked: ‘the MPR set a rare precedent by agreeing peacefully and voluntarily to vote away its own all-powerful status’ (CitationEllis 2007: 36).
3 While in many respects Yudhoyono is a political insider, he was elected to the presidency representing a new party (Democrat Party) that was outside the ‘big five’: Golkar, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), National Mandate Party (PAN), Development Unity Party (PPP), and National Awakening Party (PKB).
4 This amendment also called for the separation of powers among the executive, legislature, and judiciary, a conceptual condition rooted in Indonesia's colonial civil law tradition. It is not the same as a balance of powers, which refers to overlapping authority among the three branches that generates a system of checks and balances. In reality both common and civil law systems worldwide have gradually moved toward equilibrium (CitationPompe 2005).
5 The Constitutional Court has been granted the power to hear cases concerning the constitutionality of laws and the authority of state bodies, the dissolution of political parties, electoral disputes, and impeachment. Its decisions are binding.
6 Its role in the impeachment process as the ultimate arbiter provides a check on executive power (see note 5).
7 For example, the new (and much maligned) Commercial Court was formed under multilateral conditionality.
8 This does not deny the occasional odd and politically-charged decision, such as the one on the formation of the province of West Irian Jaya. See ICG (2006).
9 This is so, even though the court's design and structure was inspired by German and South Korean examples (CitationLinnan 2007). For example, a centralized decision-making body, its members are appointed for lengthy terms, but not for life as in the United States Supreme Court.
10 Hirschl (2004) also notes that this explanation bears little on judicial empowerment in non-transitions, mature democracies. In relation to the point I am emphasizing, he writes: ‘the voluntary self-limitation through the transfer of policy-making authority from majoritarian decision-making arena to courts seems, prima facie, to run counter to the interests of power-holders in legislatures and executives’ (2004: 39).
11 Neither does this deny the much deserved criticism of parliament and its signal contribution to Indonesia's democratic deficit. Its corruption and incompetence are well noted (CitationZiegenhain 2008).
12 Elsewhere, Jayasuriya remarks: ‘From the PWC [Post-Washington Consensus] standpoint, what is required is not the retreat of the state, but the effective development of state institutions to protect the market order’ (2002: 32).
13 Others included foreign affairs, monetary and fiscal policy, religious affairs, and defence and security.
14 Such international organizations as the Asia Society, the International Organization for Migration, and the (quasi-domestic) Partnership for Governance Reform have begun reform-oriented training programs with the police.
15 This stipulation had appeared in the 2002 State Defense Act; the 2004 bill mandated the 2009 deadline.
16 This is down from earlier estimates of 70 per cent.