The Sino–Japanese territorial dispute and threat perception in power transition

Abstract

A territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has gained a high profile in Sino–Japanese relations. Since the 2012 escalation of the territorial dispute, there is no sign of any de-escalation despite economic interdependence, which previously helped ease the tension. Drawing on the constructivist understanding of threat perception and power transition theory, this article analyzes the way in which the deepening of threat perceptions associated with a perceived regional power transition prevents Japan and China from working beyond their subjective conceptions of justice associated with boarders and history. Since 2012, the Sino–Japanese territorial dispute has increasingly fitted into a larger picture of power-political conflict taking place in a power transition in which both Japan and China aim to return to ‘normality’ by propagating their territorial claims, strengthening their military capabilities, and strategic realignment. To that end, this article first introduces a theoretical framework on the centrality of threat perceptions in power transition. Second, it traces the ways in which Japan and China have developed a threat perception of each other since 1972. The third section deals with the escalation of the Sino–Japanese territorial dispute since 2010 and highlights the deepening of mutual suspicion and threat perception exemplified at the bilateral and multilateral levels. I conclude that the Sino–Japanese territorial debate entered a new stage of normative and power-political competition in earning international support for territorial claims in the East China Sea.

Keywords:

• Power transition
• threat
• constructivism
• Sino–Japanese territorial dispute
• Senkaku/Diaoyu
• strategic realignment

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are a small group of uninhabited isles located in the East China Sea. They are about equidistant (less than 200 km) from Taiwan and from the south-western islands of Japan.

2. In 1972, Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka raised a question about the territorial issue, but Chinese Premier Zhao Enlai suggested setting it aside. Chinese President Deng Xiaoping later said that ‘our generation is not wise enough to find common language on the (Diaoyu/Senkaku) question’ (Suganuma 2000: 138). Although China did not take any action at that time regarding Japan's de facto control of the islands, it has maintained its insistence on sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.

3. Since 1895, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have been used for Japanese economic activities, and at one point about 150 people lived on the islands. After the defeat of Japan by the Allied Powers in 1945, the islands were place under the US control. Even after the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951) that enabled Japan to become independent, the ‘sole administering authority’ over the Nansei Shoto group of islands, including Diaoyu/Senkaku, was granted to the United States. In 1972, all of these islands were returned to Japan, together with Okinawa.

4. This clause was included in the textbook's screening and authorization criteria by the Ministry of Education of Japan.

5. Chinese and Japanese leaders had not met during the Koizumi era. At the end of 2005, high-level contact between Japan and China was completely suspended.

6. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama sought to develop Japan's strategic relationship with China. The DPJ's Secretary-General, Ichiro Ozawa, also made a formal visit to Beijing with about 150 Dietmen delegates. However, both of them stepped down from office after less than 10 months.

7. The total increase in Japan's military budget in 2013 was 0.8 percent, rising to 4.68 trillion yen ($51.7 billion). The Coast Guard budget went up from 1.9 percent to 176.5 billion yen.

8. The United States remains neutral over this territorial issue even though it has been directly involved in the re-construction of the postwar order in East Asia by initiating the Cairo conference (1943) and the San Francisco Peace Conference (1951) and having occupied the Nansei Shoto group of islands (which presumably included the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands) from 1945 to 1972. Toyoshita (2012) and Magosaki (2011, 2012) are skeptical of the US role in the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute. They are both against the dominant discourse that the Japan–US security cooperation should be strengthened because, first, the US will not defend Japan and, second, it is in US interests to maintain tension between Japan and China. Toyoshita criticizes the United States’ ambiguous position over the dispute despite the fact that the Kuba and Taiho Islands used to host a base where the US military could practice aircraft bombing while remaining under US control. His work implies that it is in Japan's interests to work with China rather than with the United States.