Abstract
With the Gulf War as a trigger, Japan began to make a humanitarian contribution by dispatching the Self Defense Forces to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Given Japan's strong hesitation for participation in the past, Japan's peacekeeping policy presents an intriguing challenge to examine the factors for a preference change and sustained compliance. By investigating Japan's peacekeeping policies towards East Timor and Haiti, this article examines how Japan's behavior and preferences were influenced by either internalized norms or cost/benefit calculations. While norm-driven behavior is considered to be incompatible with strategic calculated behavior, the article demonstrates that these two factors can co-exist.
Acknowledgements
An early version of this article was presented at the Annual Conference of Japan Association of International Relations, Hokkaido, October 2010. I greatly thank anonymous reviewers for their insightful and constructive comments, and people who kindly agreed to be interviewed.
Notes
1. The Five Principles are: (1) agreement on a ceasefire; (2) consent of all parties in the conflict to the deployment of the peacekeeping forces and to Japan's participation; (3) the impartiality of such a peacekeeping force; (4) a means of withdrawal in the case of a suspension of the above three agreements; (5) the minimum use of weaponry, with employment restricted to those protecting the lives of personnel.
2. The revisions enabled the SDF to participate in peacekeeping forces, which had been prohibited, and mitigated the restrictions on the use of weapons. It allowed the SDF to use weapons to protect others who are under care of the SDF and to protect munitions depots, vehicles and other equipment.
3. Criteria of international norms depend on two conditions. The first condition requires widespread support from preferably two-thirds of all nations. Second, major countries (those capable of influencing international politics) should also accept the proposed norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, Citation1998: 901).
4. The ‘National Defense Program Outline for Fiscal Year 2011 and Beyond’ hinted at a need to revise current policies, such as the Five Principles for more frequent participation in peacekeeping operations (Ministry of Defense, Citation2011).
5. Some adopted a new source of social action such as practical knowledge (Pouliot, Citation2008), social practices (Adler and Pouliot, Citation2011) or logic of arguing (Risse, Citation2000) to confront rationalism.
6. Japan dispatched four personnel to a PKO in Nepal and two personnel to a PKO in Sudan between PKO in East Timor (2002) and Haiti (2010). See Secretariat of International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet office, ‘Nenpyō kara kensaku’, available at: http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_J/result/years.html (accessed 1 April 2013).
7. These figures are calculated by using a search engine. Available at: www.database.yomiuri.co.jp/rekishikan/ (accessed 1 May 2011).
8. Another aim is to dispatch SDF personnel quickly in the case of a natural disaster. See http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/crf/pa/ (accessed 21 April 2013)
9. The Japan Socialist Party was dissolved in 1996 and reconstituted as the Social Democratic Party.
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Kyoko Hatakeyama
Kyoko Hatakeyama is an Assistant Professor at Kansai Gaidai University in Japan and currently teaching International Relations. Prior to this position, she worked as a research analyst at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Her research interests include Japan's security policy and International Relations Theory with a focus on constructivism. Her latest research focuses on Japan's arms trade ban policy and its relations to domestic norms (Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research).