![Sample our Humanities journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5939/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Humanities.jpg"})
Abstract
Recent empirical work calls into question the so-called “Simple View” that an agent who A's intentionally intends to A. In experimental studies, ordinary speakers frequently assent to claims that, in certain cases, agents who knowingly behave wrongly intentionally bring about the harm they do; yet the speakers tend to deny that it was the intention of those agents to cause the harm. This paper reports two additional studies that at first appear to support the original ones, but argues that in fact, the evidence of all the studies considered is best understood in terms of the Simple View.
Notes
Notes
[1] See also Mele (Citation1989). I defend the opposite view in my (1986, 1991).
[2] Mele and Sverdlik (Citation1996) have criticized a claim of Bratman's along these lines, on the ground that the concept of intentionality does not in itself have an evaluative component. I am disposed to agree, though I find their argument less than fully convincing.
[3] ‘Need not’ rather than ‘must not’, because the SV makes intending to A necessary for A-ing intentionally, not sufficient.
[4] For a related suggestion see Adams and Steadman (Citation2004a, p. 180).
[5] The same idea is proposed by Adams and Steadman (Citation2004b, p. 276).
[6] It is worth adding that the use of the definite article strengthens the invitation, since the phrase ‘the chairman's intention’ could be parsed (somewhat amphibolously) as ‘the intention of the chairman’.
[7] An additional factor was suggested by an editor of this journal: it may be that in each experiment, the subjects presented with both questions tended to assume, since there were two, that different answers were expected, and so were inclined to view the case in such a light. I am inclined to agree. Even so, I think the explanation I have suggested provides a rationale for the contrasting answers.
[8] This suggestion is reinforced by the results of another of Knobe's experiments, which instead of focusing on intentionality and intention, addressed the closely related question of whether the chairman in the two vignettes had harmed (or helped) the environment “in order to” make a profit. Each claim was presented separately to half the subjects, who were then asked to rate the claim on a scale of −3 to +3, with negative numbers indicating “sounds wrong,” and positive “sounds right.” The statement that the chair in the help vignette had helped the environment in order to increase profits was thought to sound wrong, the average rating being −1; that which said the chair in the harm vignette had harmed the environment to increase profits got a “sounds right” rating of +0.6 (Knobe, Citation2004, p. 184). This result is in line with the other experiments described, as should be expected. What leaps to the eye, however, is the relative tepidity of both averages, which suggests that in fact the respondents were not all that happy with either claim. I would be surprised if the same were not true of the subjects in the other experiments also.
[9] For more on the importance of pragmatics for understanding Knobe's results, see Adams and Steadman (Citation2004a,Citationb), to which the discussion here is indebted.
[10] But enough (13%) to indicate that Bentham's suggestion is at least not very far removed from everyday discourse; it appears some ordinary speakers are disposed to treat any foreseen consequence of action as intended in some weaker sense.
[11] The chair might, of course, have a policy of ignoring environmental concern. If so, then the intention to put profit above principle is of long standing, and is only being reaffirmed in the harm vignette.
[12] An earlier version of this paper was presented at the University of Siena in May 2004. I am grateful for the comments received then; also to Christoph Lumer and Robert Audi for helpful discussion, as well as to the referees and editor of this Journal for their advice and comments. Finally, I am especially thankful to Joshua Knobe, first for prompting me to think about these matters again, but much more for his patient assistance with the design and interpretation of the experiments described herein. He is not to be blamed for the interpretation I have given, but it has benefited greatly from his comments and suggestions.