ASEAN as the ‘regional conductor’: understanding ASEAN's role in Asia-Pacific order

ABSTRACT

This paper analyses ASEAN's prominence in regional order negotiation and management in Southeast Asia and the Asia-pacific through the lens of social role negotiation. It argues that ASEAN has negotiated legitimate social roles as the ‘primary manager’ in Southeast Asia and the ‘regional conductor’ of the Asia-Pacific order. It develops an English School-inspired role negotiation framework and applies it to three periods: 1954–1975 when ASEAN's ‘primary manager’ role emerged from negotiations with the USA; 1978–1991 when ASEAN's role was strengthened through negotiations with China during the Cambodian conflict; and 1991-present when ASEAN created and expanded the ‘regional conductor’ role. Negotiations during the Cold War established a division of labour where great powers provided security public goods but the great power function of diplomatic leadership was transferred to ASEAN. ASEAN's diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia provided a foundation for creating its ‘regional conductor’ role after the Cold War. ASEAN's ability to sustain its roles depends on maintaining role bargains acceptable to the great powers, an increasingly difficult task due to great power rivalry in the South China Sea.

KEYWORDS:

• ASEAN
• regional order
• social roles
• great powers
• English school

Acknowledgements

This paper is a condensed version of my PhD thesis supervised by Professor Evelyn Goh at Royal Holloway, University of London. I would like to thank Professor Goh, as well as my examiners Dr Jurgen Haacke and Professor Yuen Foong Khong for their excellent guidance, comments and criticisms. I would also like to thank participants at the LSE Southeast Asia Postgraduate Workshop May 2015 and the East Asia Studies Group, University of Warwick March 2016, especially Dr Catherine Jones, for their comments on previous drafts of this paper. The comments from two anonymous reviewers were also extremely helpful. Any remaining shortcomings or errors are my own.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. This conception of ASEAN's role is based on a metaphor of the Asia-Pacific as an ‘orchestra’ where the great powers make up the different sections (brass, woodwind, percussion, strings). They possess the instruments (military hardware, economic and financial resources); it is they that essentially ‘make the music’. The problem of great power rivalry means that the different sections want the orchestra to play their own ‘score’ (vision of regional order) and thus exist in a state of competition. Instead, the ‘conductor’, who does not possess any instrument (lacks material capabilities), steps up to provide a ‘score’ (framework of norms and rules) for the orchestra to play. It is able to do so because it is acknowledged as neutral and competent.

2. ‘Memorandum of conversation by the officer in charge of Thai and Malayan Affairs, 27th May 1954’ Foreign Relations of the US 1952-1954 Vol XII Part 1 Doc 208 and ‘Telegram: The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, 4th June 1954’ ibid Doc 215.

3. ‘Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk, Washington, 20th May /1968’ FRUS 1964-1968 Vol XXVI Doc 367 and ‘Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, Manila, 25th July 1968’ ibid Doc 369.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Robert Yates

Robert Yates is a teaching associate in politics at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol. He completed his PhD at Royal Holloway, University of London and has previously taught at Royal Holloway and Brunel University London. His research focuses on how the analysis of social roles can help us better understand regional order in the Asia-Pacific.