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Abstract
According to the thesis of the extended mind (EM), at least some token cognitive processes extend into the cognizing subject's environment in the sense that they are (partly) composed of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. EM has attracted four ostensibly distinct types of objection. This paper has two goals. First, it argues that these objections all reduce to one basic sort: all the objections can be resolved by the provision of an adequate and properly motivated criterion—or mark—of the cognitive. Second, it provides such a criterion—one made up of four conditions that are sufficient for a process to count as cognitive.
Notes
Notes
[1] In the context of EM, the terms ‘internal’ and ‘external’ have engendered a surprising amount of confusion. Internal processes are ones occurring inside or at the spatial boundary of the organism (typically, the skin). External processes are ones located spatially outside this boundary. EM should not, of course, be understood as the claim that structures and processes entirely external to the cognizing organism could, in certain circumstances, count as cognitive. The claim is that structures and processes external to the organism could, when appropriately coupled with internal cognitive structures and processes, partly constitute cognitive processes. For EM cognitive processes are always either internal or hybrid combinations of internal and external. They are never purely external.
[2] Understood deductively, of course, the argument would be a version of the modus tollendo ponens fallacy.
[3] I am grateful for conversations with Andy Clark for this point.
[4] See, for example, Heidegger (Citation1926).
[5] One should not overlook the deeply mysterious character of the concept of information that lies at the heart of this tradition in cognitive science. Shannon's theory, notoriously, only provides a criterion for when one item carries information about another. It does not say what information is.
[6] Adherence to such conventions might be taken to involve some kind of intentional action on the part of the agent, and therefore also invoke the content of other representational states, merely at one step removed.
[7] In their invocation of non-derived content, A&A sometimes refer to it as ‘intrinsic content’. This is a deeply unfortunate locution, even more misleading that ‘non-derived content’. No content is intrinsic. As Dretske once quipped, one might as well talk of an intrinsic grandmother.
[8] See, for example, Dennett (1987).
[9] Adams and Aizawa (Citation2001).
[10] Marr's theory has also been picked because of its utter familiarity. The rationale for extracting an implicit mark of the cognitive from cognitive-scientific practice is, like Plato's idea of anamnesis, to convince you of something you already (implicitly) know.
[11] My thanks to a conversation with Richard Samuels for this example.
[12] To say that they their owner is an individual is, of course, not to say, necessarily, that this is a person.
[13] In the case of digestive processes, it is undoubtedly possible to draw a distinction between personal and sub-personal processes. But this amounts to nothing more than the distinction between the digestive process as a whole, and its constituent parts. Digestion, as a whole, is something the organism does. The various components of digestion—peristalsis, the release of enzymes, etc—are processes performed by sub-systems of the organism. This is a legitimate distinction, although it may be difficult to apply with precision in particular cases. However, as we shall see, it is not the same as the personal/sub-personal distinction as this applied to cognitive processes.
[14] This sort of claim is defended by McDowell (Citation1994).