North Korea's nuclear weapons programme and the maintenance of the Songun system

Abstract

North Korea is unlikely to relinquish its nuclear programme because of its importance to the political economy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) state and the perpetuation of the Kim regime. Two observations give rise to this conclusion: firstly, the development of North Korea's nuclear programme has been a long-term project spanning several decades. At no stage has Pyongyang shown a commitment to its dismantlement. Secondly, denuclearisation negotiations have followed a cyclical pattern in which the North has provoked crises to make new demands and gain leverage in negotiations. By inference, it is clear that the nuclear programme has great intrinsic value to Pyongyang. This paper argues that the nuclear programme has value as a bargaining chip in international diplomacy to extract economic inputs for its moribund economy, in domestic politics as vehicle for bureaucratic interests and as a rallying symbol of the country's hyper-nationalist ideology, as well as its role as a defensive deterrent and important cog in Pyongyang's offensive asymmetric war strategy. For these reasons, the Kim regime is unlikely to seriously entertain nuclear disarmament.

Keywords:

• North Korea
• nuclear proliferation
• coercive bargaining
• systematic maintenance

Acknowledgments

Dr. Benjamin Habib is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia. Ben's research projects include the political economy of North Korea's nuclear weapons programme, East Asian security, international politics of climate change and methodologies for undergraduate teaching. Ben undertook his PhD candidature at the Flinders University in Adelaide, Australia, and has worked previously at the Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship. He has spent time in teaching English in Dandong, China, and has also studied at the Keimyung University in Daegu, South Korea.