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Abstract
In the Natural history of religion, Hume attempts to understand the origin of our folk belief in gods and spirits. These investigations are not, however, purely descriptive. Hume demonstrates that ontological commitment to supernatural agents depends on motivated reasoning and illusions of control. These beliefs cannot, then, be reflectively endorsed. This proposal must be taken seriously because it receives support from recent work on our psychological responses to uncertainty. It also compares quite favorably with its main competitors in the cognitive science of religion.
Notes
[1] In what follows, I will use the following abbreviations for Hume's works: “Of superstition and enthusiasm” (Hume, Citation1987) as S&E; “Dialogues concerning natural religion” (Hume, Citation1998a) as DNR; “Letter to Elliot” (Hume, Citation1998b) as LE; Natural history of religion (Hume, Citation1998c) as NHR; A treatise of human nature (Hume, Citation2002) as T; and the Selby-Bigge edition of A treatise of human nature (Hume, Citation1978) as SBN.
[2] Indeed, cognitive scientists of religion have thrown a good deal of light on this traditional topic. They have carefully documented the extent to which commitment to supernatural agents, for example, permeates contemporary religious rituals (McCauley & Lawson, Citation2002) and petitionary prayers (Barrett, Citation2002). They have also conducted laboratory experiments which reveal that those who officially believe that anthropomorphism is “theologically incorrect” nevertheless engage in this type of reasoning when performing on-line tasks (Barrett & Keil, Citation1996, p. 242). Subjects in these experiments reported that God would answer one prayer before another, even though this is inconsistent with their explicit beliefs about God's unchanging nature.
[3] This is not to say that the emotions are considered irrelevant in the cognitive science of religion. The passions play a “minimal role” in the epidemiology of belief in supernatural agents, but they have a prominent place in explanations of religious ritual (Cohen, Lanman, McCauley, & Whitehouse, Citation2008, p. 113; McCauley & Cohen, Citation2010, p. 781).
[4] The “Mickey Mouse problem” was initially discussed by Boyer as a possible objection to his account (Boyer, Citation2000, p. 202; Citation2001, p. 136). It was subsequently discussed by Atran and others (Atran, Citation2002, p. 14; Bulbulia, Citation2004, pp. 662–663). Atran objects to cognitive theories of religion on the grounds that they cannot explain why some counterintuitive agents (Zeus, Vishnu) become the objects of devotion, worship, and sacrifice, whereas other counterintuitive agents (Mickey Mouse) do not. Gods and spirits are culturally transmitted, according to Atran, because they help to resolve existential anxieties about death and deception (Atran, Citation2006, p. 186; Atran & Norenzayan, Citation2004, pp. 726–728). This emphasis on the passionate motivators of religious belief lands Atran and his colleagues squarely in the Humean camp.