Abstract
China has started choking off the flow of financial resources entering North Korea by blocking North Korea’s export of natural resources and other industrial products since early 2017. What has pushed Beijing to enforce sanctions strictly, in contrast with its loose administration of sanctions in the past? By employing principal-agent theory, this article shows that Beijing’s conformity to sanctions depends on China’s own need and the degree of pressure from Washington for sanctions enforcement. Until the end of the Obama administration, China did not act meaningfully for sanctions enforcement, as the pressure from Washington was weak and North Korea’s nuclear capabilities remained limited. Now, international contexts have dramatically changed. Beijing feels a need to discipline Pyongyang with sanctions as Pyongyang has become a de facto nuclear weapon state. The new Trump administration in Washington has also pushed Beijing to do more to rein in Pyongyang’s weapon programs.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Inhan Kim (Ph.D., in Political Science from the University of Virginia) is an associate professor of Department of Political Science at the University of Colorado, Colorado Springs. His research interests include security affairs in East Asia, U.S. foreign policy in the region and inter-Korean relations. His research has been published in academic journals including the Washington Quarterly and Journal of Cold War Studies.
Acknowledgment
The author thanks Ed Hoang, In-taek Hyun, Edward Kwon, John M. Owen, and the anonymous reviewers for excellent feedback on earlier drafts.
Notes
1 This study leaves out earlier UN sanctions in 2006 and 2009 because they had neither meaningful punishment against North Korea nor strong enforcement clauses for member states.