Is ‘good enough’ peacebuilding good enough? The potential and pitfalls of the local turn in peacebuilding in Timor-Leste

ABSTRACT

There is a palpable sense of humility within the United Nations and other international institutions regarding peacebuilding. Rather than seeking to implement the liberal peace, they now pursue the more modest goal of ‘good enough’ outcomes. This shift reflects a growing consensus in the critical literature that space needs to be provided for the local agency that will ultimately determine the outcomes of peacebuilding. At first blush this emphasis on local agency is positive; it offers an important correction to the technocratic and generally top-down nature of liberal peacebuilding. But, is the ‘good enough’ approach to peacebuilding good enough? What are the pitfalls and potential of the local turn? This article uses a case study of Timor-Leste to answer these questions. It finds that the local turn can help lend legitimacy to the state and increase opportunities for political participation and the delivery of public goods at the local level. However, the emerging evidence from Timor-Leste also highlights the pitfalls of the local turn. Most significantly, the state can transfer responsibility for public goods provision to the local level in order to lessen the burden on the state and to divert attention from ineffective or illegitimate central institutions.

KEYWORDS:

• Timor-Leste
• peacebuilding
• local turn
• liberal peace

Acknowledgments

This article benefitted from the feedback I received during the ‘Hybridity: History, Power and Scale’ workshop at the Australian National University in December 2015, particularly from Oliver Richmond. I also gratefully acknowledge the Timorese who graciously and patiently helped me during my fieldwork and the financial assistance of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and Research School of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University, and the Australian Research Council Discovery Project DP140102388 ‘The impact of political reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific’.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. As Timor-Leste is a conflict-affected state, all interviews are anonymous to protect the confidentiality of interviewees.

2. In practice they continue to be referred to as suku chiefs.

3. In 2013 each suku leader received a motorbike, a monthly allowance of US$125 for transportation (repairs to the motorbike and fuel costs), US$85 for administration (usually a part-time secretary) and an allowance of US$65.

4. Initially to the value of US$50,000 per suku.

5. For example, a 2008 survey found that, when combating crime and maintaining security, 94 percent of PNTL officer respondents indicated that they seek assistance from suku chiefs, 87 percent from elders and 81 percent from religious associations (Asia Foundation 2008a). See also: interview with a governance advisor, 11 May 2010; interview with an international governance advisor, 13 May 2010.

6. Particularly as the filing fee is $75, yet half of all Timorese live on less than $40 per month.

7. Anecdotal evidence suggests that parties were still active.

Additional information

Funding

Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and Research School of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University; Australian Research Council Discovery Project [Grant Number DP140102388].

Notes on contributors

Joanne Wallis

Joanne Wallis is a senior lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs in the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University. She completed her PhD at the University of Cambridge in 2012, where she was a Poynton Cambridge Australia and Wolfson Commonwealth scholar. Her first book, Constitution Making during State Building, was published by Cambridge University Press in 2014.