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Abstract
Although the concept of HAPPINESS plays a central role in ethics, contemporary philosophers have generally given little attention to providing a robust account of what this concept entails. In a recent paper, Dan Haybron sets out to accomplish two main tasks: the first is to underscore the importance of conducting philosophical inquiry into the concept of HAPPINESS; the second is to defend a particular account of happiness—which he calls the ‘emotional state conception of happiness’—while pointing out weaknesses in the primary competing accounts of happiness, including the hedonistic account. I argue against his claim that the emotional state conception of happiness is superior to the hedonistic conception of happiness. In the course of defending the hedonistic account of happiness against Haybron's attacks, I provide my own explanation for why the study of happiness is important to ethics.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Lacey Sischo, Dan Haybron and three anonymous referees for providing comments on earlier versions of this essay.
Notes
[1] Examples of recent philosophical investigations into happiness include Cahn and Vitrano (Citation2007), Flanagan (Citation2007), Sumner (Citation1996), and Tiberius (Citation2008).
[2] While the primary aim of this essay is to counter some of the key claims made by Haybron in “On being happy or unhappy,” the arguments I offer here in defense of hedonism and against the emotional state conception of happiness are relevant to Haybron's book The pursuit of unhappiness (Citation2008). The account of the emotional state view offered by Haybron in chapters 6 and 7 of the book is basically identical with the account of it given in “On being happy or unhappy.” As Haybron himself says in the preface of his book, “chapters 6 and 7 are based on…‘On being happy or unhappy’” (p. xiii). Furthermore, the primary arguments that Haybron offers against hedonism in chapter 4 are virtually identical to those given in “On being happy or unhappy.” I elaborate on the similarities between “On being happy or unhappy” and The pursuit of unhappiness throughout this essay.
[3] This account of happiness is put forth by, among others, Robert Nozick (Citation1989) and L. W. Sumner (Citation1996).
[4] For a more detailed analysis of Haybron's criticisms of the life-satisfaction theory of happiness, see his article (Citation2005, pp. 291–297), and chapter 5 of The pursuit of unhappiness (2008).
[5] These studies are cited in Haybron (Citation2005, p. 295).
[6] See Haybron (Citation2005, p. 307, footnote 42).
[7] Furthermore, Haybron goes on to explain that being in a mental state makes a “constitutive difference in how happy or unhappy we are” if “one's happiness or unhappiness is augmented or diminished by virtue of being in [that state]” (2005, p. 290).
[8] A similar account of the central/peripheral affective state distinction appears in chapter 7 of The pursuit of unhappiness.
[9] Haybron explicitly acknowledges the close connection between central affective states and moods—as well as between central affective states and emotions—in The pursuit of unhappiness when he says, “we can roughly think of central affective states as equivalent to the class of moods and emotions” (2008, p. 66). For additional information regarding Haybron's understanding of moods, see The pursuit of unhappiness (Citation2008, pp. 127–138).
[10] See Haybron (Citation2008, pp. 61–62).
[11] Haybron's two primary difficulties for hedonism that I discuss here are identical to what he takes to be the two main problems for hedonism in chapter 4 of The pursuit of unhappiness. He discusses the first of these “problems” for hedonism—what I have described as the charge of being psychologically superficial—in the section headed, “4. Intuitive problem two: Psychological superficiality” (Haybron, Citation2008, pp. 65–70). The second “problem”—namely, that hedonism is too inclusive as to what counts as a happiness-constituting state—is discussed under the heading “3. Intuitive problem one: Irrelevant pleasures” (Haybron, Citation2008, pp. 63–65).
[12] This point notwithstanding, I discuss below why I think a strong case can be made for accepting the hedonistic account of happiness.
[13] Another way to interpret this is that Tom merely had more instances of positive moods than did Jerry. But under this interpretation even an advocate of the hedonistic view may conclude that Jerry was happier than Tom. The idea being that while each of Tom's positive moods on an individual basis was similar in intensity to each of Jerry's positive moods, Tom's negative moods were much more profound than Jerry's negative moods. Thus, it might still be the case—under this interpretation—that the net amount of positive affect that Tom experienced was less than the amount that Jerry experienced.
[14] Let us assume for the sake of argument that Roth never reaches the point where getting what he wants begins to lose its positive impact on his affective states.
[15] If experiences are all that matter, we should also reject the view that a happiness-constituting state must include a mood-dispositional component. To see why, recall the Roth case. None of the pleasures that Roth experienced made an impact on his disposition. Even so, in as much as his happy existence was the result of these pleasurable experiences, it seems proper to call these pleasures ‘happiness-constituting’. This is to say that these pleasures clearly made a difference in how happy Roth was.
[16] This type of response to the Thor case was suggested by an anonymous reviewer.
[17] I should mention that in The pursuit of unhappiness, Haybron himself appeals to the “logical possibility” (Citation2008, p. 71) of the lack of a causal connection between disposition and conscious experience to make a point. While the issue he is discussing is admittedly different from mine, I do not see why my current maneuver of appealing to the conceivability of a causal chasm between experiences and dispositions should be deemed as somehow less appropriate than Haybron's.
[18] Carlson and his associates understand the term ‘mood’ in a different sense than Haybron. They are using it as a broad general term that refers to any affective state.
[19] This would follow since all positive and negative affective states (i.e., pleasures and pains) would now constitute central affective states and, hence, moods. Given that all pleasures and pains dispose us to similar affective states and that these subsequent affective states are themselves moods, it follows that all pleasures and pains would be mood-dispositional.
[20] Like Carlson et al., Tamir and Robinson do not distinguish between ‘moods’ and ‘affects’. They use these terms interchangeably.
[21] Studies showing a correlation between negative mood states and negative attention bias include Macleod (1999), Mogg and Bradley (Citation1998), and Williams, Watts, MacLeod, and Matthews (Citation1997).
[22] I allow that there may be rare cases of individuals with extreme psychological abnormalities for whom it is not the case that all positive and negative affective states influence their dispositions to experience similar states in the future. Any such rarities, however, would not undermine the general rule that all positive/negative affective states dispose us towards particular future experiences. Furthermore, it seems that any psychological abnormalities of this nature might also prevent an individual in the midst of one of Haybron's more ‘profound’ psychological states (e.g., “a state of deep contentment”) from being disposed towards particular affective states. Hence, an argument seems necessary for why the prospect of a bizarre psychology is more problematic for my view than for Haybron's.
[23] The view that all affective states possess dispositional qualities are further bolstered by studies indicating that people's judgments are influenced in a mood-congruent manner by affective stimuli that subjects are not aware of (e.g., Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
[24] Since all pleasures and pains have a mood-dispositional component, it follows that all happiness-constituting states under the hedonistic view (i.e., pleasures and pains) have a mood-dispositional component.
[25] See “On being happy or unhappy” (p. 300, footnote 25).
[26] This line of argument was suggested by an anonymous reviewer.
[27] How one assesses this situation will depend upon how long a time period one is using as the basis for the judgment about whether or not the individual eating the meal is happy. As I alluded to earlier, Haybron himself admits that both the emotional state view and hedonism allow that happiness can “be assessed over arbitrarily brief or long periods of time” (2008, p. 109). I would argue here that if we limit the period in question to the time during which the individual is focused on the pleasantness of the meal, a hedonist would be correct in saying that the man was happy. If, however, we are assessing the whole day, then I would think it appropriate to maintain that the man was not happy. The hedonist can account for this by saying that the pleasure experienced during the meal was outweighed by the overall pain experienced during the rest of the day.
[28] An anonymous reviewer pointed out that rather than being a product of pleasure, the increase of cooperative behavior after finding a coin in a slot may be attributable to a sense of guilt experienced by the subject. While this may be so, there are a multitude of other studies (see Isen, Citation1999, p. 526) in which an increase in helpful behavior seems best explained by an increase in positive affect as opposed to factors like guilt, shame, etc. In fact, the empirical evidence for the connection between positive affect and cooperation is so overwhelming that psychologist C.D. Batson has proclaimed that “we know that positive mood increases helping” (Citation1990, p. 90).
Additional information
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Stephen Morris
Stephen Morris is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the College of Staten Island (CUNY).