Not our war. What ASEAN governments’ responses to the Ukraine war tell us about Southeast Asia

Abstract

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been widely condemned by governments of the ‘political West’. Most other states have been either neutral or even Russia-leaning in this war. Southeast Asia is no exception. There is a sense in the West that the primary explanation for this reluctance to unambiguously side against Russia is the relationship, perhaps even dependency, that these states may have vis-à-vis Moscow; prima facie, a logical presumption. This article finds that while there is some truth to this claim, the relations between individual governments’ responses to the war and their bilateral relationships with Moscow is too uneven to suffice as a satisfactory explanation. Instead, one must look beyond materialistic, mono-causal explanations. To get the full picture, one must appreciate Southeast Asia’s diplomatic tradition, their form of open and inclusive regionalism and the continued focus on domestic politics. This research provides the first comprehensive empirical categorisation of Southeast Asian responses to the Ukraine war and traces these to ASEAN’s diplomatic culture.

Keywords:

• ASEAN
• diplomacy
• Russia-ASEAN relations
• strategic studies
• Ukraine war

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 ASEAN has “Dialogue Partnerships” with eleven states/organisations of particular importance.

2 Jokowi also invited Ukraine to the G-20.

3 Personal conversations with government and track-two representatives in Hanoi, August 2022.