Russia’s approach to South China Sea territorial dispute: it’s only business, nothing personal

Abstract

The territorial dispute in the South China Sea (SCS) affecting China and several ASEAN countries has already resulted in drawn-out political tensions in the region. However, one aspect of the dispute is rarely discussed: its influence on Sino-Russian relations and its possible role as a case study in analysing the character of these relations. While Russia moves closer to China in the dispute it still refrains from support of its territorial claims and develops close relations with some of China’s regional opponents such as Vietnam and India. This article describes most recent Russian economic and political activity in the region involving these countries with the aim of clarifying whether the Russian approach to problems in the SCS can be understood as an attempt to balance, bandwagon or hedge against growing Chinese influence, or whether Moscow’s approach is guided by different considerations.

This article concludes that Russia’s approach towards the South China Sea dispute is determined mostly by Moscow’s economic interests and cannot be seen as a case of either balancing or bandwagoning China or hedging against it.

Keywords:

• Russia
• China
• South China Sea
• Indo-Pacific
• bandwagoning
• hedging
• balancing

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 First all the Paracel Islands (1974) and then seven reefs on the Spratly Islands (1988).

2 Moving into the waters around the coast of the Philippines (seizing the Mischief reef in 1995), an attempt to engage in a border dispute with Indonesia and start prospecting for oil on Vanguard Bank shelf claimed by Vietnam.

3 When in May 2012 China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) began working on ultra-deepwater oil rig HS981, the head of the corporation Wang Yilin declared it to be part of China’s “mobile national territory and strategic weapon for promoting the development of the country’s offshore oil industry”. See: CNOOC Begins Deepwater Drilling Offshore China. (2012, May 9). https://www.offshoreenergytoday.com/cnooc-begins-deepwater-drilling-offshore-china/.

4 In any case, under Article 60 (8) of the Convention, artificial islands do not have either territorial waters or economic zones, and in that sense, they simply do not possess the status of islands.

5 See, for example, ASEAN and Russia: A Future-Oriented Multidimensional Strategic Partnership. Report of the ASEAN-Russia Eminent Persons Group. (2016). Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/storage/2016/06/11.-May-2016-ASEAN-Russia-EPG.pdf

Additional information

Funding

This work in the part of Andrey Dikarev was funded through MGIMO University [Project Number 1921-01-02].