Identity and recognition: remembering and forgetting the post-war in Sino-Japanese relations

Abstract

In the 1990s, Japanese views of China were relatively positive. In the 2000s, however, views of China have deteriorated markedly and China has increasingly come to be seen as ‘anti-Japanese’. How can these developments, which took place despite increased economic interdependence, be understood? One seemingly obvious explanation is the occurrence of ‘anti-Japanese’ incidents in China since the mid-2000s. I suggest that these incidents per se do not fully explain the puzzle. Protests against other countries occasionally occur and may influence public opinion. Nonetheless, the interpretation of such events arguably determines their significance. Demonstrations may be seen as legitimate or spontaneous. If understood as denying recognition of an actor's self-identity, the causes of such incidents are likely to have considerably deeper and more severe consequences than what would otherwise be the case. Through an analysis of Japanese parliamentary debates and newspaper editorials, the paper demonstrates that the Chinese government has come to be seen as denying Japan's self-identity as a peaceful state that has provided China with substantial amounts of official development aid (ODA) during the post-war era. This is mainly because China teaches patriotic education, which is viewed as the root cause of ‘anti-Japanese’ incidents. China, then, is not regarded as ‘anti-Japanese’ merely because of protests against Japan and attacks on Japanese material interests but for denying a key component of Japan's self-image. Moreover, the analysis shows that explicit Chinese statements recognising Japan's self-identity have been highly praised in Japan. The article concludes that if China recognises Japan's self-understanding of its identity as peaceful, Japan is more likely to stick to this identity and act accordingly whereas Chinese denials of it might empower Japanese actors who seek to move away from this identity and ‘normalise’ Japan, for example, by revising the pacifist Article Nine of the Japanese constitution.

Keywords:

• recognition
• identity
• ontological security
• anti-Japanism
• Sino-Japanese relations

Introduction

In the 1990s, Japanese views of China were relatively positive and China was rarely described as ‘anti-Japanese’. This changed dramatically in the 2000s, when the number of respondents in opinion polls who ‘dislike’ or ‘feel no affinity’ with China increased substantially. In addition, since around 2003–2004, China has frequently been described as ‘anti-Japanese’. In the 1990s, China was only mentioned in 8 out of 81 Japanese parliamentary debates in which the word ‘anti-Japan/anti-Japanese’ (han'nichi) appeared. In contrast, between 2000 and 2012, China was discussed in 140 out of 235 such debates. Among 25 books published up until 2002 that mention the word ‘anti-Japan/anti-Japanese’ in their titles none focused on China. Out of a total of 98 such books published since 2003, 40 dealt specifically with China and an additional 15 books focused on China among other states. The same trend can be detected in editorials in Japan's two largest daily newspapers Yomiuri Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun. In the former, only 2 out of 22 editorials in the 1990s mentioning the word ‘anti-Japan/anti-Japanese’ concentrated on China compared to 58 out of 70 published since 2000. In the latter, only 7 out of 38 editorials published in the 1990s discussed China. The corresponding figure for the period from 2000 to 2012 was 65 out of 89. All these indicators, then, point in the same direction – China was hardly mentioned in the discourse on ‘anti-Japanism’ in the 1990s but dominated it completely in the 2000s. It has even reached the point where China is ascribed an ‘anti-Japanese’ identity.

These changes have occurred even though trade, economic interdependence, travelling between the countries and student exchanges have increased tremendously during the 1990s and 2000s (Hagström 2008/09: 226–229; Kokubun 2006; Koo 2009), and despite the fact that Japan has largely accommodated China's rise between 1978 and 2011 (Jerdén and Hagström 2012). Why have Japanese views of China deteriorated to the point that China is even ascribed an ‘anti-Japanese’ identity, despite these positive developments?

One seemingly obvious explanation is that ‘anti-Japanese’ incidents have repeatedly occurred in China. Three cases involving widespread demonstrations against Japan were especially striking due to their large scale: in the spring of 2005 over Japan's bid for a seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), concerning the arrest of the captain of a Chinese fishing boat in disputed waters in autumn 2010 and regarding the Japanese nationalisation of three of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in autumn 2012.

Even though such incidents certainly matter, I suggest that the incidents per se do not fully explain why the Chinese state has become so closely associated with the word ‘anti-Japanese’. In addition, an explanation focused on the incidents per se fails to highlight the deeper implications of the labelling of China as ‘anti-Japanese’. The interpretation of the causes of such protests and related acts need to be taken into account. The mere fact that demonstrations, violent or otherwise, against country A occur in country B does not necessarily need to have a profound impact on bilateral relations. It might be argued that vandals are responsible and that the violence is unrelated to the government of state B. It is also possible that protests in country B may be regarded as provoked by country A. In addition, demonstrations may be considered spontaneous emotional outbursts by a minority while the majority of the population holds less negative views or expresses those views in a nonviolent manner. Either way, the state does not necessarily need to be blamed and even if it is, the meaning and significance of such events remains open to interpretation. Country B does not necessarily need to be ascribed an identity as ‘anti-country A’.

The article suggests that theories about recognition in international politics can help better explain why Japanese views of China have become increasingly negative to the extent that China has even come to be branded as ‘anti-Japanese’ in Japanese discourse. In Japan, China's patriotic education is regarded as the root cause of ‘anti-Japanese’ sentiments, which have exploded in ‘anti-Japanese’ demonstrations. This education is described as ‘anti-Japanese’ and believed to foster ‘anti-Japanese’ sentiments not merely because it contains detailed descriptions of Japanese wartime cruelty but also because it ignores Japan's post-war development as a peaceful state. China has thus come to be seen as ‘anti-Japanese’ not primarily because of protests against Japan and attacks on Japanese material interests, but because it is seen as denying Japan recognition of a key component of its self-identity. Statements by Chinese leaders to the same effect constitute an explicit denial of this identity. The article, then, demonstrates the importance of the collective memory of the post-war period for Japanese identity. Whereas a number of scholars have stressed the importance of Japanese war memory for Japan's international relations (Gustafsson 2011; He 2009; Lind 2008), up until now the way in which the post-war period is remembered has been granted scant attention.

Research on identity and Japan's international relations has been concerned with how identity is constructed, how it changes and how it relates to policy outcomes (for an overview of this literature, see Hagström forthcoming). One influential approach has emphasised the role of Japan's pacifist or ‘anti-militarist’ identity. These studies focus primarily on how domestic identity influences foreign policy. Its proponents regard this identity as relatively stable even though they do not rule out the possibility of a significant change as a result of a major external shock, for example, in the form of a collapse or rupture in the security alliance with the USA (Berger 1998; Katzenstein 1996; Oros 2008). The idea that Japan is now ‘normalising’ is often ascribed to the emergence of new security threats – usually in the form of a rising China and/or a North Korea which is developing nuclear weapons and missile technology.

The second major approach focuses on how Japanese identity is constructed through a process of drawing boundaries in relation to specific ‘others’ (Bukh 2010; Guillaume 2011; Schulze 2013; Tamaki 2010). Boundaries may be drawn in a way that stresses continuity but there may also be change. This article seeks to contribute to the literature on Japan's identity and international relations by applying recognition theory. It thereby offers a conceptualisation of identity change that differs from both approaches discussed above.

The article is structured as follows. First, I outline the article's theoretical approach, which is based on theories of identity and recognition. In short, an identity has to be recognised by others in order for an agent to be able to act confidently. Denial of recognition may therefore result in the abandonment of an identity and the construction of a new one. The second section establishes the importance for Japanese self-identity of the idea that Japan has been peaceful during the post-war period. This might be seen as similar to the approach to the study of Japanese identity discussed above, which emphasises Japan's pacifist or anti-militarist norms. However, while those scholars see a domestically constructed identity as a factor which might influence foreign policy, focusing on recognition means that identity is, to a significant extent, constructed internationally and interactively. This process is significant in itself and not only because the resulting identity is believed to impact foreign policy. In addition, identity is constructed in relation to difference. For example, some identity discourses promoted by Japanese domestic actors who seek to make their preferred vision of Japanese identity dominant construct Japanese identity in relation to contemporary others, for example, China. Significantly, however, in official Japanese discourse, Japan's identity has often been constructed primarily in relation to its past self. External recognition or denial of recognition may strengthen particular identity discourses promoted by domestic actors. The third section shows that many Japanese regard China as denying Japan recognition for its development as a peaceful state during the post-war period. In the fourth part, I examine in greater detail the Japanese government's responses to these denials. The section takes the analysis one step further by demonstrating how the perceived denial of recognition leads to additional effects through actions taken by certain agents. In particular, I argue that the increased ascription of an ‘anti-Japanese’ identity to China is a way of dealing with what is interpreted as Chinese denial of recognition of Japan's self-identity. Japanese identity entrepreneurs have sought to use this window of opportunity to emphasise Japan's identity as democratic in relation to an authoritarian China. Identity entrepreneurs are political actors who promote an identity that they espouse through the discursive representation of certain issues and actors. What sets them apart from other actors is that they do not merely reproduce but also seek to alter identities. In addition, I suggest that Japanese movements in the direction of an identity shift seeking to make Japan a ‘normal’ state are strengthened by Chinese denial of Japan's peaceful identity. Finally, I conclude that China and other states can influence Japanese identity by recognising or denying recognition of particular Japanese stories about what Japan is. Whether or not Japan ‘normalises’ therefore depends in part on which Japanese identity narrative is recognised by other states.

It should be mentioned that the focus of the analysis is on Japanese views. The article does not seek to determine whether or not China really recognises Japan's identity. As long as China is seen as denying Japan recognition of its peaceful identity, Japan's identity as well as Sino-Japanese relations will likely be affected. I also do not analyse Chinese views of whether or not Japan recognises China's identity. Nonetheless, the analysis still sheds light on critical issues in Sino-Japanese relations hitherto largely overlooked.

Identity and recognition

Identity construction is the process through which individuals, collectives and states construct narrative accounts of who they are. These stories tell actors who they are as well as how they are supposed to act. States may, for example, tell stories about themselves being super, great or middle powers (Ringmar 2007: 66–77; 2012: 3–7).

The basic understanding of identity in Ringmar's theory of recognition is similar to that found in ontological security theory as it argues that agents need stable and secure self-identities in order to be able to act in a self-confident way. They hence act in a routine-like manner that seeks to maintain their narrated self-identities. The identities of states may be challenged if it occurs to an actor that its self-identity does not correspond with its actions (Steele 2008). In recognition theory, other actors perform a more central role in prompting such challenges because for an agent to be able to act in a self-confident manner its identity needs to be recognised by others. Continuity in recognition makes agents feel secure in their identities. In other words, it enhances ontological security. ‘To the extent that we are able to achieve recognition for our performance and to the extent that our audience remains loyal, we are able to increasingly take our identities for granted’ (Ringmar 2012: 8).

Recognition is sometimes divided into two types – ‘thin’ and ‘thick’. Thin recognition is about being recognised as a full member of a community. In this sense, it is about identity with other actors. Thick recognition, in contrast, acknowledges difference or uniqueness, for example, in the form of specific qualities (Wendt 2003: 511–512). This article is concerned with the latter kind of recognition. ‘The political representatives of other communities are to “recognise” that upon which a community founds its self-image – the challenges it has overcome in the past, its power to resist authoritarian tendencies, its cultural achievements, and so on’ (Honneth 2012: 29). Mutual recognition, involving two parties recognising each other not merely as equals but as possessing different traits or qualities, can create solidarity and improved relations (Wendt 2003: 511–512). However, such stories will not necessarily be accepted by other states. Others may regard a state's accounts as unreasonable or even hubristic. The audience may, for example, not agree that a state is a great power and instead deny it recognition for the story it tells about itself (Ringmar 2007: 78–83; 2012: 7–8).

Regardless of whether or not it is possible to objectively determine if an actor A denies actor B recognition, it has been argued that it is the subjective feeling of not being recognised or being denied recognition that matters. Identity markers, what we believe makes us what we are, are closely linked to emotions (Lindemann 2010). Denial of recognition may therefore be understood as humiliating and disrespectful (Wolf 2011). What is interpreted as an insult, of course, depends on one's self-identity (Lindemann 2010). For a state, the leaders and people of which see the state as a great power, being called or treated as a middle power will most likely be interpreted as an insult. Needless to say, if this self-identity were that of a middle power the same treatment would not be considered offensive. To this discussion, it might be added that there is a difference between (1) the absence of explicit recognition, (2) explicit recognition, (3) non-explicit acts, behaviour or statements that are interpreted as recognition, (4) non-explicit acts, behaviour or statements that are interpreted as denials of recognition and (5) explicit denials of recognition. An explicit and unequivocal denial arguably matters more and is more likely to provoke a stronger response than, for example, the absence of recognition. Similarly, explicit recognition is likely to be more powerful than non-explicit recognition.

If the stories a state tells about itself are not accepted, Ringmar suggests that three options are available to it. First, it can accept that its stories were inaccurate and that those ascribed to it by others were correct. In that case, it needs to refashion its story about itself and hope that the new narrative is accepted. The second option is for the state to accept that its narrative was incorrect but argue that it can change in order to become what it has claimed that it is. The third option is for it to stick to its stories without altering its behaviour and instead try to convince those who do not believe in the stories that they are actually accurate. Violence, or the threat of violence, may be one way for a state to prove itself. If a state, for example, argues that it is a great power it might attempt to force other states to accept this description through the use of military force (Ringmar 2007: 78–83; 2012: 7–8). This, according to Ringmar, is why Sweden intervened in the Thirty Years War. ‘We act, as it were, in “self defence” in the most basic sense of the word – in defence of the applicability of our selves’ (Ringmar 2007: 83). The struggle for recognition can thus be a cause of international conflict. I suggest a fourth option; in the face of denial of its identity, a state could increasingly construct its identity as different from that of the denying state, while stressing similarity with third parties to which it appeals for support and recognition without admitting that its story was incorrect.

So whose recognition matters? In his book on Sweden's participation in the Thirty Years War, Ringmar suggests that some actors’ recognition matters more than others’ and introduces the concept of ‘circles of recognition’. For the Swedish king at the time of the Thirty Years War, those countries it identified as friends (mainly fellow Protestant countries) formed a circle of recognition. Sweden hence sought recognition primarily from those countries rather than from its Catholic enemies even though it did want a more limited recognition from its enemies, at least as a ‘state worthy of animosity and as an opponent on the battlefield’ (Ringmar 2007: 81, 164–170). Other studies suggest that recognition between adversaries matters to an even greater extent. The Soviet Union, Ringmar suggests, desired recognition from the West (Ringmar 2002). Moreover, the Libyan government's politics of recognition toward the USA, argues Lindemann, for a long time helped to keep the latter from attacking the former (Lindemann 2010). Recognition of an antagonist, then, can function as a form of appeasement that makes one's adversary less likely to engage in antagonistic behaviour.

In addition, context matters. The Europe of the 1620s that Ringmar discusses differed significantly from the contemporary world. In a world in which most states are members of the ‘international community’, this community arguably forms a circle of recognition from which states seek recognition (cf. Murray 2010). This argument notwithstanding, it might be argued that Japan is more concerned with having its self-identity recognised by the USA, a fellow democracy and alliance-partner, than by China, an authoritarian state commonly seen as denying human rights. While this is most probably the case, it does not mean that the Japanese government does not care about Chinese recognition. First, whether China is regarded as a friend or a foe and the extent to and way in which Japan's identity is constructed in relation to China, as well as Japan's relationship with China in general, is likely to be affected by whether China recognises or denies Japan's self-identity. Furthermore, the Japanese government's range of options in bilateral dealings is influenced by its identity as recognised by China. In addition, denial of recognition, especially explicit denials directed toward the international community, might be contagious even when they emanate from actors considered less important.

Japanese self-identity and the post-war

A number of studies have emphasised the significance of Japanese war memory for Japan's international relations (Gustafsson 2011; He 2009; Lind 2008). In contrast, scholars have granted the Japanese collective memory of the post-war period scant attention. Yet, the collective memory of the post-war era has, I argue, come to occupy an important place in the stories Japanese tell about themselves, especially those told by the Japanese government in the international arena. In this section, I demonstrate the centrality of the post-war period in Japanese self-identity by revealing how it appears in official documents as well as in apologies and speeches delivered by Japanese prime ministers. These representations matter for thick recognition as they contain explicit claims about what is particular about Japan. As the 50th and 60th anniversaries of the end of the war, the years 1995 and 2005 have been especially important occasions for making such representations, and they are still highlighted as significant on the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MOFA) website.

Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi's 1995 apology in which he expressed ‘feelings of deep remorse’ and ‘heartfelt apology’ for Japan's ‘colonial rule and aggression’ is well known. Less attention has been given to the sections in the statement that refers to the post-war period: ‘The peace and prosperity of today were built as Japan overcame great difficulty to arise from a devastated land after defeat in the war. That achievement is something of which we are proud, and let me herein express my heartfelt admiration for the wisdom and untiring effort of each and every one of our citizens’ (Murayama 1995).

Prime ministers since Murayama have not only repeated and expressed support for key phrases from his apology but have also further elaborated on and emphasised Japan's positive post-war self-identity as peaceful. Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō, for example, referred to Murayama's statement during a visit to Beijing in 1997, saying that ‘Japan's development was the result of rigorous self-remorse on our past, self-remorse that led us, in the postwar era, to completely abandon the path of becoming a military power and seek to be a pacifist state’ (Hashimoto 1997). Similarly, Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichirō, after visiting the Chinese People's War of Resistance Memorial Hall in Beijing in 2001, quoted the statement's key passages. Significantly, he emphasised that Japan, by ‘squarely facing the past’ was able to ‘prosper as a peaceful state in the post-war’ era, based on ‘self-reflection’, according to which it can ‘never cause another war’ (Koizumi 2001).

When he paraphrased Murayama again in 2005 during the Asian–African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, Koizumi elaborated even further on Japan's post-war achievements: ‘with feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved in mind, Japan has resolutely maintained, consistently since the end of World War II, never turning into a military power but an economic power, its principle of resolving all matters by peaceful means, without recourse to use of force. Japan once again states its resolve to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world in the future as well’ (Koizumi 2005).

The most elaborate official story about Japan's identity as peaceful during the post-war era is probably presented in the leaflet 60 Years: The Path of a Nation Striving for Global Peace, published by MOFA in July 2005. On its first page, it quotes Prime Minister Koizumi's General Policy Speech delivered to the Diet in January 2005: ‘In the post-war period, Japan has become the world's second largest economic power. Never turning into a military power and always observing pacifism, Japan has played an active role in achieving world peace and prosperity by contributing financially, such as through Official Development Assistance and contributions to the UN, and by personnel contributions, such as participation in UN peacekeeping operations’. It then paraphrases the Murayama statement and describes how Japan, following the end of the war, started over as a ‘nation striving for global peace’. The document states: ‘Japan, underpinned by its solid democracy, has resolutely and consistently strived for peace by adhering to a strictly defensive security policy, preventing the escalation of international conflict, and dedicated itself to international peace and stability by mobilizing all its available resources. It has adhered to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. During these 60 years, Japan has never resorted to the use of force’. Furthermore, the pamphlet described Japan as the ‘world's leading donor country’ and showed that 12.6% of Japan's total bilateral official development aid (ODA) has gone to China (MOFA 2005). Clearly, this construction of Japanese identity emphasises uniqueness.

When Prime Minister Abe Shinzō visited China in 2006 he stated in talks with Chinese leaders that Japan ‘shall look at past history squarely and shall continue to conduct itself as a peaceful nation. Japan has come through the 60 years of the postwar period on the basis of the deep remorse over the fact that Japan in the past has caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of the Asian countries’ (Abe 2006). In 2007, Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo made a similar statement in Beijing (Fukuda 2007).

In 2009, MOFA published another pamphlet called Japan and China: Building a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests. Significantly, it featured a section on ‘Japan's pursuit of the path of a peaceful country’, which stated that Japan's ‘progress in the 60 years since the war is grounded on deep regret’, which ‘is shared by the Japanese people’ (MOFA 2009: 2).

Defeat in a war commonly makes an identity change necessary. Since it was unable to defeat the enemy the country was obviously not as great as its citizens may have believed (Ringmar 2012: 8). This was the case for Japan after its defeat in 1945 and this arguably explains the centrality of the post-war period to Japanese identity. Since 1995, Japanese apologies and statements have made increasingly clear references to the post-war period. The need to emphasise that Japan has been peaceful throughout the post-war period would not have been there had it not been for Japan's history as an aggressor. This becomes quite clear in Japanese apologies, which contrast post-war Japan with the wartime ‘other’ as they depict the past as a foreign country. They present the Japanese story of its peaceful post-war and requests recognition for this self-identity.

Recognition and China's amnesia concerning Japan's peaceful post-war

Chinese patriotic education is frequently described as the root cause of partly violent ‘anti-Japanese’ demonstrations, which have taken place in China since the mid-2000s. For example, the Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) Matsubara Jin responded to the 2005 protests against Japan in China during a speech in the Diet by directly connecting what he labelled ‘riots’ (bōdō), to Chinese patriotic education. He showed a Chinese teacher's manual in which teachers were told to ‘stimulate the pupils’ minds and encourage them to harbour a strong resentment toward the assaults by Japanese imperialist aggression against China’. Such sentences, according to Matsubara, appeared in abundance in the manual (Diet session 162, Foreign affairs committee meeting 6, 22 April 2005). A Yomiuri Shimbun editorial discussing the demonstrations blamed the former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin for launching ‘life-long learning’ of ‘anti-Japanese education’ in the mid-1990s and mentioned that his plan for patriotic education laid the foundation for the establishment of more than 200 patriotic education bases. In addition, it claimed that Chinese textbooks feature numerous descriptions that ‘deliberately plant anti-Japanese sentiments’ in Chinese pupils (Yomiuri Shimbun 2005b).

In Diet statements as well as in newspaper editorials, patriotic education is described as problematic partly because it is filled with such detailed depictions of the Japanese military's wartime atrocities. However, the problem with Chinese education is not seen as only related to what it contains but also to what it excludes. China's patriotic education is regarded as ‘anti-Japanese’ because its historical narrative largely ends in 1945. Japan's peaceful development during the post-war period is consequently denied, creating a one-sided image of Japan.

In the Japanese Diet, a number of speakers representing various political parties have expressed similar views. For example, in 2006, Takano Hiroshi of the New Kōmeitō argued that Chinese education was ‘anti-Japanese’ as it devoted considerable space to detailed descriptions of Japanese wartime aggression while not at all mentioning Japan's post-war development as a peaceful nation that has expressed regret concerning the past and provided China with large-scale ODA. He questioned whether it was really possible to build Sino-Japanese friendship on the basis of such education (Diet session 164, Foreign policy and defence committee meeting 22, 13 June 2006).

Around the time of the large-scale protests against Japan in spring 2005, a representative of the Japan Communist Party, Daimon Mikishi, similarly demanded that the Chinese government not only teach young people about Japanese aggression but also about Japanese post-war aid to China (Diet session 162, Investigative committee for international affairs meeting 8, 18 April 2005). Kishimoto Takeshi of the DPJ described Japanese aid to China as something that ought to nurture gratitude. He called for an investigation into what Japanese aid to China had been used for and that the results be disseminated to the Chinese people as this might benefit Sino-Japanese friendship. Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka responded that Beijing's international airport had been built with Japanese aid but that the only acknowledgement of this at the airport was a tiny plate in an inconspicuous place (Diet session 162, Fiscal administration review committee meeting 1, 25 April 2005).

In response to the 2005 protests, the Asahi Shimbun similarly expressed concern about what it described as misrepresentative and biased Chinese depictions of Japan: ‘Through patriotic education, many Chinese repeatedly see the photos and images of the Japanese military's aggression. The other side – the post-war history of the Japan that has a constitution, which forbids the use of force to solve conflicts, does not possess nuclear weapons and has not been engaged in war is practically unknown’ (Asahi Shimbun 2005).

A related point, which is made repeatedly, is that Japanese expressions of contrition and apologies for its past aggression have not been properly recognised. After Japanese diplomatic missions were attacked in spring 2005, Japan demanded that because it had failed to stop the destruction the Chinese government pay reparation costs and issue an apology. Chinese President Hu Jintao refused to apologise and instead insisted that Japan express regret for its past war of aggression. Yomiuri Shimbun criticised Hu, arguing that the claim that Japan has not shown regret is an ‘obvious distortion of history’. The editorial stated that official expressions of regret or apology have been made more than 20 times since the normalisation of bilateral relations in 1972. It pointed out that Koizumi apologised just before his meeting with Hu at the Asia-Africa Summit. Hu, however, called for the expression of ‘regret to be turned into real actions’. The editorial retorted that in that case, China should also put a stop to its own ‘actions’ concerning its ‘patriotic and anti-Japanese education’ (Yomiuri Shimbun 2005a). During a visit to China in May 2005, the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) Takebe Tsutomu explicitly stated that because ‘based on regret, post-war Japan has continued to walk the path of a peace state’ it deserved some recognition (Sankei Shimbun 2005).

The Chinese Foreign Ministry's agreement in the wake of the 2005 demonstrations to initiate a joint bilateral history research project prompted optimism in Japan. In a Diet debate in October 2006, Higashi Junji of the New Kōmeitō, for example, interpreted it as a sign that the Chinese government would teach Chinese children about Japan's post-war development as a peaceful state. The then prime minister, LDP's Abe Shinzō, lamented that China had previously not evaluated Japan's post-war development positively but said that it was significant that it did now (Diet session 165, The lower house budget committee, meeting 4, 10 October 2006). The next day, the New Kōmeitō's Takano Hiroshi explicitly urged Abe to demand that China teach a ‘correct recognition of our country as a peaceful country’ during the post-war era (Diet session 165, The upper house budget committee, meeting 1, 11 October 2006).

These expectations of Chinese recognition were actually realised in 2007–2008 when Sino-Japanese relations temporarily improved. First Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and then President Hu Jintao visited Japan. Significantly, it was not the visits per se that led to improvements in bilateral relations. Instead, it was arguably the fact that during their visits, both leaders recognised Japan's self-identity as a peaceful state during the post-war period that had provided China with ODA. On 13 April 2007, Chinese Prime Minister Wen stated in a speech in the Japanese Diet, which was broadcasted in both Japan and China: ‘The Japanese government and its leaders have on several occasions expressed its attitude towards the history issue, officially recognised its aggression, expressed deep regret and apologies to the victimised countries’ (Wen 2007). The Asahi Shimbun welcomed this clear recognition of Japan's apologies as ‘epoch-making’ (Asahi Shimbun 2007). Wen also mentioned that ‘China has received support and assistance from the Japanese Government and people in its reform, opening-up and modernization drive’ (Wen 2007). The Asahi Shimbun commented that ‘this must be the first time many people in China hear the truth’ about Japan's aid to China (Asahi Shimbun 2007). The Yomiuri Shimbun similarly commented that few Chinese knew about the role that Japanese ODA had played in China's development, for example, in developing important infrastructure in coastal regions. At the same time, it expressed appreciation and mentioned that before Wen's visit, state television screened programs about Japanese life and culture for three weeks. It was speculated that the purpose might be to ‘correct the anti-Japanese education, which had gone too far and to mitigate anti-Japanese sentiments’ (Yomiuri Shimbun 2007).

In the Joint Statement issued by the governments of Japan and China in connection with Chinese President Hu Jintao's meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo on 7 May 2008, China again explicitly recognised Japan's self-identity: ‘The Chinese side expressed its positive evaluation of Japan's consistent pursuit of the path of a peaceful country and Japan's contribution to the peace and stability of the world through peaceful means over more than sixty years since [the Second] World War’ (MOFA 2008). As attempts to improve Sino-Japanese relations, Hu and Wen's visits were especially significant because they involved explicit recognition of Japan's post-war self-identity as a peaceful state. The positive reactions to the statements arguably demonstrate that recognition of the achievements central to Japan's identity can contribute greatly to improved bilateral relations.

However, the optimistic reaction to the visits and the expectations raised by the joint history project eventually abated. In a Diet debate in 2010 when protests against Japan were again occurring in China, the LDP's Hirasawa Katsuei stated that in Chinese war museums such as the one located in Jiandao in Jilin province in Northeast China, the Japanese military was shown torturing Chinese while there was no mention of friendly bilateral relations and Japan's abundant aid to China in the post-war period (Diet session 176, The lower house judicial affairs committee, meeting 2, 22 October 2010).

In autumn 2012, when large-scale and partly violent demonstrations against Japan took place in more than 100 Chinese cities, the previous optimism had completely vanished. China's refusal to recognise Japan's post-war identity was again cited as a fundamental bilateral problem. The Yomiuri Shimbun mentioned that even though Japan had contributed to China's development by providing Yen-loans with generous terms this spirit of cooperation on behalf of Japan was hardly recognised at all in China. On the contrary, ‘anti-Japanese patriotic education’ had been strengthened during the 1990s (Yomiuri Shimbun 2012). The Asahi Shimbun urged the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to stop using ‘anti-Japanism’ (han'nichi) to deal with its many social problems. In addition, it argued that Japan must work hard to guarantee that Chinese people learn about Japan's ‘actual circumstances’, as few Chinese knew about Japan's contributions to China's development through more than 3 trillion Japanese Yen (JPY) in Yen-loans (Asahi Shimbun 2012).

When the Sino-Japanese joint history research project was conducted, the Japanese researchers similarly stressed the post-war period. When the texts written by the historians were ready to be made public, the Chinese side expressed unwillingness to publish the chapters on the post-war era (Kitaoka 2010: 7–13). The Japanese side had hoped that ‘by adding the contemporary period … Japan's assistance to China and Japan's status as a peaceful state would be included’ (Kawashima 2010: 31). Again, this is important as it clearly demonstrates that the problem with Chinese patriotic education is not only regarded as having to do with depictions of Japanese aggression but, more importantly, with Chinese forgetfulness concerning Japan's development and achievements as a peaceful state that provided China with ODA during the post-war era.

The importance of remembering Japan's post-war development is stressed by politicians belonging to various parties, in editorials in the largest newspapers as well as by leading historians. This further demonstrates the centrality of the post-war period to Japanese self-identity. Whereas it has been demonstrated that Japan's war memories are highly disputed (Seaton 2007), consensus concerning the post-war appears to exist among most Japanese. The post-war has provided a positive and relatively uncontroversial memory that serves as a unifying element of a national identity that can be more broadly agreed upon.

While the many examples discussed above concern how China is seen as denying Japan's peaceful post-war identity through education, another incident, which took place following the Japanese nationalisation of three of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, involved a more explicit denial of this identity in the form of a statement by a Chinese senior government official. In September 2012, Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang made the following statement when he met with Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Peter O’Neill: ‘Both China and Papua New Guinea were victims to the Japanese fascist invasion back in the Second World War’. He continued: ‘Japan's position today on the issue of the Diaoyu Islands is an outright denial of the outcomes of victory in the war against fascism and constitutes a grave challenge to the post-war international order. No nation or people who are peace-loving and justice-upholding will tolerate Japan's stance’. O’Neill reportedly replied: ‘Papua New Guinea understands China's position and that Japan's move cannot be accepted by the international community. The international community should work together to defend the post-war world order’ (MOFAPRC 2012). Arguing that Japan's behaviour denied the post-war order and that such actions would not be tolerated by ‘peace-loving’ nations in effect denies Japan's identity as a peaceful nation. This was done in an attempt to appeal to the international community. Li drew a line between the peace-loving international community and Japan, excluding the latter from the former (Gustafsson 2014b). If the international community constitutes a circle of recognition, denial of Japan's identity could arguably spread beyond the bilateral context.

Dealing with the denial of recognition

This section goes one step further in analysing the effects of what is regarded as Chinese denial of Japan's post-war identity as a peaceful state by addressing how the Japanese government has dealt with such perceived denial. Because having one's identity recognised by others is necessary in order to act confidently, doing nothing is not an option. What options are available to Japan in its struggle for recognition within the context of Sino-Japanese relations?

One possibility is for Japan to accept what the Chinese denial suggests – that it does not live up to its self-image – and to work harder to be what it considers itself to be. Such an approach would mean accepting that Japan is not sufficiently peaceful and to try harder. Despite much talk about Japanese ‘normalisation’ and ‘remilitarisation’, Japan has not waged war since 1945 and consequently has arguably been peaceful. To argue that it has not would require an extraordinarily broad definition of ‘peaceful’ that it seems unlikely that the Japanese government will accept.

Another option, in the face of denial of recognition is to attempt to convince the other party that one's stories indeed describe the self accurately. In other words, the actor in question would fight for his or her self-identity, possibly through the use of force. In this particular case, however, Japan requests recognition for its identity as peaceful. It would be an obvious contradiction for Japan to force China to recognise its peaceful identity through violent means.

If force is not an option, how can Japan persuade China that its stories are accurate? Since the mid-2000s, MOFA has tried to convince the Chinese foreign ministry to recognise Japan as peaceful. China did make some concessions, including Wen's speech in the Japanese Diet, which, according to Japanese accounts, recognised Japan's identity for the first time. In addition, MOFA managed to make the Chinese side add some material that emphasises post-war peaceful bilateral relations to Chinese war exhibitions (Gustafsson 2014a). However, there are several indications that this approach might be changing.

To begin with, in response to Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang's explicit denial of Japan's identity in September 2012, Japanese Foreign Minister Gemba Koichirō wrote an opinion piece that was published in the International Herald Tribune to counter the Chinese allegations. In the article, he responded that Japan through its actions in relation to the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute is ‘absolutely not’ trying to deny the post-war international order. He also directly addressed Li's denial of Japan's identity as a peaceful state during the post-war period: ‘Japan is a peace-loving nation and has greatly and consistently contributed to peace and prosperity throughout Asia in the post-war period. This policy, strongly supported by our citizens, is a hallmark of Japan and will never change’. He further stated: ‘In a joint statement between China and Japan issued when President Hu visited Japan in 2008, China itself stated that, “The Chinese side expressed its positive evaluation of Japan's consistent pursuit of the path of a peaceful country and Japan's contribution to the peace and stability of the world through peaceful means over more than 60 years since World War II”’. While it might be seen as an attempt to convince China to recognise Japan's self-identity, there are several factors suggesting that the audience, which Gemba was addressing was not primarily China. To begin with, the article was published in the International Herald Tribune, suggesting that the international community was the primary audience. Moreover, Gemba also criticised China:

As a first step after the war, Japan concluded the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which was signed by 48 other countries, including the United States. The treaty constitutes an important element of the postwar international order, but the Chinese government considers the treaty “illegal and void.” In addition, China enacted a Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1992 that treats the Senkaku Islands as belonging to China, thus trying to unilaterally change the status of the islands defined by the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Which country, Japan or China, negates the postwar international order? (Gemba 2012)

In addition, following Li's statement, the Japanese MOFA began to stress Japan's identity as a peaceful and democratic country in a number of statements and position papers on the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute published in a number of languages (e.g. MOFA 2013).

Following another speech by Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang that similarly denied Japan's identity, delivered in late May 2013 during a visit to the Cecilienhof Palace in Germany where the Potsdam Proclamation was signed in 1945, Japanese Defence Minister Onodera Itsunori made a speech on 1 June 2013 at the Shangri-La Dialogue, an Asian forum on security issues. Onodera responded to what he referred to as criticism that Japan was ‘tilting towards the “right”’ and that it was ‘abandoning its identity as a “pacifist” nation and … attempting to challenge the existing international order’. He described such views as a ‘total misperception’ and stated that the Japanese government stands by expressions of ‘deep remorse and genuine apologies’. Onodera's speech might be regarded as an attempt to convince China and/or others that Japan's self-identity is actually correct. Much of the speech appears to be directed at the South East Asian nations rather than at China. Onodera emphasised cooperation with ASEAN and that Japan shares universal values, such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights with these nations (Onodera 2013). He did not explicitly describe China as not subscribing to these values but it was arguably implied.

Just before his official visit to the USA in February 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō stated in an interview with the Washington Post that as a country under one-party rule, China bases its legitimacy on patriotic education, which in effect involves teaching ‘anti-Japanese’ sentiment. He argued that this education has created a ‘mood and atmosphere’, which undermines China's ‘friendly relationship with Japan’ (Washington Post 2013). Abe, then, depicted the Chinese government's dependence on ‘anti-Japanese’ patriotic education for its legitimacy as the root cause of the bad state of Sino-Japanese relations. This was the first time a Japanese prime minister has criticised China's ‘anti-Japanese’ education in a statement directed at the USA and arguably the international community as a whole.

That Abe made such a statement in an effort to appeal to the international community suggests, along with Onodera's speech, that Japan, or at least its current cabinet, might have given up on attempting to convince China to recognise its peaceful identity. Abe and others seem to regard the Chinese response to Japanese attempts as insufficient. In the absence of the possibility of using force, branding China ‘anti-Japanese’ can be understood as part of an appeal to the international community. It is a way of arguing that China's assertion is incorrect; that the denial of Japan's identity is an inaccurate description that can only be explained by the fact that China is ‘anti-Japanese’. Pleading directly to China is portrayed as impossible because of its hostile and undemocratic identity. Significantly, Abe emphasised Japan's identity as democratic, and that the reason that China teaches ‘anti-Japanese’ education is its authoritarianism. If the rest of the international community accepts Japan's story this might convince China to follow suit. At the same time, such a course of action could be taken to suggest that China should not be accepted as a responsible member of the international community because, unlike democratic states, it irresponsibly relies on negative representations of its neighbour for legitimacy. This might hurt Chinese efforts at being recognised as a responsible power, thereby causing it to strengthen similar appeals to the international community. The result could be a spiral of negative representations of the other before the international audience that might further inhibit mutual recognition. In addition, it is possible to argue that Abe and others are using Chinese denial of Japan's identity as peaceful, which has previously typically been constructed in relation to Japan's past aggressive self, to refashion Japan's identity in a way that constructs it less in relation to its wartime past and to a greater extent in relation to an undemocratic China.

Japan could take the option of refashioning its identity when faced with denial of its peaceful identity even further. The idea that Japan should become a ‘normal’ state has been a political goal for Japanese conservatives for decades. For those pushing this agenda, denial of recognition of Japan's peaceful identity presents an opportunity for identity change. Some proponents of this change describe Japan's post-war identity as excessively peaceful and argue that it has been mistaken and ‘abnormal’. For this reason, they argue that Japan should abandon its ‘mistaken’ pacifism and ‘normalise’ through the revision of the pacifist Article Nine of its constitution and the strengthening of its military (Hagström forthcoming; Kō 2005: 346). For example, the commentator Miyazaki Masahiro has argued that China's ‘anti-Japanism’ (han'nichi) has functioned as an ‘external pressure’ that has given birth to a Japanese ‘healthy nationalism’ that will replace its ‘mistaken pacifism’ (Miyazaki 2005: ix–x, 233–236). Those supporting a revision of the constitution, he maintains, have increased significantly thanks to China's ‘anti-Japanism’ (Miyazaki 2012). Whereas these arguments might partly be characterised as wishful thinking on behalf of advocates of far-reaching identity and foreign policy change, it is clear that significant changes have indeed taken place, including the reinterpretation of Article Nine of the Japanese constitution to allow for collective self-defence (Japan Times 2014). Another commentator has stated that in order to become a ‘normal country’ Japan must stop yielding to China on diplomatic issues such as the Yasukuni Shrine (Komori 2007: 203–207). A Japanese identity shift in the form of such ‘normalisation’, it is suggested, would entail constitutional revision and less consideration for Chinese views. Of course, China might not recognise such an identity. However, a ‘normal’ identity offers more options in the struggle for recognition than does a peaceful one as it can be imposed on others through force. Moreover, the more Japan emphasises its identity as different from China, the less important Chinese recognition becomes.

Conclusion

This article has demonstrated that the Chinese government's patriotic education is viewed as the root cause of ‘anti-Japanese’ incidents in China. The Chinese government has come to be seen as not recognising Japan's identity as a peaceful state during the post-war era. It is regarded as ‘anti-Japanese’ not merely because demonstrations against Japan and attacks on Japanese material interests have taken place. More fundamentally and importantly, China is seen as ‘anti-Japanese’ because it is understood as denying a key component of Japan's self-image. The analysis has also shown that when the Chinese leadership explicitly recognised Japan's identity this move was very positively received within Japan. However, when it explicitly denied Japan's identity, Japanese leaders reacted by criticising China for being undemocratic and even ‘anti-Japanese’. There are clear signs that Japanese identity entrepreneurs who advocate identity change in the form of ‘normalisation’ and challenge Japan's peaceful identity as ‘mistaken’, are attempting to take advantage of Chinese denials of Japan's identity as peaceful.

China (and other countries) can (and do) influence Japanese identity by recognising or denying recognition of specific stories about Japan. The politics of recognition in Sino-Japanese relations can influence the future course of Sino-Japanese relations. The best way for China (and other countries) to make sure that Japan stays peaceful and refrains from ‘normalising’ is to recognise that it has been peaceful during the post-war period. Recognising this identity might also encourage further contrition on behalf of Japan as this identity is often stressed in relation to Japan's aggressive wartime self. In contrast, if China continues to deny Japan recognition for this identity it may very well lead Japan to refashion its identity in relation to a negatively depicted undemocratic China to a greater extent and in relation to its past aggressive self to a lesser extent.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Hans Agné, Linus Hagström, Ulv Hanssen, John Hennessey, Björn Jerdén, Shogo Suzuki, Taku Tamaki and one anonymous reviewer for insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article. A collective expression of gratitude also goes to the participants in the International Security section of the Swedish Political Science Association's annual meeting in Stockholm 2–4 October 2013.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Swedish Research Council [grant number 2012-1150].

Notes on contributors

Karl Gustafsson

Karl Gustafsson is a research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. His doctoral dissertation received the Stockholm University Association's award for best dissertation in the social sciences in 2011. His research interests include alternative approaches to security and issues related to identity and collective memory in international relations. Empirically, his primary research interest is Sino-Japanese relations. He recently published in Asian Perspective and Asian Studies Review.

Notes

1. In one opinion poll, respondents choose three countries they ‘strongly dislike’ (kirai). In July 1989, following the crackdown on Tiananmen Square in Beijing, 30.2% of Japanese respondents expressed ‘strong dislike’ of China. After this, it never exceeded 30% until August 2004 when it reached 31.5%. Around the time of the large-scale demonstrations against Japan in China in May 2005, 43.3% of respondents disliked China and in November 2010, the figure reached 68.8% (Jiji Tsūshinsha 1988–2013). A survey on whether Japanese ‘feel affinity with China’ similarly demonstrated that respondents who ‘do not feel any affinity with China’ have surged from around 50% in 2003 to 63.4% in 2005, and remained high thereafter, hitting 80.6% in October 2012 (Cabinet Office 2012).

2. This is based on an analysis of the results yielded by a search in the database for Japanese parliamentary debates for sessions in which the word ‘anti-Japan/anti-Japanese’ is mentioned. The database is available online: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp.

3. This is based on an analysis of the search results yielded by a search conducted on 18 March 2013 for all books listed in the National Diet Library's catalogue, which mention the word ‘anti-Japan/anti-Japanese’ in their titles. The catalogue is available online: http://ndl.go.jp.

4. This is based on the analysis of the results of a search for editorials in which the word ‘anti-Japan/anti-Japanese’ appeared in the Yomiuri Shimbun's Yomidasu database.

5. This is based on an analysis of all the results of a search in the Asahi Shimbun's Kikuzō database for editorials that mention the word ‘anti-Japan/anti-Japanese’.