Economic statecraft, interdependence, and Sino-Japanese ‘rivalry’

Abstract

China’s increasingly active economic diplomacy in recent years has often been deeply linked to its geostrategic interests. Japan is said to be watching this development with alarm. Analysts have often claimed that this has resulted in Sino-Japanese rivalry, where the Japanese see any gains made by China in zero-sum terms, and make concerted efforts to counter China’s growing influence. This article, however, is critical of such views. While elements of rivalry may indeed be visible in some aspects of Sino-Japanese relations, it would be premature to apply this perspective to economic statecraft, which is inherently multifaceted. This article claims that too much attention has been paid to the strategic aspects of Chinese economic statecraft at the expense of economic/commercial ones that could foster cooperative relations between Beijing and Tokyo. It argues that Japan does not hold a monolithic view that Chinese diplomatic activities in the economic realm are an axiomatic threat to Japanese security interests, and it remains premature to say that Japan and China are ‘rivals’ in the realm of economic statecraft. Future analysis in this area needs to pay greater attention to the complicating effects that economic interdependence can have in strategic policies.

Keywords:

• Economic statecraft
• rivalry
• Sino-Japanese relations
• rise of China
• Japanese foreign policy
• Chinese foreign policy

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 I have (in particular) focussed on the two main conservative and liberal newspapers, the Yomiuri and Asahi. In addition, I have examined Nikkei (Nihon keizai shinbun), which can be considered to represent business interests.

2 For stylistic purposes, I will use the terms ‘economic statecraft’ and ‘economic diplomacy’ interchangeable in this article.

3 For a comprehensive overview of the multiple names given to various aspects of economic statecraft, See Hasegawa (2013: 28—47).

4 This is of course not to imply that other states will not be targeted as part of this strategy. It is merely to suggest that the main target of Beijing’s efforts to limit other states’ influence is more likely to be the US, given the latter’s hegemonic position and the sense of rivalry felt by China towards it.

5 For this point, I am indebted to Yang Jiang and the anonymous reviewer.

6 I am indebted to the anonymous reviewer for this point.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Shogo Suzuki

Shogo Suzuki is senior lecturer at the University of Manchester. His main research areas are Chinese and Japanese foreign policy and diplomatic history, as well as International Relations theory with reference to East Asia. His research has been published in journals such as European Journal of International Relations, International Affairs, and Millennium.