How to fake Munchausen's syndrome

Abstract

Sorensen raises the issue of whether it is logically possible to fake Munchausen's syndrome by way of a fictional exchange between a physician and an insurance company. In this paper, it is shown that it is possible to fake Munchausen's syndrome and to fake faking Munchausen's syndrome. The implications of this on deeper philosophical issues such as Lewis’ puzzle of iterated pretence and “internalist” versus “externalist” accounts of faking are discussed. An externalist account of faking is defended and offered as a solution to Lewis’ puzzle as it arises in this context.

Keywords:

• Faking
• Lying
• Munchausen's Syndrome
• Pretense
• Puzzles of Iteration
• Roy Sorenson

Acknowledgements

Thanks go to Jay Newhard and an anonymous referee for their very helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Thanks to Len Olsen for the same and for a helpful discussion on iterated bluffing in poker. I also thank Roy Sorensen for an email correspondence that directed my attention to the connection between the case of the clever patient and Lewis’ puzzle of iterated pretence. Thanks go to Marcus Mitchell for the insight that inspired the case of the clever patient.

Notes

Michael Veber is Associate Professor of Philosophy at East Carolina University.

Notes

[1] Arpaly (2005) disputes this sort of comforting psychiatric slogan and discusses some of the moral implications of Munchausen's syndrome and other mental disorders.

[2] It is worth noting that Radford provides compelling reasons in support of a similar position on iterated knowledge and belief. Ordinary people acquire knowledge of multiply iterated knowledge and belief claims only after being “taken through the analysis” (Radford, 1969, p. 334). Limits are not precisely specifiable but “vary from person to person and from conversation to conversation” (Radford, 1969, p. 335). It should also be noted that the language he uses in articulating this position suggests that his own attitude toward it is something short of full commitment.

[3] In course of the discussion, Daneeka's account of faking illness shifts from focusing on what the subject believes (Sorensen, 2000, p. 204) to emphasizing what the subject's overall evidence indicates (Sorenson, 2000, p. 205). Both views allow that one can fake an illness that he actually has and thus both qualify as “internalist” as the term is being used here.

[4] An alternative reason for the quotation marks is that Nichols is borrowing Leslie's (1994) idiosyncratic notation.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Michael Veber

Michael Veber is Associate Professor of Philosophy at East Carolina University.