China and Responsibility to Protect: Maintenance and Change of Its Policy for Intervention

Abstract

This article tries to analyze Chinese policy stance on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) concept from two levels: its basic attitude towards the core principles of this concept and its specific attitudes towards the execution of this concept, that is, the international intervention actions. Starting from the clarification of the RtoP concept, the article analyzes the maintenance and change of China's stance on state sovereign and non-interference principle. In the third part, four features of Chinese specific attitudes on intervention actions are abstracted, including cautiousness, aversion of military means, emphasis of UN authority and local support. Then the article further examines China's policy during the Libyan war, and finds that it basically follows the above framework.

Keywords:

• RtoP
• Chinese Attitude
• Maintenance
• Change

Acknowledgments

Liu Tiewa is Assistant Professor of School of International Relations and Diplomacy at Beijing Foreign Studies University, Deputy Director of Research Centre of the United Nations and International Organizations, Beijing Foreign Studies University.

Notes

1 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established by the Government of Canada in September 2000 whose mandate was generally to build a broader understanding of the problem of reconciling intervention for human protection purposes and sovereignty; more specifically, it was to try to develop a global political consensus on how to move from polemics – and often paralysis – towards action within the international system, particularly through the United Nations. See “The Responsibility to Protect”, 1. 7., p. 2, available at: <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>.

2 Recently, a number of western and Chinese scholars have done plenty of research of the RtoP concept. Besides those core documents of RtoP, two very comprehensive studies have been done by Gareth and Bellamy. Gareth (2008); Bellamy (2009). Most of Chinese scholars are researching this field from the legal perspective, especially focusing on the challenge of this concept to the nation state system For instance, Gao (2011: 26–31); Li (2007: 131–139); Li (2006: 99–107); Li and Gong (2007: 56–60). A few of Chinese scholars also explore the concrete function of this concept, such as Yuan (2008: 58–62). His conclusion is that China can play a role in resolving Africa's internal conflicts under the RtoP concept, and has not discussed China's attitudes on this issue. Teitt (2008) has given the best academic illustration of China and RtoP so far. Based on her valuable discourse on China's policy principle and priorities toward RtoP, this article tries to give a more framed explanation on China's policy and attitudes on this issue.

3 The so-called “Chinese Model” includes: (1) The basic principle is “people-oriented” developing model. (2) The relationship between human rights and the rule of law should be clarified. (3) The multiple contents of human rights are interdependent and indispensible to each other. (4) The relationship between state sovereignty and human rights, international and domestic, human rights and society, theory and practice should be clarified and well coordinated. Available at: <http://www.humanrights.cn/cn/zt/tbbd/bjtl/04/t20091104_507531.html>. For more information about the progress of human rights practice in China, please see http://www.humanrights.cn.

4 Pillar One: The protection responsibilities of the State; Pillar Two: International assistance and capacity-building; Pillar Three: Timely and decisive response. WFM-IGP Summary of SG Report on RtoP, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,’ available at: <http://globalr2p.org/media/pdf/GCR2P_General_Assembly_Debate_Assessment.pdf>.

5 More recently, “state sovereignty beheld by China” has been added to this principle.

6 There are actually narrow and broad definitions of “intervention”. The former one indicates the dictatorial interference involving elements of force and the broader one extends to non-forcible techniques, including the refusal of recognition, economic and financial pressure, propaganda and infiltration. For more information about this concept. (Damrosch, L. F. 1989: 1–50).

7 Compiled from ‘UN Peacekeeping Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Civilian Police Personnel’, available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/>.