Terrorizing the CPEC: managing transnational militancy in China–Pakistan relations

Abstract

Despite the continuous risk posed by transnational militancy to Chinese interests in Pakistan, China and Pakistan have improved their cooperation on matters of security and economy in recent years. While transnational militancy in a state dyad is known to increase the potential for conflict, it may also spur interstate cooperation on counter-militancy operations under certain conditions. This article examines the sources of the increase in Sino-Pakistani cooperation in fighting transnational militancy. Pakistan was in the early 2000s the country where the Chinese experienced most militant attacks resulting in the cancellation of Chinese projects in Pakistan despite the dyad’s professed all-weather friendship. More than a decade later, the Chinese are back with a prospected $62 billion in investments in the China–Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC). This overarching incentive has altered the challenge of transnational militancy to their mutual relations from a mostly negative, to a more constructive one requiring costly cooperation. In a quest to secure a continuing relationship in a hazardous landscape, the state dyad is attempting to roll out a concerted security strategy involving the army, navy, paramilitary forces and private security companies. A mix of domestic policies of both states, their foreign policies and the nature of threat posed by the militants facilitates this cooperation.

Keywords:

• China–Pakistan relations
• transnational militancy
• responses to terrorism
• violent non-state actors in interstate relations

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to my mentor Magnus Petersson, supervisors Kristian Berg-Harpviken and Øyvind Østerud, Ian Bowers and other colleagues at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, the anonymous referees and the editors of the Pacific Review.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. All numbers are best viewed as estimates.