China’s rise, institutional balancing, and (possible) peaceful order transition in the Asia pacific

Abstract

Challenging a popular view that China’s rise will lead the United States and China to fall into the ‘Thucydides trap’—a possible hegemonic war between the two—this paper proposes an ‘institutional peace’ argument, suggesting that the ongoing international order transition will be different from previous order transitions in history. Instead of using military means to change the international order, China and the United States have relied on various institutional balancing strategies to compete with one another for an advantageous position in the future international order. The discussion on the institutional competition between China and the US around the AIIB and the ARF-related multilateral security architecture supports the ‘institutional peace’ argument: institutional competition in the form of institutional balancing strengthens the dynamics and utility of international institutions, encourages states to offer new public goods, and could lead to a more peaceful order transition in the international system. However, this institutional peace argument is constrained by two caveats: the continued validity of the MAD nuclear deterrence and a limited degree of ideological antagonism between the US and China.

Keywords:

• Institutional balancing
• international order transition
• China’s rise
• institutional peace
• peaceful change

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 For critiques on the Thucydides’ trap argument, see Chan (2020); Feng & He (2020).

2 International order is a contested concept in IR. Here, we adopt Henry Kissinger’s definition of international order, emphasizing the two pillars of the order: balance of power and international institutions. See Kissinger (2014, p. 9). For other conceptualizations of international order, see Nye Jr. (2003); Bull (1977); Reus-Smit (2017); Feng & He (2020).

3 Ikenberry recognizes the evolution of the liberal international order from 1.0 to 2.0 and 3.0 and argues that ‘precisely because the crisis of liberal order is a crisis of success, leading and rising states in the system are not seeking to overturn the basic logic of liberal internationalism as a system of open and rule-based order.’ See Ikenberry (2009, p. 84).

4 Other notable works include Lipscy (2017); Daßler et al. (2019); Chan et al. (2021); He et al. (2021).

5 For institutional balancing see He (2009).

6 Without nuclear deterrence, states can certainly use military force to challenge institutional leadership and rules. For example, Japan challenged the authority (rules) of the League of Nations by withdrawing from the League in 1933 after it invaded Manchuria in 1931.

7 The concept of ‘involution’ introduced by anthropologist Clifford Geertz refers to the process by which a group or organization is internally constrained by the existing modes of operation. It will lead to the loss of creativity and competitiveness for this group or organization. One way to avoid involution is to bring in competition from the outside so that this group or organization will have to change the old mode of operation. See Geertz (1963). For applications of this concept in political science, see Lu (2000); Bell (2006).

8 For the debate over China and revisionism, see Johnston (2003); Feng (2009); Chan et al. (2019).

Additional information

Funding

This project is supported by the Australian Research Council (DP210102843). The author would like to thank Hoo Tiang Boon, T.V. Paul, T.J. Pempel, and Bhubhindar Singh as well as other participants for comments and suggestions at the virtual workshop on “Sources of Peace in East Asia,” co-sponsored by the Global Research Network on Peaceful Change (GRENPEC) and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, (NTU), Singapore on 29 January 2021. All errors and omissions are the author’s own.

Notes on contributors

Kai He

Kai He is Professor of International Relations and Director of the Centre for Governance and Public Policy, Griffith University, Australia. He was an Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow (2017-2020). His latest book is Contesting Revisionism: the United States, China, and Transformation of International Order (with Steve Chan, Huiyun Feng, Weixing Hu, Oxford, 2021).