Japan's emerging arms transfer strategy: diversifying to re-centre on the US–Japan alliance

ABSTRACT

Japan's lifting of its arms export ban through the Three Principles on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology has opened up new strategic opportunities for its policy-makers to reinforce existing, and build new, security partnerships. Japan still retains the intent to sustain and develop an indigenous defense production base, now through international collaboration rather than mainly autonomous production, and the leverage this may provide to hedge within and outside the US–Japan alliance framework. However, this paper demonstrates that Japan's principal objective through international arms transfers is very much to use this as a mechanism to strengthen Japan's integration of capabilities into the US–Japan alliance and overall US ‘rebalance’ strategy in East Asia. Japan's main moves in developing an arms transfer strategy have either revolved around US–Japan bilateral projects, or cooperation with US allies and partners. Moreover, Japan's continuing deficiencies in military technology and experience of international collaboration on the government and private sector levels means that its arms transfer strategy remains quite limited in ambition and especially implementation.

KEYWORDS:

• Japan
• arms production
• US
• arms exports
• weapons co-development
• rebalance to Asia

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. In 1967, Prime Minister Satō Eisaku's administration first enunciated restrictions on arms exports to communist states, countries under UN sanctions, and parties to international disputes. In 1976, Prime Minister Miki Takeo's administration ordered restraint in the case of all states, and prohibited the export of weapon-related technology. Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro began to erode this principle by signing an Exchange of Technology Agreement Between Japan and the United States in November 1983. For an exhaustive account of the arms export ban principles, see Morimoto (2011). For Japan's export of dual-use technologies that despite the ban found their way into military usage, see Drifte (1986).

2. The Development Cooperation Charter states that: ‘Japan will avoid any use of development cooperation for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts. In case the armed forces or member of the armed forces in recipient countries are involved in development cooperation for non-military purposes such as public welfare or disaster relief purposes, such cases will be considered on a case-by-case basis in light of their substantive relevance’ (Cabinet Office Japan, 2015).

3. For the Yoshida Doctrine's origins and evolution, see Kōsaka (1968, pp. 47–59), Pyle (1987, pp. 246–249), Green (2001, pp. 14–15), Samuels (2007, pp. 35, 43), Chai (1997, pp. 389–412).

4. JMOD for fiscal 2015–2016 has requested a 2.2 percent increase in the defence budget, which would bring it back to the levels of the late 1990s and mark the largest defence budget in the post-war period (Bōeishō, 2016).

Additional information

Funding

Osaka University.

Notes on contributors

Chris Hughes

Christopher W. Hughes is a professor of Politics and International Studies, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick.